









    Energy Transitions: The Case of South African Electric 
Security. 
      Melani Van der Merwe 
    VMRMEL003 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Public Law
University of Cape Town
August 2017
Supervisor: Professor Clifford Shearing
           (University of Cape Town) 
         Co-supervisor: Professor Jan Froestad 
         (University of Bergen) 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











I, Melani Van der Merwe, hereby declare that the work on which this thesis is based 
is my original work (except where acknowledgements indicate otherwise) and that 
neither the whole work nor any part of it has been, is being, or is to be submitted for 
another degree in this or any other university. I authorise the University to reproduce 
for the purpose of research either the whole or any portion of the contents in any 
manner whatsoever. 
Signature     Date: 15/08/2017 
Signature Removed
Table of Contents: 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………...…………..i 
Abstracts………………………………………………………......…………………...ii 
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………….…………………iv 
List of Tables and Figures……………………………………….………..…………..vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………….………….……………………………1 
1.1 Background…………………….…………….……………………………2 
1.2 Introducing the Context………..……………………………….………….8 
1.2.1 The Centralised Procurement of Renewable Electricity….......…8 
1.2.2 Local Level, Decentralised Sustainable Electricity 
Developments……………………………………………….…………9 
1.3 Outline………………………………………………………..…..………11 
Chapter 2: A Theoretical Understanding of Agency in the 
Niche Environment……………………………………………………..…………..14 
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………..…..……14 
2.2 Key Concepts of Regime Change in the Multi-Level Perspective on Socio-
Technical Transitions………………………………………………….……..15 
2.2.1 The Regime…………………………………………….………16 
2.2.1.1 Regime Dynamics and Interaction…….…………..…18 
2.2.1.2 Core Alliances within the Regime………….……..…19 
2.2.2 Tenacity of the Regime……………………………….…..……20 
2.2 The Socio-Technical Niche……………………………….……………...21 
2.3 The Socio- Technical Landscape……………………….………………..22 
2.4 Pathways of Transition………………………………….….………….…23 
2.4.1 Transformation…………………………………..……………..23 
2.4.2 Reconfiguration…………………………………..…………….24 
2.4.3 Technological substitution……………………….…………….24 
2.4.4 De-alignment and Re-alignment………………….……………25 
2.5 The Role of Agency in Different Transitional Pathways in the Multi-Level 
Perspective……………………………………………………….…………..25 
2.5.1 Strategic Games…………………………………….………….26 
2.5.2 Agency and Field-level Trajectories……………….…………..27 
2.5.3 Reformulation of the Multi-level Perspective’s Conception of 
Transitional Pathways ……………………………………………….27 
2.6 Actors, Networks, and the Co-evolution of Socio-technical 
Systems………………………………………………………………………29 
2.7 Agency in the Niche: Key Questions and Debates………………………30 
2.7.1 The Categorisation of Actors in the Socio-technical 
Environment………………………………………………………….30 
2.7.1.1Regime Membership………………………………….31 
2.7.1.2 Types of Actors………………………………………31 
2.7.2 The Categorisation of Developmental Trajectories within the 
Niche…………………………………………………………………34 
2.7.2.1Types of Niches and their developmental 
trajectories................................................................................34 
2.7.2.2 Properties of Niches………………………………….36 
2.7.3 Power and Agency in the Niche…………………………….….37 
2.7.3.1 Agency in Policy……………………………………..37 
2.7.3.2 Agency in Action………………………………...…..40 
2.7.3.3 Agency in Discourse …………………………….…..41 
2.7.3.4 Agency in Networks and Resources…………….……42 
2.7.4 Directionalities of Agency……………………………………..47 
2.7.5 The Relationship between Power-Giving and Power-Taking in 
the Niche Environment……………..………………………………...49 
2.8 Conclusion………………………………………………………………..52 
Chapter 3: Methodology…………………………………………………………....56 
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………56 
3.2 Methodological Foundations……………………………………………………..57 
3.2.1 Qualitative Research………………………………………………...…57 
3.2.2 Knowledge Claims and Theoretical Perspectives and General 
Reasoning…………………………………………………………………….59 
3.3 Strategies of Inquiry…………………………………………………………...…61 
3.3.1 Adaptive Theory…………………………………………………..……61 
3.3.2 Collective Case study…………………………………………………..63 
3.4 Sampling………………………………………………………………………....64 
3.4.1Theoretical Sampling……………………………………………...……64 
3.4.2 Selecting case studies…………………………………………………..67 
3.4.3 Selecting Participants………………………………………………..…71 
3.5 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis…………………………………….…73 
3.5.1. In-Depth Interviewing………………………………………………....73 
3.5.1.1 The Process of Interviews Throughout ………………….…..74 
3.5.1.2 Structure of the Interview and Questions………………….…75 
3.5.2 Documentary Analysis…………………………………………………78 
3.5.3 Observations……………………………………………………………79 
3.5.4 Data Analysis an Interpretation ………………………………………..80 
3.5.4.1 Initial Data Sorting, Concept Formation and Nvivo……...….80 
3.5.4.2 Data Analysis and Coding………………………………...….81 
3.5.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...83 
Chapter 4: Contextualising the Case Studies……………………………………..86 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………86 
4.2 Historical Development of the South African Electricity Sector……….. 87 
4.2.1 From Escom to Eskom………………………………………....88 
4.2.2 The Minerals-energy Complex……………………………..…..93 
4.2.3 The Politics of Electricity in South Africa……………………..95 
4.2.4 Electricity policy - toward the inclusion of alternative energy 
technologies……………………………………………………….….97 
4.3 Procurement of Electricity from Independent Power 
Producers………............................................................................................100 
4.3.1 The Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Procurement Programme……………………………………………104 
4.4 Non-utility Scale Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: the Case of 
the Western Cape…………………………………………………………...106 
4.4.1 Renewable Energy at Provincial Level……………………….106 
4.4.2 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency at City and Municipal 
Level………………………………………………………………...110 
4.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………....111 
Chapter 5: The Case of the REIPPPP…………………………………………....112 
5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………..……112 
5.1.1 The Interpretation of Policy……………………………….….113 
5.1.2 The Unforeseen Circumstances of Changing the System…….114 
5.2 The Placement of the Programme……………………………………....119 
5.2.1. Alignment along Social Objectives………………………….120 
5.2.2 The Alignment of Actors along Economic Objectives…….…122 
5.2.3 Spill-overs of Agency…………………………………...……125 
5.2.4 The relevance of alignment in the case of the REIPPPP……..127 
5.3 Discussion……………………………………………………………....130 
5.3.1 Power and Agency within the Niche……………………….…130 
5.3.1.1 The Misalignment of Core Regime Members………131 
5.3.1.2 The Alignment of Actors in Fit-and-Conform 
niches………………………………………………………..134 
5.3.2 Developmental Trajectories within the Niche……………………...…135 
5.3.3 Steering Actors and the three Core Processes of the Niche…………..138 
5.3.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….139 
Chapter 6: The Steering of Decentralised Electricity Development……………142 
6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………….….142 
6.2. The Green Ideology………………………………………………….…143 
6.3 Western Cape Government Facilitating Institutional Change…………..145 
6.3.1 Testing Phase……………………………………………….....147 
6.3.2 Consolidation Phase…………………………………………..149 
6.4 Monitoring and Evaluation Toward the Alteration of Regulations……..153 
6.4.1 Quantification and Measurement…………………………..…155 
6.4.2 Reporting……………………………………………………...158 
6.4.3 Target Setting and Lobbying for National Regulatory 
Changes…………………………………………………………..…159 
6.5. Discussion…………………………………………………………...…160 
6.5.1 Power and Agency within the Niche…………………………160 
6.5.1.1 Agency in Discourse……………………………..…161 
6.5.1.2 Stretch-and-Transform Empowerment…………..….161 
6.5.2 Developmental Trajectories within the Niche……………...…165 
6.5.3.1 Steering Actors Contributing to the Properties of the 
Niche……………………………………………………..…165 
6.5.2.2 The Articulation of Selection Pressure……………..166 
6.5.2.3 Regime Membership………………………………..167 
6.5.2.4 The Importance of Field-level Rules ………………168 
6.5.3 Steering Actors and the Three Core Processes of the Niche….169 
6.5.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………….171 
Chapter 7: Power-Taking in the Niche…………………………………………..174 
7.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..174 
7.2 The Problem with the Privatisation of Electricity……………………....174 
7.3. Hybrid Intermediaries: the Case of GreenCape………………………..177 
7.3.1 Institutional Structure…………………………………………178 
7.3.2 GreenCape as Problem Solvers ………………………………179 
7.4 Small-scale Embedded Generation, Energy Services and Large-scale 
Renewable Energy in the Western Cape…………………………………....180 
7.4.1 Small-scale Embedded Generation……………………..…….180 
7.4.2 Finance………………………………………………………..184 
7.4.3 Manufacturing……………………………………………..….187 
7.4.4 Energy Services, New Business Models and Sustainable 
Thinking…………………………………………………………….189 
7.5 Discussion…………………………………………………………..…..192 
7.5.1 Power And Agency in the Niche…………………………..….192 
7.5.1.1The Coordination of Resources……………………...192 
7.5.1.2 The Transference of Rules………………………….194 
7.5.1.3 Rowing and Monitoring………………………...…..195 
7.5.2 Developmental Trajectories of the Niche………………….….196 
7.5.2.1 Innovation Deviating from the Rules of the 
Niche…………………………………………………..……196 
7.5.2.2 Rowing and Framing in the Niche………………….197 
7.5.2.3 Positive Externalities of the Niche……………...…..200 
7.5.2.4 Rowing and the Three Core Processes of the 
Niche……………………………………………………..…204 
7.5.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………….206 
Chapter 8: Conclusions on Niche Governance…………………………………..210 
8.1 Review and Background……………………………………………..…210 
8.2 Emerging Themes from the Research…………………………………..212 
8.2.1The Deterioration of the Dominant Regime……………….…..212 
8.2.2 The Interaction Between the Niche and the Regime………….213 
8.2.3 Actor Proximity to the Regime……………………………….214 
8.2.4 Steering Governance Practices……………………………….214 
8.2.5 Rowing Governance Practices………………………………..216 
8.2.6 The Importance of Framing…………………………………..217 
8.2.7 The Formulation Developmental Trajectories………………..218 
8.3 Theoretical Insights……………………………………………………..219 
8.3.1 Deterioration of the dominant regime…………………..…….219 
8.3.2 Niche Regime Interactions: the Creation of Boundaries……..220 
8.3.3 Actor Proximity to the Regime and the categorisation of 
actors……………………………….……………………………….221 
8.3.4 Steering and Rowing in the Niche: the exertion of 
power…………………………………..……………………………222 
8.3.5 The Importance of Framing…………………………………..224 
8.3.6 Developmental Trajectories ……………………………….…224 
8.4 Areas for Future Enquiry……………………………………………….225 
8.5 Final Remarks………………………………………………………..…227 
Reference List………………………………………………………………………230 
Appendix 1 Actor Categories……………………………………………………....243 
i	
Acknowledgements	
I stand in awe of a God that has not only given me the intellectual ability to come this 
far, but allowed me a life in which I could pursue these talents.  
To my family, my parents Louis and Henriette Van der Merwe and my sister, Leandi 
Moore, I dedicate this thesis. Through your guidance and love I was able to weather 
the storms and enjoy the ride. From your example, I have learnt what hard work 
means, and that dedication and perseverance pays off. You have cultivated my mind 
and inspired my academic pursuits, and for this, I will be eternally grateful to you. 
Secondly, I am tremendously grateful to my non-biological family. To my main 
supervisor, Professor Clifford Shearing, who believed in me when I had trouble 
believing in myself: you have become a mentor and a friend, truly a great hand in my 
life. For your dedication and guidance, I am tremendously thankful. To my friends 
and my wonderful partner, Mark, who were always understanding, supporting and 
interested in the process and my progress, thank you for your unwavering support. 
I would like to make mention of the incredible community at the University of Cape 
Town, and thank especially the people of the Institute for Safety Governance and 
Criminology (SafGo) and the Global Risk Governance Programme. A special thanks 
to Elaine Atkins, without whom this process would not have succeeded. Thank you 
for listening to my complaints, always being ready with advice, coffee and a biscuit 
and always doing your utmost to help along the way.  Also to Professor Jan Froestad, 
my co-supervisor, and the entire SANCOOP team, thank you for your invaluable 
insights and all of the support that I got from you along the way. 
Lastly, I would like to thank the National Research Fund and SafGo for the funding 
without which I would not have been able to complete this research, and my 
interviewees who selflessly sacrificed so much of their time for my thesis. 
ii	
Abstract:	
Modern civilizations have evolved to be highly dependent on electrical energy. The 
exponentially growing renewables market has signaled transitions in electricity 
sectors that have traditionally been dominated by fossil fuel electricity. Various 
theoretical debates have recently emerged surrounding the processes of socio- 
technical transition, focusing on the pathways of transition, the levers for radical 
change and path-dependencies within these systems. The Multi-Level Perspective on 
Socio-technical Transitions is one such theory. This perspective views socio-technical 
change as a factor of interdependent shifts between three analytical levels observed 
within the system: the socio-technical regime, the socio-technical niche and the 
landscape. In accordance with this theory, radical change is generally observed as 
originating at niche level. Irregularities within the dominant regime and landscape 
pressures allow for niche innovations to break through into the dominant regime in 
processes of socio-technical transition. 
Toward understanding actor influences on energy transitions, considerable attention 
has been paid to actor’s impact on governance processes through: patterns of 
consumption, the shaping of legislation and technical innovations, by socio-technical 
transitions theories. However less attention has been paid to the ways in which actors 
in renewable electricity markets are: forming networks toward the establishment of 
new regimes and governing processes at niche level, and consequently how actor 
governance has impacted the established perceptions and available pathways for 
realizing electric security. 
This thesis, builds on the Multi-Level Perspective, through an exploration of how 
actors govern socio-technical systems at niche level, paying careful attention to the 
modalities of power giving and power taking that allow for the development of 
networks of people and things toward the stabilization of novel socio-technical 
practices, innovations and developmental trajectories. It does this through a 
networked analysis of how different actors with different interests cooperate to open 
up innovative social and technological pathways. 
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Modern civilisations are highly dependent on electrical security. The way in which we 
consume the earth through forms of energy has become a central characteristic of 
humanness. As such, we have not only manipulated earth systems to enable the 
fulfilment of our needs, we have also created needs that, should they not be met, place 
the future of human life as we know it in jeopardy. The problem of electrical security 
should thus be viewed as a problem of human security. 
The word ‘technology’ in laymen’s terms denotes gizmos and gadgets and human 
inventions that have become useful. In this common conception of useful artefacts, it 
might be easy to forget the human and social underpinnings that make them so. 
Technology would not be technology if not for the human aspect thereof. We made it 
and we found it useful. More importantly, it works. By this I do not mean that it lights 
up when it’s supposed to or spins in the right direction, as many a forgotten gizmo 
that technically ‘works’ has found itself abandoned. Rather, it adds value to our social 
lives, be it financial, physical or otherwise because it fits into our world. Lewis 
Mumford expresses quite accurately this interconnection between humans and 
technology, and the extent of humanness that becomes technology: 
 Our age has not yet come to terms with the peculiar utilitarian bias that 
regards technical invention as primary and aesthetic expression and 
secondary or superfluous; and this means that we have still to acknowledge 
that technics drives from the whole man, in his intercourse with every part of 
the environment, utilizing every aptitude in himself to make the most of his 
own biological and ecological potentials (Mumford, 1966: 309). 
Artefacts and technologies do not produce societal functions on their own but rather 
are part of networks in interlinked elements that achieve these outcomes together. In a 
system with social and technical aspects such as energy production or transport, these 
clusters of elements are referred to as socio-technical systems (Geels, 2005b). 
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Socio-technical systems do not only produce ‘good’ societal outcomes. In fact, the 
negative externalities produced by these systems pose a mammoth risk to the survival 
of the human and the ecological systems that underpin human life. This thesis is 
contextualised by the need to transition socio-technical systems, such as energy, in 
such a way that it contributes to human and non-human security rather than 
diminishing it. This thesis studies the occurrences and peculiarities of socio-technical 
transitions by considering some of the incidences of change that have emerged in the 
electricity system of South Africa.   
1.1 Background 
The governance of energy holds significant implications for the organisation of 
society. Humans have learnt to harness the natural world that they are a part of and in 
so doing transformed both themselves and the natural world.  We, as humans, have 
developed a ‘carbon metabolism’ that has formed the basis for certain habitual 
patterns of life; it is part of what defines us in the modern world and it delineates what 
we could and should do with the natural resources at our disposal (Urry, 2014: 6). We 
are essentially trapped by our intensive need for energy, and by the efficiencies that 
energy as a commodity has provided us.  The ways in which we have been consuming 
the planet, together with our ability to efficiently develop has led to a globally 
interconnected world. This in turn has led to new risks and new harms. Processes such 
as climate change, the spread of disease and market fluctuations now challenge the 
way that we conceptualise the world. These shifts do not take place in a linear or 
scale–bound manner, rather, they involve complex systems that interact at different 
levels with one another. This has had a pronounced effect on scientific inquiry into 
society and politics (Duit & Galaz, 2008: 311).  
Energy governance is troubling for social scientists because energy’s path-dependent 
nature is not subject to simple human intervention (Urry, 2014: 3). Globally, most 
electricity markets evolved within a vertically integrated monopoly that had control 
over generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply of electricity (Joskow, 
2008: 10). The decentralisation of these systems through the adoption of new 
technologies and through the allowance for new producers and new ways of 
consumption, results in new active participants in the outcomes of these systems. 
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Various efforts at sustainable change have been implemented at different scales in a 
growing number of countries in the world. For developing nations like South Africa, 
the implementation of these efforts take place within a development focussed context 
where policy-makers and sustainability advocates have to contend, not only with the 
historical relevance of an existing centralised system, but also with socio-economic 
and socio-political issues that shape social and technical systems.  
Socio-technical systems can change or transition when the outcomes of these systems 
produce enough negative externalities or problems for the societies in which they 
exist. Because of the embedded nature of these systems in the social world, the 
occupants of socio-technical systems, especially those that benefit from or contribute 
to the outcomes of these systems, often become blind to the negative externalities 
produced by the systems. A pre-requisite for systems change is thus the recognition of 
an outcome of the system as a problem by the occupants of the system and the 
availability of a possible solution to the problem.  
Within systems such as electricity, the advocates of change, or the actors that have 
observed the negative externalities of existing regimes are constantly contesting the 
social and economic trade-offs that go hand in hand with sustainable transitions. One 
example of such a trade-off in the electricity context is promotion of further 
concentrations of wealth and the consequent growing inequality between the wealthy 
system occupants that can afford alternative methods of electricity and the low-
income groups that cannot. This contestation between global ideals of sustainability 
and different local ideals gives sustainable transitions its inherent political 
characteristic (Raven et al., 2016: 102). What is more, these social, political and 
economic trade-offs are amplified in the developing world because of the intensity of 
existing social, political and economic issues in these contexts. 
Change in systems demands fundamentally altering components of a system or a 
structure within a system that leads the system to behave in an unacceptable manner. 
In a complex system such as electricity, these components and structures are not only 
currently complicated by the political struggles of sustainability advocates but are also 
embedded in layered networks of cause and effect that are the result of historical 
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occurrences. These systems are made up of historically embedded rules and their 
outcomes are generated through these rules around their social, political and physical 
contents. Thus isolating a particular problematic system component or structure and 
changing this component or structure is impossible without sending a ripple effect 
throughout the entire system. 
Over the past decade, debates around change in complex systems have emerged in 
various forms. In the field of socio-technical transitions, there have been ground-
breaking reorientations that move away from a linear conception of system change 
toward an appreciation of the increasing complexity of these systems, taking account 
of the multi-layered aspects of the system that function in a non-linear fashion to 
produce system outcomes and system change.  
One such reorientation is captured in the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) on Socio-
Technical Transitions. For this thesis this perspective was chosen and built upon 
because it embraces the complexity of sustainable systems change and views the 
problems created for human security by the functioning of socio-technical systems as 
a defining factor in socio-technical transition in the modern day (Geels, 2010: 495). 
This perspective views the evolution of socio-technical systems as change 
occurrences on three inter-related analytical levels: the regime, landscape and the 
niche.  
The regime is understood as the relatively stable sets of rules that originated out of the 
action and occurrences that shape and reshape the system. These rules generally 
undergo cycles of incremental adjustment rather than radical sporadic change. The 
recurrence of action along specific developmental trajectories of the regime creates 
stability within the regime and makes it difficult to counteract the path-dependent 
rules of the system resulting in system lock-ins. The landscape level is the physical 
context that structures the socio-technical system. It encompasses those realities 
surrounding a socio-technical regime that are difficult to change, for example the 
availability of coal in an electricity system. The niche level is the incubation room(s) 
where radical innovation emerges. The MLP considers three core niche processes: the 
articulation and adjustment of expectations, the formulation of social networks and 
the processes of further articulation and learning (Geels, 2005a, 2010b; Geels & 
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Schot, 2007). If one considers the regime as a stable set of rules that historically guide 
action, then the niche can be considered as the primary location for the formation of 
new rules.  
The re-orientation of the analysis of complex socio-technical systems was primed by 
a noticeable shift in the nature of socio-technical system change in the world. There is 
a clear shift away from centralised command control governance modalities toward a 
noticeable dispersion of power and agency between actors, around artefacts within the 
system and within the physical context in which the system functions (Smith, Stirling 
and Berkhout, 2005). Globally, one of the prominent factors in this type of change has 
been the political awakening to the risks posed to humans and non-humans by climate 
change. Much of this relates to human dependence on fossil fuel sources of energy 
that produce high levels of carbon dioxide emissions and irreversible damage to the 
environment. Socio-technical transitions to sustainability demand not only new 
technologies but also critical changes to the ways that markets for these technologies 
function.  
Scholars of socio-technical transitions have used the notion of protective spaces, or 
niches, to study how innovations and radical system changes emerge. Raven, Kern, 
Smith, Jacobsson and Verhees have summarised three different ways in which 
protective spaces have been conceived of in the literature (2016: 103). The first 
perspective captured in the evolutionary understandings of innovation and socio-
technical transition argues that incumbent selection pressures impede path-breaking 
innovation and therefore, radical innovations require temporal protection from these 
forces, which are primarily made up of a collection of shielding forces.  
The second is the relational perspective, which centres around actor-networks and 
analyses ways in which actors themselves draw the boundaries for development. 
According to the relational perspective, protective spaces are constituted by the 
dynamic interactions between actors, network flows, artefacts and the contestation 
that emerge from these interactions. In this perspective, the boundaries of the 
protected space easily become blurred. Thirdly, institutional perspectives highlight the 
process through which institutions are constructed relative to socio-technical 
transition. In line with this perspective, protected spaces are constituted by alternative 
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framings and institutional arrangements that are required for the development and 
implementation of alternative technologies.  
The MLP argues that change occurs at system level once a niche is stable enough to 
break through into the dominant regime, once the niche-level practices are able to 
consolidate and progress in a manner that challenges the wider institutional setting of 
the regime. Such an analytical framework is best captured as a combination of the 
evolutionary and the institutional perspective because the emphasis is placed on the 
shifting institutional arrangements in the system during transition. I argue that these 
three perspectives do not necessarily contradict one another and that the groundwork 
done by the MLP can be elaborated on by considering interactions at niche level from 
a relational perspective. 
Very few studies have considered how these protective spaces are constructed and 
there has been an outcry within the literature for a nuanced relational investigation of 
not only the ways in which emerging niche systems are interacting with politically 
powerful incumbent regimes, but also around their counter claims to the dominant 
regime and bargaining processes over the redistribution of risk and rewards as 
consequences of sustainable transitions (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005b; Smith & 
Raven, 2012; Raven et al., 2016). Crucially there has been a serious disregard of how 
these systems of innovation shape themselves and their development.  
Socio-technical transition scholarship has begun to grapple with broader concerns of 
the gaps in analysis specifically relating to understanding the role of actor agency in 
bringing about socio-technical transitions. Various scholars have explored modalities 
of governance and agency in socio-technical systems and have found that agency is 
captured in the ways that actors are able to articulate the balance of selection 
pressures and coordinate the distribution of resources (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 
2005: 1503). Agency plays out in various ways in protected spaces including the 
alignment of other actors (ibid.) and the strategic linking up or networking of actors 
and through the negotiation of protective spaces via discourse and framing (Martin, 
2016). In recognition of the gaps in the literature, Smith and Raven (2012) have 
analytically deepened the conception of socio-technical niches by conceptualising 
three specific features of protective spaces: shielding, nurturing and empowerment. In 
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addition to this, substantial work has been done toward understanding the 
developmental trajectories of the niche that lead to the three core niche processes 
considered by the MLP (Schot & Geels, 2007). Some authors have also suggested 
that, in order to better understand the interaction between actors at niche level, we 
have to understand the differences between actors through more nuanced actor 
categorisations (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016).  
However, there is still a serious lack of substantive and integrated analysis of how 
agency can be interpreted at niche level as contributing to the formulation and 
outcomes of the niche environment. It is exactly this paucity of analysis that this 
thesis aims to address. This type of analysis requires an appreciation of the political 
setting described above and a nuanced conception of the redistribution of risk and 
reward within the niche environment before it is ready to ‘break through’ into the 
broader socio-technical system. Smith and Stirling argued that there is a need for 
greater appreciation of the ‘internal’ methods of governance that moves away from 
top-down management. Moreover, the artificial removal of the governance subject 
from the unsustainable object (the socio-technical system) provides a simplified 
explanation for the functions of governance that neglects to engage with the more 
reflexive role of actor agency in communally constituting socio-technical systems 
(Smith & Stirling, 2007).This type of analysis also requires an appreciation of the 
nature of actions and reactions and differentiates between first order reflexivity (the 
unintended consequences of action) and second order reflexivity (the critical 
responses to action that evoke agency and direct reaction) (Grin, 2012).  Lastly it 
requires a pluralised understanding of the dispersion of power between actors that 
does not search for command control chains of causation in the flow of events but 
rather considers the reactive, counteractive and unpredictable nature that the exertion 
of agency can assume within a socio-technical system and especially within the niche 
setting.   
This chapter lays the groundwork for this analysis and introduces the theoretical 
terrain for analysis. In what follows, I continue this discussion through the 
introduction of the contextual arena in which this analysis took place: two niches 
within the electricity market of South Africa. This will be followed by an outline of 
the main questions answered in this thesis.  
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1.2 Introducing the Context 
In South Africa, the addition of the global sustainability narrative is difficult to 
contend with as it competes with local issues such as the need for industrial growth 
and job creation, the unequal distribution of resources and a crucial connection 
between fossil fuel-based energy sources and the accumulation of wealth. The story of 
the South African electricity sector is one of increasing complexity in which 
positional relationships have translated into power and governance issues, interlinked 
with the addition of sustainable development goals, and thus an excellent terrain in 
which to observe the implications of sustainable socio-technical systems change.  
The availability of technological alternatives to fossil fuel-base sources of electricity 
have spilled over from the global market, however in South Africa they have been 
used to counteract more than the harmful effects produced by a carbon dependent 
electricity system. They have been used to counteract the negative externalities 
produced by the electricity system and to guard against the failures of the system, 
including increasing electricity prices and sporadic faults in the system resulting in 
interrupted supply. The growing instability of the dominant regime has produced new 
tensions within the system and has also added to the existing social, political and 
economic tensions that exist in the broader South African context. This complex of 
problems has resulted in windows of opportunity for sustainable electricity 
developments and some of the problems with which the advocates of these 
developments have to contend. 
1.2.1 The Centralised Procurement of Renewable Electricity 
Various efforts at diversifying the electricity mix of South Africa and increasing the 
amount of sustainable electricity technologies within the system has emerged in 
policy and practice since the late 1990s. This type of deliberate governance, guided by 
the normative goal of sustainability through policy, has received a lot of attention in 
recent years (Unruh, 2002; Nill & Kemp, 2009; Geels, 2014; Raven et al., 2016). 
These studies have shown that the cognitive, normative and regulative routines of the 
regime sets boundaries for the development of the niche (Rip & Kemp, 1998). The 
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response of niche actors to the effect of the routines of the dominant regime has either 
been to fit-and-conform to the selection pressures at play, or to stretch-and-transform 
their own selection environments (Smith & Raven, 2012). These two niches within 
the South African electricity sector are examples of these two different responses to 
regime routines.  
Fit-and-conform responses are studied by looking at the way in which actors have 
shaped the development of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Procurement Programme. Despite various failed policy attempts at the inclusion of 
independent power producers and alternative sources of electricity into the South 
African energy mix, the procurement programme proved to be successful. This thesis 
tells the story of the niche that formed as a result of the procurement programme 
between 2014 and 2016. The Independent Power Producer (IPP) office is viewed as 
fit-and-conform response empowering actors, as the success of the programme 
required that it exist parallel to the dominant regime. The timing of the programme 
was telling to its success - amidst global sustainability debates and local electricity 
shortfalls, the actors within this niche were able to utilise a window of opportunity, a 
temporary pardon from the dominant regime. This case study reveals insights about 
the necessary misalignment within the dominant regime that created the windows of 
opportunity for the niche to exist. It also provides insights into the interplay between 
policy and regime actors. Crucially this case study sheds light on the types of 
alignment that need to happen for fit-and-conform empowerment to succeed. Studies 
in this regard have suggested that diversification of the electricity mix of a country 
that has for a long time functioned as a centralised electricity system should include 
long-term planning rooted in the goal of carbon reductions rather than short-term 
concerns about the introduction of competition into the market (Woodman & Baker, 
2008). To a certain extent this has been captured in the policy landscape of the South 
African electricity transition, however these normative goals have not necessarily 
translated into the longevity of efforts, like the procurement programme for the 
country because of the different levels of appreciation that exists between actors in the 
system.  
1.2.2 Local Level, Decentralised Sustainable Electricity Developments 
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The organisation and influence of various actors and decision-makers at local levels 
of government have become a critical focus in sustainability studies. There is a 
growing consensus among policy-makers and sustainability advocates that embedded, 
bottom-up solutions potentially hold more affective sustainable potential than top-
down, centrally focussed solutions because the former include the reformulation of 
cultural, economic and social practices captured in the everyday lives of consumers 
and producers (Fudge, Peters & Woodman, 2016: 2).  
The selection pressures associated with sustainable energy transitions have mobilised 
local authorities to become active participants in the processes of energy and 
electricity governance. Findings from studies conducted in the United Kingdom (UK), 
for example, have highlighted the dynamics around the creativity, innovation and 
agency that lies with local authorities captured in different aspects of low carbon 
agendas within the country. These dynamics suggest an ever more complex 
relationship between the niche and regime level than that observed by the MLP 
(Fudge, Peters & Woodman, 2016: 14).  Fudge, Peters and Woodman found that the 
role played by local level government in the UK in energy governance derive mainly 
from enhancing the services that they are already delivering, enhancing the strategic 
role that they are already playing in the energy landscape and in interfacing with 
national government towards the successful implementation of standards set by 
national government. In this way, they view the role of local government as an 
intermediary actor between local and national government (2016).  
The Western Cape province is a South African example of where local-level 
government has actively become involved in the governance of electricity. This case 
study comprises two chapters of this thesis, one focussing on the ‘steering 
governance’ that takes place within this niche (Chapter 6) and one focusing on the 
‘rowing governance’ that takes place within this niche (Chapter 7). The developments 
within this niche are stretching-and-transforming the rules of the dominant regime. 
Boundaries are created for niche actors by the path-dependent rules of the dominant 
regime, however the activity that takes place in the spaces between these boundaries 
is one of the main issues dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7. These chapters, especially 




This chapter sought to introduce the study that is presented in this thesis. The thesis is 
divided into eight chapters and proceeds as follows: in line with Chapter 1, the 
background for the study is dealt with in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 lays bare the 
theoretical underpinning of the research by first considering the work that has been 
done from the Multi-Level Perspective and considering the main areas of interest and 
elaboration for this research. The overarching question that this research aims to 
address is:  How is agency constituted in the niche environment of a transitioning 
socio-technical system, which enables the establishment and strengthening of 
alternate developmental pathways, and what are the implications for socio-
technical transitions? This question is rooted in the observation that the socio-
technical transitions literature does not examine or offer a nuanced explanation for the 
role of human agency in the processes of transition. Further, the sub questions as 
shown below and as discussed in Chapter 2, explore areas that have been touched on 
in the literature, however, that have not been explored in depth in a developing nation. 
The sub-questions are identified in Chapter 2 as areas for elaboration and research 
toward answering the main research question. The sub-questions are as follows: 
1) At niche level, which are the categories of actors that can be differentiated?
2) What methods do actors use in niche environments to exert power?
3) Under what conditions do actors contribute to the formulation and strengthening of
developmental trajectories within niche environments?
4) What are the conditions for ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ within the niche environment?
A heuristic framework of agency typologies is developed in Chapter 2 toward 
answering sub-questions 2 and 3. For the rest of the sub-questions, this chapter 
introduces the theoretical progress that has been made in attending to these questions. 
Often these conceptualisations of different concepts and issues have been regime 
bound or considered to be system wide occurrences. One of the objectives of this 
study is to consider these occurrences with particular reference to the niche and to 
compare my findings with that of more generalised studies.  
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Chapter 3 focuses on the methodological process that this research followed. The 
study is qualitatively orientated and utilises a combination of adaptive theory and 
collective case study methods. This chapter also discusses the difficulties of case 
selection and procedures of data gathering and analysis.  
Chapter 4 provides a background for the selected case studies. It engages with the 
historical relevance of electricity in South Africa and considers politico-economic 
trends that have emerged from the South African electricity market, such as the 
minerals-energy-complex. It also tells the story of the struggle of introducing new 
participants and new forms of technology into the electricity market of South Africa 
and considers various political and regulatory shifts that have taken place in this 
context. This detailed historical background proves to be incredibly relevant toward 
understanding the interaction of actors in and around niches today. 
Chapters 5-7 provide the substantive analysis of the research questions posed. The 
substantive chapters each focus on a different modality of governance. The first two 
substantive chapters focus specifically on two modalities of ‘power giving’, or 
‘steering’: fit-and-conform empowerment (Chapter 5) and stretch-and-transform 
empowerment (Chapter 6). The final chapter focuses on ‘power taking’ or ‘rowing’ 
governance (Chapter 7). Sub-questions 1-3 are posed in each of the substantive 
chapters toward a comparative analysis of the differences between governance in 
stretch-and-transform and fit-and-conform niches. These differences are then further 
contextualised by addressing sub-question 4 in each substantive chapter, specifically 
focusing on ‘steering’ governance in Chapters 5 and 6 and ‘rowing’ governance in 
Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 draws together the findings of this thesis and reflects on the broader 
implications of these findings for socio-technical transitions literature. This chapter 
also revisits some of the broader theoretical debates in the literature first brought up in 
this chapter and in Chapter 2.Various studies that precede this have concluded grand 
narrative explanations for how change takes place in socio-technical systems. This 
thesis challenges the explanatory power of these neat frameworks of change in 
complex systems. As such the findings presented in the substantive chapters of this 
thesis and in Chapter 8 fail to give a complete account of how change takes place in 
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socio-technical systems. It does however fill in some gaping holes that have been 
consequent oversights of holistic type theorising. Some of the proponents of the 
Multi-Level Perspective are challenged, such as the problems of large categorical 
boxes for the actors within socio-technical systems and the lacuna that exists for 
analysis of the formation of niche level rules. One of the most important challenges 
that this thesis poses to the Multi-Level Perspective lies in pulling apart the perceived 
dichotomy between niche and regime environments. I show that there are a multitude 
of niche reactions and interactions that take place beyond the interactions of the niche 
with the regime, and that often the regime merely provides the boundaries of action 
for the niche. The Multi-Level Perspective has engaged with the ways in which the 
niche contests or acts around this boundary, however it has neglected to take account 
of the interactions and outcomes that take place in the spaces left untouched by the 
regime boundaries.  
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Chapter 2  
A Theoretical Understanding of Agency in the Niche Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
There are a variety of theories that provide insights into how change in socio-
technical systems might occur. Historical parallels are frequently drawn in the 
literature, for instance, both between the ‘big’ transitions, such as the Industrial 
Revolution (Leggewie & Messner, 2012; Schmitz, 2016) and the Neolithic 
Revolution (Leggewie & Messner, 2012) and to a lesser extent, from ‘small’ 
examples, such as concerns with cultural appropriation. Studying change in complex 
systems requires that the observer pay careful attention to the relationships between 
objectives of the various aspects and actors of the system as a whole; rather than 
empirically ‘dissecting’ segments thereof.  
This idea has been developed in modern transition theories, theories of evolutionary 
change and theories of systems change. The central analytical framework built on by 
this study will be the Multi-level Perspective on Socio-Technical Transitions, which 
was developed to aid understanding the shifts in regime structures of large systems 
toward transitions (Geels, 2002, 2005c). The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) has been 
applied in various studies that centre on transitions within electricity sectors (Geels, 
2002; Geels & Kemp, 2007; Verbong & Geels, 2007). 
Perhaps before delineating the basis for my enquiry into complex socio-technical 
systems it might be good to establish some of the known limits in any study of 
complex systems or their elements. A complex system is more than the sum of its 
parts, it cannot be reduced to analytical integers or to its constitutive parts, and as 
such, all of the parts of a complex system cannot be known. Thus, as the subject is not 
independent of the whole, not a free-agent making decisions irrespective of the whole, 
it too can be regarded as a complex phenomenon in itself (Cilliers, 2002: 80). 
Meaning then is created through dynamic interaction between the elements of a 
complex system, it is not something complete or abstract but rather is historically 
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created through open systems. That is to say that meaning is created across the 
boundaries of systems and only exists in specific times for specific contexts. This is 
important because if one considers that an infinite number of interactions have to be 
considered in order for something to have meaning in a complex system, then the 
production of meaning would be indefinitely postponed.  
But this is not the case; meaning is generated in real time, only through the 
consideration of some components as opposed to others. Reducing complexity by 
limiting the boundaries through which we establish meaning is the only method at our 
disposal for understanding complex systems and the reactions that take place within 
them (Cilliers, 2002: 80). This realisation does not mean that attributing meaning in 
the study of complex systems is a useless exercise, rather that we must face the 
limitations of such a study and presuppose that, extracting meaning from the elements 
of a complex system by setting limitations to the number of factors considered could 
also have been considered in light of other factors and new limits. As Cilliers 
explains: “The study of complexity, in other words, is not going to introduce us to a 
brave new world in which we will be able to control our destiny; it confronts us with 
the limits of human understanding” (Cilliers, 2002: 77).  
This chapter will begin with a review of the MLP on Socio-Technical Transitions, 
with the first section highlighting the important aspects of the theory upon which this 
dissertation aims to build. This will be followed by a discussion of the work that has 
already been done towards elaboration and refinement of key concepts and 
conceptualisations toward better understanding the role of actors in governing niche 
spaces. The chapter will end with a discussion of questions of ‘power giving’ and 
‘power taking’, and the creation of rules in the niche space. 
2.2 Key Concepts of Regime Change in the Multi-Level Perspective on Socio-
Technical Transitions 
Geels defines a socio-technical system in its functional sense, as a system depending 
on the linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions. Social groups 
maintain and reproduce the elements and links within the socio-technical system 
while rules guide actions of social groups and actors (Geels, 2005a: 449). The groups 
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within a socio-technical system have relative autonomy and share specific 
characteristics, such as language (jargon), problem agendas, norms and preferences. 
Thus there is coordination within the social groups that exist in a socio-technical 
system.  
The configuration of social groups in the socio-technical system is the product of 
historical processes of differentiation. The chains of social groups lengthen over time. 
In the last two centuries, production and consumption are not as close together as they 
used to be. Knowledge, capital and labour were often situated in a single producer, 
which is often not the case today due to efficient low-cost transport and mass 
production methods. Different groups form networks of interdependencies which 
means that they need to give up some of their autonomy and align themselves with 
other groups (Geels, 2004: 901). 
The MLP looks at shifts that take place within socio-technical systems by considering 
change on three conceptual levels (Geels, 2005: 449): The niche; the socio-technical 
regime and the socio-technical landscape.  
This perspective emphasises that the elements and linkages of the socio-technical 
system do not exist autonomously. They are created and perpetuated by the actions of 
social groups and the environment within which the socio-technical system functions. 
Actors align themselves according to specific rules and established practices within 
the system.  Rules are cognitive routines that are either reinforced or changed through 
action. A semi-coherent set of rules is a regime (Geels, 2005: 449). Technological 
regimes have a coordinating effect and because of this, function with relative stability. 
This is however not stationary as incremental advances are to be expected along the 
established technological trajectory of the regime. 
2.2.1 The Regime 
Nelson and Winter (1977) first referred to technological regimes in reference to the 
cognitive routines of a shared community of engineers that guided their research 
practices and activities. The term was used to indicate the search function that guided 
development in a specific socio-technical system.  Rip and Kemp broadened this 
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definition of technological regimes by including not only the cognitive routines but 
also a wider sociological category of rules. According to them, a regime is a rule set 
embedded in practices and institutional environments. They are the outcomes of 
previous changes and subject to change in the future (Rip & Kemp, 1998).  This 
coherent set of rules materialises in the form of production processes, technologies, 
user practices and search heuristics.  
This conception of the regime has been extended under the Multi-level Perspective to 
include broader social and institutional systems that are intertwined with 
technological systems as the socio-technical regime. In terms of the Multi-level 
Perspective, socio-technical regimes are viewed as the so-called semi-coherent ‘deep 
structure’ that holds in place a stable socio-technical system (Geels, 2011: 27).  
Conceptualising the rules of a regime as semi-coherent indicates the distinction 
between a complicated system and a complex system. If a system can be dismantled 
and re-assembled to function in exactly the same way (for example a motor vehicle 
with various complicated interacting parts) then the whole is the sum of its parts. 
When considering the functionality of a complex system, such as a regime, the whole 
can never be considered to be the sum of its parts. This, as I indicated at the beginning 
of this chapter, is why the rules, or meaning, ascribed to such a system can never be 
considered as completely coherent, all-encompassing or complete.  
This semi-coherent set of rules is Geel’s delineation of the parameters of a complex 
system within its context, in such a way that it can be studied. It places the regime in 
focus as the messo level of a socio-technical system (Geels, 2005a: 450). And this 
enables scholars to view the technological trajectories that are created by this level. 
These technological trajectories are the result of cognitive routines between various 
actors within the socio-technical system (Geels, 2002a).  
Regimes remain in place because of constant reinforcement and the strengthening of 
pathways. Strengthening of existing socio-technical pathways happens through the 
legally binding contracts, laws, routines, best practices, life style and user preferences, 
institutional arrangements and regulations, social relationships, market control, 
political lobbying, investments and established capabilities. Interdependent markets 
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form when regimes become established and mutual role expectancies are created. The 
multitude of stabilising factors that contribute to the prosperity of a regime makes it 
hard for radical innovation to take place because stable regimes are characterised by 
‘lock-ins’ (Geels, 2011: 27). The lock-ins mean that innovation occurs incrementally 
with micro readjustments that lead to stable developmental trajectories over time.   
2.2.1.1 Regime Dynamics and Interaction 
Geels distinguishes between the types of interactions that are to be found in socio-
technical systems, between actors and institutions/rules that guide actors (Geels, 
2004: 902). Actors reproduce the elements and the linkages in a socio-technical 
system. Perceptions and interconnections of actors are guided by rules. However, 
actors are not powerless in the process of rule production. Rules are reproduced and 
enforced by the actions of individuals, companies, other actors and other elements 
within the socio-technical system. Rules can also be embedded in the nature of 
artefacts. Technologies have a certain hardness that is difficult to bypass, as they 
cannot be shaped at will (Geels, 2004: 904). There are three inter-related analytic 
dimensions: rules or institutions, the socio-technical system, and actors.  
Geels proposes viewing the function of institutions as rules, to avoid confusion 
between institutions and public organisations (Geels, 2004: 904). He distinguishes 
between regulative, normative and cognitive rules: regulative rules are explicit formal 
rules such as state law; normative rules are values, norms, and role expectations; 
cognitive rules are the way we make sense of the world through mechanisms such as 
symbols and ideologies.  
Rules do not exist autonomously, they are organised into rule systems. Regimes can 
be viewed as semi-coherent rule systems that are linked together. It is hard to change 
one rule without affecting other rules. This alignment is what gives stability to 
regimes. Societal groups consist of actors that share a set of rules for a regime. As 
different groups share their specific rules, we may distinguish different regimes 
(technological, design, policy, science etc.) (Geels, 2004: 905).  
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The dynamic interactions between rules-regimes, actors and systems can be observed 
between rule-regimes and actors in two feedback loops: first, social learning, meaning 
the sociological and institutional dynamics and the reproduction or transfer of 
cognitive, normative and regulative rules. Secondly, actor structuring can be observed 
as the interactions between actors affecting their positions and relationships. (Geels, 
2004: 908). The dynamics between actors and systems are more circular as socio-
technical systems are maintained and changed by the activities of the actors that 
inhabit them; conversely, the actions of these actors are also shaped by the system. 
Social interaction in the system is not necessarily harmonious but most often requires 
some level of bargaining or anticipation of the other parties’ ‘next move’. 
2.2.1.2 Core Alliances within the Regime 
In his later work, Geels (2014) introduced concepts of politics and power into the 
MLP by looking at the resistance of incumbent regime actors to deep structural 
changes in socio-technical systems. This, in reaction to three core criticisms of the 
perspective: first, the MLP was criticised for not giving enough attention to the role of 
power and politics in socio-technical transitions; secondly, as most transition scholars 
focus on green innovations, existing regime actors are given less attention and are 
often viewed as barriers to overcome; and thirdly, the stability of existing regimes are 
conceptualised as path dependencies and lock-ins, and characterised in studies as 
factors providing inertia. This portrays their stability in a somewhat automatic light, 
which neglects the finer nuances of fluid regime functioning (Geels, 2014: 23).  
In relation to the issue of politics and power being under-theorised by the MLP, Geels 
suggests borrowing some insights from political economy studies. The main argument 
here is that policy-makers and incumbent actors can often be seen to form ‘core 
alliances’ at the regime level specifically aimed at maintaining the status quo of the 
dominant regime. The power of actors in maintaining regime dynamics have been 
studied by other theorists, most notably by Gregory Unruh (Unruh, 2000, 2002; 
Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). He conceptualised various shapes that these 
alliances could take including: the techno-institutional complex and carbon lock-in. 
The techno-institutional complex represents the linkages found between technological 
systems and institutions feeding off one another in a self-reinforcing cycle. These 
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complexes come about because of the coevolution in socio-technical systems that 
provide increasing returns, which results in techno-institutional infrastructure and 
provides incentive structures that guide the development and focus of the market 
(Unruh, 2000: 826). Carbon lock-in represents the self-reinforcing barriers created by 
the techno-institutional complex that inhibit policy action toward sustainable 
development, even in the face of solid scientific counter arguments relating to price, 
performance or the harmful effects of carbon-heavy fuel sources (Unruh, 2002:319).  
Policy-makers and central regime actors tend to become reliant on one another. 
Governments support the shaping of a socio-technical system but also determine the 
rules of exchange and determine corporate structures by setting the boundaries of 
legal corporate action. Geels suggests that there are at least three ways in which 
companies influence policy-makers: first, through the close interpersonal relationships 
that are born out of the networks that exist between big business and senior policy-
makers, secondly, through the frequency of contact that exists between large firms 
and policy-makers might lead policy-makers to internalise the ideas and interests of 
industries. Lastly, firms use corporate political strategies in order to influence 
policymakers. This can include direct approaches, such as litigation strategies and 
lobbying or more indirect strategies such as financial investments and organised 
pressure. 
2.2.2 Tenacity of the Regime 
There is general consensus over the axiomatic structure of lock-in creation.  Central to 
this understanding is the role of historical occurrences in creating developmental 
trajectories within socio-technical regimes. Theorists of path dependency have 
reached consensus on the fact that contingency and small events culminate at a critical 
juncture where positive feedback loops are created in the system (Arthur, 1989). 
These positive feedback loops are reinforced over time and are viewed as path 
dependent, which locks a system into a specific developmental trajectory. Systems are 
also stabilised because they are embedded in society and have become part of the 
alignment of heterogeneous elements (techno-institutional complex and techno-
economic network concepts highlight this). This make them ‘blind’ to the possibilities 
of pursuing developmental avenues (Geels, 2011: 27).  
21	
The lock-ins mean that innovation occurs incrementally with micro readjustments that 
lead to stable developmental trajectories over time.  Radical change usually takes 
place outside of the regime level, at the niche level according to the Multi-Level 
Perspective. The tenacity of regimes complicates the process of introducing new 
technologies, even when the regime has deteriorated to a certain extent or significant 
landscape pressure has resulted in windows of opportunity.  
One of the ways in which regime members actively resist change is through the 
adoption of different types of framing. Geels distinguished three framing dimensions 
(Geels, 2014: 29): diagnostic framing determined by the identification and definition 
of problems; prognostic framing moves toward solutions for problems, while 
motivational framing sets forth a rationale for action. This indicates that the structural, 
financial and habitual dependencies that form in a regime are not the only factors 
preventing change, but rather that regime actors actively resist change and exert their 
power in this way.  
2.2 The Socio-Technical Niche 
The primary space for radical innovations to develop within the socio-technical 
system, according to the Multi-Level Perspective, is the niche environment (Geels, 
2005: 449). Niches are the incubation rooms in which innovations that go against the 
grain of the dominant regime can grow. Niche developments have low technological 
performance and development within a niche tends to be slow and costly (Geels, 
2002: 1262). The term ‘niche’ does not denote the development of a technology or 
practice in secret, away from the dominant regime, but rather conditions in which the 
time and funds have been created for novelty. At its core, a niche allows actors to act 
in ways that contradict dominant market trends, and in so doing develop what could 
become a successful new market or ultimately alter an existing one. Look for example 
at the rise of Airbnb. A simple internet application allowed actors to utilise space and 
skills that they already had, toward the alteration of an existing market. The business 
model has become so disruptive that it has started becoming a major source of 
competition for hotels and existing bed and breakfast establishments. The Airbnb 
service providers were able to develop their product in relative isolation of existing 
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industries as they offered a new product, that was at the start, not in direct conflict 
with existing businesses.  
 During the early phase, there is little stability to be found within a niche as the niche 
level lacks the supporting infrastructure, regulatory backing and consumer backing 
enjoyed by the stable regime (Geels, 2011: 27). There are three core processes in 
niche developments: first a process of articulation and adjustment of expectations of 
the niche actor through which external funding for early development is sourced. 
Secondly, the process of formation of social networks in order to expand the resource 
base of the niche development. Lastly, there is a process of learning and articulation 
(Geels, 2011: 28).  The alignment of different developments between different levels 
is greatly emphasised by the multi-level perspective. This is important for the 
conception of the niche because it determines the types of outcomes that will be 
generated by a niche. If landscape pressures come about at a time when niche 
innovations are not developed to a critical point, the outcome of niche-regime-
landscape interactions will look different from the interactions that could come about 
if the niche has reached a level of stability and development (Geels & Schot, 2007: 
405). Geels and Schot argue along the lines that there are some indicators of 
stabilisation of viable niche-innovations, making them ready to break through: 1) A 
dominant design has been crystallised through the stabilisation of learning processes. 
2) Powerful actors form part of the network that support the innovation. 3) Price and
performance improvements have occurred and there are further improvements
expected. 4) The innovation is used in market niches, which amount to around 5 per
cent of the entire market (Geels & Schot, 2007: 405).
2.3 The Socio- Technical Landscape 
Wider aspects of society that impact on socio-technical systems have been termed the 
landscape (Geels, 2005: 451). These are the material aspects of society (such as 
infrastructure) and those things that are beyond the immediate control of the actors 
within the system. The socio-technical landscape forms gradients along which action 
is forced to happen. The relevance of landscape pressures is twofold: first it impacts 
on the stability of the regime and it shapes the developmental trajectories of the 
regime. Secondly, landscape pressures could make it easier for niche innovations to 
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break through as these external landscape pressures can cause cracks in the regime 
that cannot be dealt with through incremental re-adjustments.  
2.4 Pathways of Transition 
The term Socio-technical Transition denotes deep structural changes involving 
reconfigurations of policy, technology, infrastructure, social behaviour and scientific 
knowledge within a system such as water, energy or transport (Geels, 2011: 24).  
Earlier work on the multi-level perspective considered transition in a somewhat linear 
fashion (Geels, 2005: 451).  Geels and Schot (2007) later discussed different 
transition pathways in more detail, slightly deviating from the deterministic, 
somewhat linear process described in earlier works. They found four types of 
transition pathways: transformation; reconfiguration, technological substitution and 
lastly de-alignment and re-alignment. They suggested in this work that different types 
of alignment lead to different transitional pathways, and formulated this typology 
based on combinations of timing and the nature of multi-level interactions to reflect 
this phenomenon. 
2.4.1 Transformation 
When moderate landscape pressure is exerted at a time when niche innovations are 
not yet sufficiently developed, the regime will respond through the modification of 
the direction of developmental paths and activities regime (Geels & Schot, 2007: 
406). The main actors involved in this transitional pathway are usually regime actors 
and external groups such as social movements. External actors voice criticism about 
the problems of the dominant regime and incumbent regime actors adjust the rules of 
the regime in response. Landscape pressures can only exert an influence on the 
dominant regime if they are observed and acted on by regime members. Often, regime 
actors are blind to negative externalities produced by regime problems. Here outside 
actors are important: they translate and draw attention to the landscape pressures 
involved and in so doing force regime actors to respond. This is however not an 
immediate response and usually involves contestation and power struggles. Therefore, 
social institutional dynamics and evolutionary dynamics are important: regime actors 
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use their adaptive capacity to change developmental trajectories. Technical variations 
then occur and the regime is changed from the inside out, based on the best fit among 
the novel mutations. Thus the social and institutional changes and evolutionary 
changes reinforce one another and new regimes grow out of old regimes through 
cumulative readjustments. Here niche innovations tend to add to the regime rather 
than disrupting its internal architecture.   
2.4.2 Reconfiguration 
When symbiotic innovations, which are developed in the niche, are initially adopted 
to solve problems within the dominant regime, subsequent adjustments are triggered 
in the architecture of the regime (Geels & Schot, 2007: 411). The main actors 
involved in this transitional pathway are regime actors and suppliers. Regime actors 
use component innovations developed by new suppliers, which creates competition 
between new and old suppliers. The adoption of symbiotic innovations into the 
dominant regime are usually based on economic considerations and they usually end 
up solving small problems, leaving most of the rules of the regime intact. When the 
advances result in the general architecture of the regime remaining unchanged over 
time, then the transition happens along a transformation pathway rather than a 
reconfiguration pathway. However when the changes snowball into new elements in 
the regime as actors learn more about novelties over time, then it can be considered as 
a reconfiguration of the dominant regime. Transitions are not caused by the 
breakthrough of one technology but rather by the breakthrough of various component 
innovations. 
2.4.3 Technological substitution 
When larger landscape pressure takes place at a time when niche innovations have 
sufficiently developed, the niche innovations will break through and replace the 
dominant regime (Geels & Schot, 2007: 409). The main actors involved in this type of 
transition pathway are incumbent firms and new firms. New firms develop novelties 
that compete with existing firms. Here radical innovations have been developing and 
stabilising for some time in niches but could never break out because of the existence 
of a stable regime. Without the presence of landscape pressure, this becomes merely a 
reproduction process. Reproduction occurs when a regime remains stable. Problems 
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may exist but regime actors have confidence in the ability of the regime to solve 
these. Niche innovations might also exist but the regime is too strong for them to be a 
threat. Only once disruptive change occurs, will a window of opportunity be created 
for niche innovations to break through. If a new technology replaces an old one, this 
leads to knock-on effects and wider regime changes, thus wider evolutionary 
processes follow technological substitution along this transitional pathway.  
2.4.4 De-alignment and Re-alignment 
If larger landscape changes occur suddenly and in a divergent manner, then increasing 
regime problems cause regime actors to lose faith in the dominant regime, which 
leads to de-alignment within the dominant regime. If niche innovations are not 
developed sufficiently at that point in time, there is no clear substitute. This type of 
situation often results in the creation of multiple niches that co-exist and compete and 
eventually, one niche innovation becomes dominant, forming the basis for the re-
alignment of the new regime (Geels & Schot, 2007: 408). The main actors involved in 
this type of transitional pathway are the new niches actors. Here divergent landscape 
pressures lead to the hollowing out of the regime and eventually leaves a vacuum as 
the rules of the regime begin to erode, research and development stops and support of 
the regime disappears. It is this lack of rules that leads to the exploration of multiple 
niche-innovations. Broad evolutionary processes either precede or co-occur with 
technological change.  
2.5 The Role of Agency in Different Transitional Pathways in the Multi-Level 
Perspective 
In later works, Geels, Berkhout and van Vuuren recognised that this typology still 
pays little attention to agency and institutions. The influence of landscape 
developments depends, for example not only on the timing factor but also on the 
interpretation and mobilisation of actors. Another inconsistency that they found was 
in the characterisation of niche-innovations as disruptive or symbiotic - as this 
depends not only on the technological characteristics of the innovation but also on 
how such innovations are institutionally embedded (Geels et al., 2016: 897). Based on 
this they reformulated the typology, using the existing conceptual categories from 
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previous works: actors and social groups, rules and institutions, and lastly 
technologies and the wider socio-technical system. One of the aims of this 
reformulation was to develop alternate understandings for the way in which shifts 
between transition pathways occur, which they say depend less on external landscape 
pressures and more on shifting actor coalitions, the adjustments of rules and actor 
struggles. This also built on previous work under the MLP banner that delineated the 
assumptions about agency held within this theory. MLP allows for two strands of the 
ways in which the ground-level logic of inter-personal relations between actors can be 
related to the macro MLP logic. The first elaboration is found in the metaphor of 
socially embedded games and the second example is found in the link made between 
agency and field-level trajectories (Geels et al., 2016: 897). 
2.5.1 Strategic Games 
Geels has likened the actions and reactions of actors in socio-technical systems to 
moves in a game, in which the rules are developed as the game is being played 
(Geels, 2004b: 908). The game is comprised of rules and regimes and played by a 
diverse actor set, with each individual actor and each group of actors having their own 
understanding of the game and their own aims within the game. This game is not a 
unilateral process with various rounds of development, including research and 
innovation, the introduction of technologies to the market and the development and 
altering of regulation and policy. This view of action and agency is similar to the 
Foucaultian notion of power and action. Power is seen as not only found in the 
relationship between people, it is also the way in which certain behaviours modify 
others. It is, according to Foucault, ‘an action upon an action’ (Foucault, 1982: 788). 
The relationship of power then is a mode of action, not necessarily aimed directly at 
others, but one that prompts a reaction from them. Foucault’s conception of power is 
productive rather than being prohibitive; it enables us to view power and agency very 
broadly at various scales, secured in the notion of micro practices between social 
beings in modern society (Fraser, 1989:18). Power is then always understood in 
relation to knowledge as knowledge is the vehicle through which power is 
communicated and transmitted and in so doing frames the social world.  
The socio-technical system is comprised of a number of these strategic games 
between actors and firms, between firms and firms, between firms and groups and 
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within groups and firms. And different groups and individuals have different levels of 
power in the transactions of the game (Geels, 2004b: 909). The relevant power that an 
actor holds in the game is derived from their resources and the way in which their 
interests are aligned with the interests of other actors. The moves that actors make 
have an effect on the rules of the game, i.e. they shape the sector. Because there are 
multiple games taking place at once in socio-technical systems, these games or 
strands of development co-evolve. This means that rule systems, actor groups, 
material networks and innovations all co-evolve. 
2.5.2 Agency and Field-level Trajectories 
A trajectory within a socio-technical system can be viewed as a sequence of events 
made up of four successive mechanisms: the structural conditioning of actors in the 
system by rules and institutions; other social interactions between the actors; 
structural elaboration where rules and instructional shapes are reproduced; and lastly 
the acceptance and retention of rules and institutions through externalisation. Thus the 
MLP takes account of the continuous efforts by actors in the reproduction of even 
seemingly stable developmental trajectories (Geels et al., 2016: 897).   
2.5.3 Reformulation of the Multi-level Perspective’s Conception of 
Transitional Pathways  
Both the transformation pathway and the substitution pathway were reformulated and 
better differentiated based on possible combinations of mechanisms of change for 
actors, institutions and technologies. The reconfiguration pathway and de-alignment/ 
re-alignment pathways were also slightly reformulated (Geels et al., 2016: 898).   
Geels et al. proposed that actors should be further defined under the substitution 
pathway as including not only new firms that act in the Schumpeterian pattern in their 
struggle against existing firms but also from incumbents that are diversifying from 
other sectors. With regards to institutions, this pathway may follow one of two 
patterns. The first is when innovations outperform existing technologies and in so 
doing disrupt the system with little institutional change. This is also called fit-and-
conform innovation (Smith & Raven, 2012). The second pattern is what Smith and 
28	
Raven call stretch-and-transform innovation. This is when institutional change occurs 
to support niche innovations. 
For the transformation pathway, they suggest further differentiations of technologies, 
actors and institutions. First, they aim to move past the dichotomy often deduced from 
the MLP that incumbents are responsible for incremental advancements and new 
entrants for radical innovations. Instead they say that it is possible for incumbents to 
also reorient themselves strategically toward radical niche innovations and that these 
incumbent reorientations can differ in depth depending on the kinds of organisational 
elements that are adjusted. The organisational elements that can be adjusted are: 
search routines and operating procedures; economic positioning strategies and 
technical capabilities and lastly, beliefs, identity and the business models of 
institutions. With regards to technology, they include not only incremental change in 
the existing technology, but also: 1) competence additions (creative accumulations), 
which is the integration of new knowledge into existing regimes, and 2) reorientation, 
which could be a gradual shift toward new technologies, often through defensive 
hedging, diversification and later full reorientation. The speed of the process is 
dependent on the strength of socio-political pressure and market opportunities. The 
depth of reorientations is associated with the degrees of institutional change and often 
involves struggles between policymakers and industry actors.  
To the reconfiguration pathway they added that new alliances between incumbent 
actors and new actors could be involved in the transitional pathway. They also added 
that niche innovations could initially be incorporated as add-ons to existing 
technologies but then result in unintended problems or opportunities that trigger 
innovation cascades (Geels et al., 2016: 899).  Regarding the de-alignment and re-
alignment pathway they noted that transitions research has not yet paid sufficient 
attention to the role of large shocks, such as wars, in bringing about socio-technical 
change. Overall, this collaboration of authors also took cognisance of the fact that 
transitions are non-linear processes that depend less on external landscape change (as 
suggested in earlier works) and more on endogenous enactment within a sector.  
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2.6 Actors, Networks, and the Co-evolution of Socio-technical Systems 
The evolutionary approach to studying innovation and transition in large socio-
technical systems, focussing on uncertainty and institutional complexity has been 
adopted by most modern theories of socio-technical transition and innovation. 
Examples can be found in: the Multi-Level Perspective on Socio-technical Transitions 
(Schot & Geels, 2007); Innovation Theory (Greenacre, Gross & Speirs, 2012); 
Carbon Lock-in Theory (Unruh, 2000); the Transition Management literature 
(Loorbach, 2010); Sectorial Systems of Innovation (Malerba, 1999) and the work on 
Strategic Niche management (Rip & Kemp, 1998).  The central idea of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory maintains that variation takes place and is followed by selective 
retention. These three elements: variation, selection and retention form the basis for 
evolutionary theories of technological change (Schot & Geels, 2007: 609). Modern 
evolutionary economists have argued that firms innovate in order to fill new market 
niches, and that while coexisting niches focus on specific functionalities, they are all 
part of larger socio-technical regimes.    
The influence of evolutionary theory on the MLP derives from the work of 
evolutionary theorists such as Nelson and Winter. Nelson and Winter, faced with the 
issue of understanding complex systems of innovation, said that if we wanted to 
incorporate seemingly disparate segments of knowledge about these systems into a 
single study, we have to take into consideration the evolutionary nature of innovation. 
This means taking account of the uncertainty and disequilibrium of the innovation 
process (Nelson & Winter, 1977: 49). Instability, in short, is a fundamental feature 
and functional requirement of a complex system. 
Technological advances often seem to have a mind of their own, an inner logic. Often, 
action cannot be described as a fine-tuned response to demand and market pressures, 
especially in rapidly changing markets. Action often seems to follow a ‘natural 
trajectory’. This natural trajectory does not fit neatly with economic logic; however, 
Nelson and Winter say that it is still possible to study this flow of events. These 
trajectories are most often specific to a particular technological regime, where the 
regime relates to the cognitive processes of the ‘technician’ about the feasibility and 
practicality of a product (Nelson & Winter, 1977: 57). Development and expectation 
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are the function of a dynamic relationship, itself understood within the parameters of 
a larger episteme, which is underwritten by the ontological idea of development as a 
positive occurrence.  
These cognitive processes are part of the evolutionary logic, as they determine what 
can and cannot be selected, and have more relevance than the actual economic or 
technical viability of an innovation. Thus, one cannot neatly divide up and study the 
processes of invention and market implementation, given the amount of uncertainty 
that goes into both of these processes. And one cannot regard the actions of actors as 
purely logical, as all of the above takes place within a ‘selection environment’ that 
determines how the usefulness of technologies evolves over time (Nelson & Winter, 
1977: 61).  
2.7 Agency in the Niche: Key Questions and Debates 
2.7.1 The Categorization of Actors in the Socio-technical Environment 
The categorisation of actors by the MLP perspective is somewhat limited. The theory 
takes cognisance of the fact that groups within socio-technical systems have both their 
own internal dynamic and form part of the dynamic of the system through the 
enactment and formulation of rules and through interconnected networks. However, 
very little concrete attention has been given to the assignment of different categories 
to different actors. This is because the dynamic interactions observed by the MLP are 
predominantly between the three conceptual levels. The relationship between high-
level categories of actors has been considered by MLP theorists, for example the 
relationship between ‘incumbent actors’ and ‘policy-makers’ and the relationship 
between ‘niche actors’ or ‘innovators’ and ‘regime actors’. It has been argued that the 
MLP does not allow for the definition of actors at its landscape level (Fischer & 
Newig, 2016: 6). With its large sweeping categories, such as external actors, regime 
actors, niche actors, incumbent actors and firms, the MLP generally allows for the 
comparison between different elements resulting in systems change rather than 
focussing on the effects that one element - such as a specific actor group - has on 
another. The question thus is, at niche level, which are the categories of actors that 
can be differentiated? 
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When taking into account the focal area of this study, the niche environment, I argue 
that this type of specification is not only advantageous, but also extremely necessary 
for understanding niche dynamics and that conclusions can be drawn from further 
sub-categorisation that will improve our understanding of the processes of socio-
technical transition. Crucially, however, one must guard against the possibility of this 
type of categorisation becoming a reductionist exercise. That is by no means the 
desired effect of categorising actors; rather, I wish simply to define elements to be 
included for the extraction of meaning out of a complex system.  
2.7.1.1 Regime Membership 
Regime members do not all look the same and their positions can never be regarded 
as permanent. One method of measuring and understanding regime membership is to 
look at the degree to which actors participate in the activities that reproduce the path 
dependencies within the regime (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1505). Crucial in 
the determination of the development and perpetuation of a regime is not only the 
agency that rests in the core members (those who intensively contribute to the 
perpetuation of the regime) but also the norms and procedures governing their 
relationships and interdependencies.  
This is complicated by the way in which non-core members provide inertia. This type 
of inertia represents a whole new power relationship, as the agency of these actors are 
not found within the legitimate structures within the dominant regime or within the 
possession of resources, but rather these external forms of authority and external 
resources bring new issues to the table, conditioning the structures of demand and 
supply in new ways. In order for non-core regime members to successfully bring 
about change, coalitions have to form that actively seek to change strategies, 
initiatives and power relationships in the existing regime (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 
2005: 1505).  
2.7.1.2 Types of Actors 
Avelino and Wittmayer developed a multi-actors perspective that functions as a 
heuristic framework for understanding shifting power relations between different 
categories of actors in sustainable socio-technical transition (Avelino & Wittmayer, 
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2016: 628).  This perspective distinguishes between sectors (market, state, 
community, and an additional third sector, of which more further below) and between 
different levels of aggregation for actors in terms of sectors, organisational actors and 
individuals. This aggregation differs from the MLP’s functional aggregation of the 
landscape, niche and regime levels. It is an elaboration of previous attempts at vertical 
typologies of power (the governance perspective) to which they add a horizontal arm 
which allows one to analyse who exactly exercises power and how the disposition of 
power, cemented in actor configurations is arranged across different actors.  The actor 
categories differ in relation to their being formal or informal, public or private and for 
profit or not-for-profit as represented in the table below. 
Table	1:	Actor	Categories	
Formal Informal For Profit Not for 
profit 
Public  Private 
State x x x 
Market x x x 
Community x x x 
Third Sector x x x x x x 
Incorporating these four categories of actors with the proposed aggregation 
differentiations between actors, allows them to address two important shortcomings of 
the current transitions literature: they address the bipolar view that categorises 
anything that is not immediately state related as civil society, and in so doing they 
allow for differentiation and specification when we talk about actors and the power of 
actors in the form of aggregation, where previously studies simply referred to actors 
or groups of actors.  
Another group that could have a significant influence on the transitional process is 
intermediary bodies. These are organisations that operate between other actors or 
groups (Moss, 2009: 1482). These bodies can take a variety of forms. The concept 
resonates strongly with the ‘boundary institutions’ (Guston, 2001). The relationships 
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affected by boundary institutions are not static and often require hybrid forms of 
governance to succeed in multiple domains. Intermediaries include a variety of 
different actors with one role in common- their ability to mediate (Fischer & Newig, 
2016: 10).  The mediate between production and consumption, between levels of 
priorities including funding and regulation and between different ideologies or visions 
created (Hodson & Marvin, 2010: 6). Steyaert et al. described these actors as 
matchmakers, aligning two or more actors or groups of actors with one another 
(Steyaert et al., 2016: 3). These actors cannot be viewed as neutral participants in the 
transitional process as they actively engage in the various tensions that exist in a 
market (ibid.). 
Of particular importance here is Avelino and Wittmayer’s conception of the third 
sector. The third sector lies in between the three others and can occupy any of the 
categories of differentiation as indicated in the table. It is not simply a residual 
category but rather lies in tension between the other three categories. This includes 
actors such as intermediaries that were discussed earlier in this chapter, however it 
also includes sub-sectors, such as science. Science could then be viewed as an 
intermediary between state, market and community, crossing boundaries between 
private and public and acting for profit and not for profit.  Here they argue along the 
same lines as triple helix theorists. The triple-helix relationship described by Henry 
Etzkowitz denotes the university-industry-government relationship as being 
interdependent, overlapping institutional spheres where the model has shifted from 
the state encompassing industry and academia.  He has found globally that bilateral 
relations between governments, academia and industry has expanded into what can be 
considered a triadic relationship emerging from different starting points with the 
common purpose of stimulating knowledge-based economic development (Etzkowitz, 
2002: 2). Etzkowitz found that new relationships are being established across 
institutional boundaries, creating hybrid organisations such as virtual incubators and 
centres of technology (Etzkowitz, 2002:11).  
Avelino and Wittmayer suggest that our understanding of power relations between 
actors needs to be refined. Specifically, in terms of the MLP, assumptions about 
power relationships that underlie frameworks of transition needs to be crystalised- 
meaning that we need to delineate which type of sectors or actors are situated in 
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niches and in regimes (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016: 638). While sectors themselves 
can be regarded in the same way that transition studies regard actors, they can also be 
viewed as discursive contexts in their own right or as institutional contexts with their 
own dynamics. When considering these categories and their interactions one can 
move from questions of who has more or less power in a study of agency, toward also 
understanding different types of power and how this affects interdependencies 
between actors over time (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016: 644). 
2.7.2 The Categorization of Developmental Trajectories within the Niche 
With its large categorical boxes, one of the things that the MLP does best is 
describing developmental trajectories in socio-technical systems. The tenacity of the 
regime, as described earlier in this chapter, forms a solid foundation for understanding 
the change resistant attributes of socio-technical regimes. The transitional pathways 
put forward by the multi-level perspective have been discussed in detail earlier in this 
chapter. Even though the niche conditions in each case are considered, this is mostly 
in dichotomy with the regime. Interestingly enough, later works by Geels and Schot 
further elaborated these pathways through the characterisation of niche actors (as 
those bringing about radical innovation) and of regime actors (as only bringing about 
incremental advancement). And yet they do not elaborate on the sub-categories of 
niche and regime actors, which complicates this mission. Another aspect that is also 
under-theorised by the MLP is how different types of niches have different internal 
developmental trajectories.  The MLP theorists do take account of these internal 
dynamics to some extent, but not in detail. What is made clear is that all niches have 
three core processes: the articulation and adjustment of expectations; the formulation 
of social networks, and lastly, processes of learning and articulation. In light of this 
shortcoming, one of the main questions that is posed by this thesis is: how do actors 
contribute to the three above-mentioned processes? Or rather: under what conditions 
do actors contribute to the formulation and strengthening of developmental 
trajectories within niche environments?  
2.7.2.1Types of Niches and their developmental trajectories 
In work not directly related to the MLP, Schot and Geels explored the use of the niche 
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concept for understanding radical change based on the work done by evolutionary 
theorists on the topic. Radical change, by their definition, is an alteration to the 
underlying structure that regulates technical changes, meaning a shift in the socio-
technical regime. Change in the socio-technical regime means new pathways along 
which incremental advancements can take place, a shift in the dynamic equilibrium.  
They proposed that radical change is generated by four different evolutionary patterns 
and mechanisms: natural selection; punctuated equilibrium; market niche 
development; and technological niche development (Schot & Geels, 2007). They also 
found that the differences between niches lead to different outcomes based on their 
positioning within or outside of the socio-technical regime and the level of stability 
reached within the niche regarding the rules for design. 
Natural selection is involved in cases where a variant in the regime’s internal market 
niche links up with a selection criteria or trend in the socio-technical regime.  The 
success of this variant might lead to replication and imitation and lead to tensions 
between regime actors and regime rules, which leads to alteration of the rules of a 
regime, which ultimately leads to the establishment of a new regime (Schot & Geels, 
2007: 617). 
Punctuated equilibrium denotes change that results from large-scale inventions that 
break through because of dramatic changes in the selection environment. Processes of 
incremental changes in niches, coupled with competition between niches leads to new 
regimes (Schot & Geels, 2007: 618). Market niche development in contrast denotes 
the development of big or small innovations in isolation from the mainstream market. 
Once stable enough this might diffuse to other niches and result in regime shifts.  
Technological niche development denotes patterns where macro-inventions are 
applied in proto-markets created by a coalition of actors that want to test new 
technologies with the aim of producing new markets. These coalitions could be made 
up of both incumbent actors and new actors. Often these niches result in a few pilot 
projects and culminate in nothing more than niche gestation. However when these 
niches lead to socio-technical change one of the above mentioned patterns of 
development is followed.  
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Based on the patterns of evolutionary development found for niches, Schot and Geels 
distinguished four types of niches (Schot & Geels, 2007: 618):  
1. Internal market niches - a niche that is highly stable but not very isolated from the
dominant regime.
2. External market niches - A niche containing stable rules that builds on its isolation
from the dominant regime.
3. Technological niches - an isolated niche with no stability.
4. Breakthrough niches - a niche that, despite not yet being at a good level of stability,
is not isolated from the dominant regime because the regime is deteriorating,.
2.7.2.2 Properties of Niches 
Smith and Raven ( 2012) focussed on how agency and politics play out in niche-based 
or protective spaces. Protective spaces in their framework exhibit three distinct 
properties that relate to socio-technical transitions: shielding, nurturing and 
empowerment. Shielding involves the protection offered by a protective space from 
the selection pressures that are at play. Nurturing involves the identification and 
development of path-breaking innovation in both passive and active ways. 
Empowerment involves the processes that help innovations to become competitive 
within unchanged selection environments or through processes that change the 
selection environment to favour path-breaking innovations.  
They also distinguish between active and passive niches. Passive niche spaces are 
often the initial environments where selection pressures are felt to a lesser degree for 
contingent reasons, such as remote geographical location, for which an alternative to 
the dominant regime proves more fruitful, or a market that is willing to sacrifice price 
or other trade-offs that they deem more important. These generic spaces that pre-date 
the deliberate mobilisation of certain innovations still provide the shielding properties 
of a purposefully created niche. An active niche space is constructed through niche 
management interventions and include regulations, tax and tariff interventions on the 
supply side and quotas, public purchasing, information campaigns and market 
segmentation on the demand side. 
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2.7.3 Power and Agency in the Niche 
According to Avelino and Wittmayer, the socio-technical perspective associates 
power with the rules that underlie socio-technical regimes. Socio-technical 
perspectives on transitions are concerned with power to the extent that it relates to 
struggles between individuals and groups, conflicting goals, conflicting interests and 
the hegemonic power that lies in the regime’s ability to resist change played out by 
incumbent actors as discussed earlier in this chapter. Avelino and Wittmayer question 
the tendency of transitional scholars to equate regime dynamics (or power) to 
particular actors at the cost of other actors. According to them, this leaves little room 
to observe the fluid nature of power or the shifts in power that take place, because 
what more is a transition other than shifts in power (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016: 
632)?   
Because the categorization of elements in socio-technical systems by the MLP 
focuses on umbrella categories, the theory doesn’t really get down to discussing the 
micro-level methods that actors use to exert power and the differences that exists 
between power beyond the oppositional kind. However it must be noted that recent 
additions to the MLP have touched on this in recognising the importance of alliances, 
and that alliances could exist between actors that occupy heterogeneous groups, for 
example instances where incumbent actors strategically align themselves with 
external and/or niche actors toward ‘transformation’ transitional pathways.  
Again, in the light of this gap in research, another of the main questions posed by this 
thesis is: What methods do actors use in niche environments to exert power? 
2.7.3.1 Agency in Policy 
Innovation scholars model technological transitions as long periods of incremental 
advancements followed by episodes of rapid change. Superior technological 
breakthroughs in these cases are seen as exogenous to the system. Even though there 
is empirical support for the affectivity of exogenous factors in bringing about 
transition, the magnitude of performance improvements required have been shown to 
be quite large (Unruh, 2002: 321). These types of developments generally do not 
come from within the dominant regime, as the natural inclination from those actors 
locked in by the dominant regime is to resist changes to the status quo.  
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One strategy of bringing about this type of change for policy-makers is to allow for 
development to happen within a special niche. This, however, might work for certain 
technology, but it will be challenging to find a niche for an entire technological 
system, and niche developments are only effective if they are allowed enough time for 
market conditions to mature (i.e., the threat of environmental degradation or other 
casualties is not so immediate) (Unruh, 2002: 321). The idea of using niches to foster 
the development of specific transitional pathways is captured in the Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM) concept. It involves the management of protected niche spaces 
for the development of technologies and often requires policy support: “SNM is a 
strategy to escape lock-in by fostering learning processes and processes of socio-
technical alignment.” (Nill & Kemp, 2009: 672). 
Another evolutionary policy approach is Transition Management (Nill & Kemp, 
2009: 672). In terms of this approach the aim is to shift the production and 
consumption patterns within an entire system due to persistent problems, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions for which incremental advancements and reorientations will 
not suffice. Various pathways are explored concurrently to avoid lock-in to certain 
paths.  
Time Strategies is yet another type of evolutionary policy intervention that might take 
place in socio-technical transitions. This approach takes into account that lock-ins 
may vary from time to time during the stable and unstable phases of transition and 
that political opportunities for intervention are dependent on the underlying dynamics 
of the system (Nill & Kemp, 2009: 673). Techno-economic windows of opportunity 
result in unstable phases of transition.  
Three different windows of opportunity can be found and acted on by policy-makers: 
Windows of Preparation, where a feasible technology provides a solution to a 
problem in the dominant regime in order to stimulate technological diversity and 
develop solutions to become competitive. This is similar to Unruh’s End-of-Pipe 
policy solutions: End-of-Pipe (EOP) policy solutions are typically the first solutions 
that are sought to climate change issues that result from lock-in and tend to be those 
that affect the system in the least dramatic way. It usually takes the form of add-on 
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technology on the output side of the system and generally does not add much value to 
the system (Unruh, 2002: 318). 
Secondly, Windows of Creation: where there is stronger social pressure on the state to 
act, it needs to balance the need for a quick solution with the need for long-term, 
viable market shifts. This is similar to Unruh’s conception of Continuity Policy 
Approaches. If EOP solutions prove to be ineffective, the next step is usually 
incremental advances that function within the limits created by the path dependencies 
of the dominant regime and often includes component or intra-system advancements 
(Continuity Advancements). This means that a new technology is introduced within 
the framework of the existing dominant technology, using the same language, and 
same technological pathways, meaning that it fits neatly into the structures that 
already exist (Unruh, 2002: 318). 
Lastly, when the dominant regime has become unstable the state can apply Windows 
of Utilisation Policies, through which they enact pressure on the selection 
environment (Nill & Kemp, 2009: 674). The last, and most radical option, according 
to Unruh, is discontinuity. This is similar to Windows of Utilisation Policies. There 
are some examples of this type of radical change, however this is not very common in 
large complex systems like electricity and transport. Technological choices often 
influence the nature of the policy response. As Unruh explains, renewable energy 
technologies can be connected to the existing grid in a continuity response or they can 
be made to function in a way that abandons the grid. Technological constraints are 
less of an obstacle for changing policy than those constraints created by techno-
institutional lock-in. Thus the social component is harder to shift than the 
















Regulatory structures evolve and are shaped by similar process to those that shape 
regimes. Governance is exercised through relatively stable sets of norms and 
practices, much like a regime and “the concept of governance accommodates the fact 
that state actors rely upon non-state actors in the formulation and implementation of 
public policy. Effective policy levers for regime transformation… cannot be decreed 
by states in isolation” (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1498).  
Governance within the regime is carried out through processes of negotiation between 
various actors. Major impulses for change will seldom succeed because of the fact 
that they often represent uncoordinated interactions between shifting selection 
pressures and struggling adaptive capabilities. Smith, Stirling and Berkhout argue that 
more attention needs to be given to the context in which regime transformation takes 
place, meaning that both the nature of the regime and the specific features of 
governance need to be taken into account. 
2.7.3.2 Agency in Action 
According to Smith, Stirling and Berkhout (2005), agency in socio-technical 
transition can be defined as “the ability to intervene and alter the balance of selection 
pressures or adaptive capacity” (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1503). These 
scholars have made two important contributions to our understanding of agency in 
socio-technical transition. Firstly, they showed why agency and power are important 
in regime transformations and secondly they went on to explore different ways that 
social actors govern regime transformation.   
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Power, exercised through agency, can modify behaviour. It can persuade actors in a 
regime to modify their behaviour in a specific manner as these actors adapt to 
changing selection pressures. Agency in this case can also act to keep certain issues 
on the agenda and others off.  Power and agency can modify adaptive capacity in 
another way, by restricting critical reflection. In doing so, those with agency can 
prevent other actors from realising that they are at a disadvantage. Agency in this case 
can take certain options off the table so that this kind of reflection is not possible. 
Power and agency affect the representation of problems. In considering these points, 
we should look at how agency rests in different discourses during regime change as 
these visions of the future should indicate how selection pressures are recognised and 
how responses to selection pressures are coordinated. According to Smith, Stirling 
and Berkhout: 
 The challenge here is to analyse how contrasting visions and expectations 
enrol actors into coalitions of support, come to define their interests, and 
shape the way that they seek to respond to selection pressures or shape their 
collective adaptive capacity (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1503).  
Much of the tacit agency rests within the regime, as the regime provides a structure 
for conditioning the relationships and dependencies that form, representing certain 
interests and neglecting others. Lastly, agency and power are dependent on the 
physical structures that they inhabit. Resource distribution is an important factor in 
two ways. First, it makes the terrain for affecting behaviour uneven; an agent’s power 
depends largely on his resources. Secondly, because no one agent has so many 
resources that she can be entirely independent, the distribution of resources dictates 
the interconnectivity of actors (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1504). 
2.7.3.3 Agency in Discourse 
A key facet of the agency that actors wield is through the narratives that they develop 
in order to reshape perspectives and patterns and enable institutional reform. These 
narratives are important political tools to enable change and lock-in braking (Smith & 
Raven, 2012: 1032). The politics of a niche is captured in the narrative that is created 
within it. Actors create narratives in order to reshape societal action and mentalities in 
such a way that allows for institutional reform.  Smith and Raven have found that 
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there are three over-arching themes within the competing actor narratives negotiating 
empowerment. Negotiating protective spaces involves the contestation of narratives 
regarding: positive expectations about the niche that justifies it for society; explicit 
claims for institutional reforms or claims on competition in order to change the 
environment; and lastly, a reframing of the past that justifies the challenges that the 
niche poses to the dominant regime (Smith & Raven, 2012: 1033). Narratives can also 
provide a basis for understanding how different levels of actors reshape each other, 
for example how global level niche actors reshape social action (Martin, 2016: 150). 
In this way, narratives of niche empowerment seek to mobilise resources, spread 
positive expectations and highlight tensions within the regime. The second approach 
to explaining the effect of discourses in the niche environment is framing. Framing is 
a deliberate form of discourse aimed at mobilising resources and actor consensus 
around a specific issue (Martin, 2016: 150).  
2.7.3.4 Agency in Networks and Resources 
In reference to the work of Grin, Avelino and Wittmayer explain that the governance 
perspective on transitions, views an agents’ capacity to ‘act otherwise’ as a trigger for 
institutional transformation by ‘smartly playing’ into the power dynamics that exist 
between various layers. This perspective is linked to the MLP through a multi-
levelled framework of power and distinguishes between three levels of power: 
rational, dispositional and structural that corresponds with the niche, regime and 
landscape. The governance perspective considers rational power at niche level that 
rests upon the competition at niche level and the ability to draw on regime actors. 
Dispositional power is observed at regime level, where rules, resources and actor 
configurations lead to a powerful dominant image. Actors at regime level may draw 
on the dispositional power of the dominant regime. Structural power is found at the 
landscape level as symbolic, economic and social capital (Avelino & Wittmayer, 
2016: 632). This framework opens up the regime concept by looking at how agency 
relates to the structures in a socio-technical system.  In order to establish a proper 
understanding of the relationship between structure and agency in transitional 
dynamics, Grin suggests that it is important to view a modern sustainable transition as 
a process of redirecting the regime (the co-evolutionary structure); and agency or 
innovative processes toward a complex normative orientation (sustainability), while 
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taking into account a whole range of exogenous trends (Grin, 2012: 73). Regarding 
agency, Grin suggests that it is important to distinguish between first order reflexivity 
and second order reflexivity. First order reflexivity indicates the unintended reflex-
like consequences; second order reflexivity indicates self-critical processes, which 
evokes a sense of agency and intended change. Critical outcomes in transitions 
processes are often the unintended consequences of actions. These unintended or 
otherwise intended actions result from first order reflexivity and can often be 
considered as part of the normal way of doing things. Second order reflexivity 
denotes a process of conscious decisions, a plan made and followed toward an end.   
With this differentiation in mind he suggests that politics in transitions, with the 
added normative orientation produced by goals of sustainable development, might be 
easier to address if we understand how transitions not only presuppose the 
transformation of agency, the creation of legitimacy and power relations, but may, in 
addition to this, aid in creating these conditions (ibid.).  
Smith, Stirling and Berkhout’s quasi-evolutionary conception of regime change views 
socio-technical transition as being a function of two elements: shifting selection 
pressures and the coordination of resources within and outside of the regime in 
processes of adaptation to these selection pressures (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 
2005: 1494).  
Governance within regime transformation is organised through the intervention of 
these two co-evolving realms by affecting the intensity, articulation or direction of 
selection pressures. It might also happen through addressing the adaptive capabilities 
of actors. According to them this latter form of governance operates mostly through 
regulative or financial channels (ibid).  
Selection pressures however, is more dispersed in socio-technical transition as debates 
in wider society, including academia, civil groups and consumer awareness and 
preferences affectively frame the functional reproduction of known truths and 
consequently, change, in socio-technical systems. Changes in the broader structures of 
society that are related to, but do not directly focus on a specific socio-technical 
system, might affect the system because of interconnectivities. Examples here are to 
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be found in the wider political and economic landscape that surrounds the socio-
technical system in question (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1495).  
In any given regime there is no shortage of selection pressures. This is a given and	
constitutive to the logic of a complex system itself and it is very difficult to control as 
these pressures shift at different time scales on different levels. The significant 
component of transition shaping is captured in the way in which selection pressures 
are articulated. Selection pressures can be orientated to different degrees to form 
coherent pressure in a specific direction. The second element that makes the 
articulation of selection pressures effective is the processes that make this 
accumulation of pressures explicit in such a way that prompts a reaction from the 
dominant regime (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1495). An example offered here 
is that of climate change for which scientific, social and political consensus resulted 
after years of articulation (ibid). 
The change resistant characteristic of regimes is the factor that affords them the 
capacity to adapt to selection pressures (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1495). It is 
the functions of a regime that become specialised and consequently locked in, and the 
better the members of the regime are able to fulfil these functions according to the 
path dependency created, the higher the adaptive capacity of the regime. Sometimes 
when the adaptive capacity of a regime is weak, alternate developmental trajectories 
might come from outside of the regime. 
Those actors that act to create selection pressure might not be separate from the ones 
that act to coordinate the resources necessary for adaption (Smith, Stirling & 
Berkhout, 2005: 1497). This overlap is especially prominent in cases where the 
‘search function’ of adaptive capacities has been influenced by the articulation of 
selection pressures and result in unanticipated possible avenues for finding solutions. 
This is to say, in situations where the positive feedback loop has deteriorated or 
stagnated, that the parties providing this stagnation or deterioration might be the same 
parties looking for alternate avenues for development.  
Selection pressures differ in magnitude and reach. The more prominent selection 
pressures require interactions and alignments along networks, including those within 
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the dominant regime for adaptation to follow.  The extent to which regime change can 
be achieved depends on the positions held by the ‘coalitions of prime movers’ defined 
in terms of their interests and ideas and the degree to which the actions that they 
perform is central to the collection of pressures at play within the dominant regime. 
Coalitions of prime movers, according to Smith, Stirling and Berkhout, are groups of 
actors that are financial, technically and politically powerful enough to influence the 
diffusion processes of selection pressures and adaptive capacities (Smith, Stirling & 
Berkhout, 2005: 1497).  
Smith and Raven have added to this debate that selection pressure and protective 
spaces function at different levels of socio-technical systems (Smith & Raven, 2012: 
1028).  
Table 2: Socio-technical Selection Pressures and Protective Spaces (adapted from Smith and Raven, 2012) 
Regime Dimension Selection Pressures Logic of the 
selection space 
Passive shielding Active shielding 
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preferences advantage primarily 
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Smith and Raven have focussed on how agency and politics play out in niche spaces. 
Protective spaces in their framework exhibit three distinct properties that relate to 
socio-technical transitions: shielding; nurturing and empowerment. Shielding involves 
the protection offered by a protective space from the selection pressures that are at 
play. Nurturing involves the identification and development of path-breaking 
innovation in both passive and active manners. Empowerment involves the processes 
that help innovations to become competitive within unchanged selection 
environments or processes that change the selection environment to favour path-
breaking innovations. Empowerment has been studied in various ways, including 
empowerment as a systematic transitional pattern; disempowerment as a process 
through which actors gain or lose their intrinsic motivation, and empowerment as a 
functional property of niches(Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016: 633). This thesis is most 
interested in the latter. Two types of empowerment are found in protected spaces 
(Smith & Raven, 2012: 1030): fit-and-conform empowerment and stretch-and-
transform empowerment. 
When an innovation that is originally viewed as path breaking becomes incremental 
because of the broader socio-technical implications, but when cumulative economic 
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impact is larger than other path-breaking advances, fit-and-conform empowerment 
acts toward making niche innovation competitive with regards to the dominant regime 
within an unchanged selection environment.  
There are two challenges when we are talking about sustainable transitions: first, one 
of the results of this type of empowerment is improved alignment with existing 
industrial norms of the dominant regime. However this could be to the detriment of 
sustainability goals because of the trade-offs made to ‘fit in’. Secondly, the providers 
of the protective niche might find it hard to govern the performance improvements 
that would allow for the niche to fall away. The main actions in a fit-and-conform 
empowerment model in terms of sustainable transitions are: institutional reforms that 
change incumbent regimes and political capacity that can avoid a scenario where the 
niche becomes captured by sectional interests and to ensure that a protective space 
stimulates the dynamic accumulation of capacities for sustainable avenues of 
development. 
Conversely, when empowering innovations undermine the dominant regime and 
transmit niche-driven institutional changes into re-structured regimes, stretch-and-
transform empowerment applies. Here niches influence their selection environments 
and favourably affect the subsequent changes to the socio-technical system. The 
processes here rely on the broader environment and are not internal to the niche. 
Niche advocates here present solutions to instabilities and tensions within the broader 
regime that often include control policies.  
2.7.4 Directionalities of Agency 
From the discussion of agency above, it is possible to synergise existing knowledge 
into distinct categories of directionalities for agency. I gather three interlinked 
directionalities of power from the literature and base my analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 
7 on this typology: relational-, hegemonic- and networked agency.  
Relational Agency 
Relational agency can be exerted through the alignment of actors and through 
discourse. The alignment of actors involves two inter-related loops: the articulation of 
selection pressure and the coordination of resources. Shifting selection pressure 
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means affecting the articulation, direction and intensity of selection pressure. This is 
done through alignments and interaction across networks that inhabit different levels 
of the socio-technical regime.  
Smith, Stirling and Berkhout (2005) suggested that the extent to which regime change 
can take place depends on the positions held by ‘prime movers’. This is to say the 
degree of technical, financial and political power held by coalitions, and it is 
measured by the response that is elicited from the dominant regime. They also 
showed that directing action towards different selection pressures results in different 
types of shielding within the niche. 
Even though the coordination of resources falls under the shifting of selection 
pressure, this most often relates to networked agency. Actors’ resources affect their 
ability to exert power to a large extent. Addressing this inequality, however, can only 
happen through cooperation with other actors. No one actor is entirely independent, 
so the distribution of resources is a determining factor in the interconnectivity of 
actors. 
Hegemonic Agency 
Hegemonic agency is the top-down agency exerted mostly through policy. However it 
must be realised that the exertion of relational agency most often leads to making the 
terrain for action uneven and in so doing results in some actors becoming more 
powerful than others, thereby giving them a form of hegemonic agency. Top-down 
power considered in transitional studies most often relate to the policy mechanisms 
that can be implemented to change, or to resist change in a socio-technical system. As 
it relates to the niche, various policy mechanisms have been identified through which 
policy-makers can enable niche development. These include SNM; transition 
management and time strategies.  
Power in policy is a complex matter because the effect of policy may be intended or 
unintended. Foreseeing the effects of policy in unstable environments, such as 
transitioning socio-technical systems, is most often impossible. Thus it would be 
wrong to assume that the power that policy holds rests only within the policy-makers. 
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This is one of the cases where distinguishing between first order reflexivity and 
second order reflexivity becomes very important (Grin, 2012). First order reflexivity 
relates to unintended consequences, while second order reflexivity relates to critical 
processes that evoke agency and directed action. 
Networked Agency 
Networked agency involves the power that actors get from their network. As 
previously mentioned, the coordination of resources is one of the processes within the 
niche that can clearly be attributed to networked agency. A second type of networked 
agency that is to be observed is the formation of alliances, not to be confused with the 
alignment of actors and resources. The formation of alliances relates to actors’ ability 
to link up with other actors with a specific purpose in mind. This involves partial or 
complete sharing of goals, sharing mind-sets and ideologies or simply having a 
common enemy.  
2.7.5 The Relationship between Power Giving and Power Taking in the Niche 
Environment 
Understanding the differences in power relationships at the niche level is key to 
understanding how actors govern in the niche space. Up to now I have elaborated on 
the different power relationships that have been found in socio-technical regimes. The 
MLP does take account of this to some extent, as they recognise that power does not 
only result from one’s position in the socio-technical system but also one’s position in 
networks and that alliances can be sources of power for actors. This leaves one 
important stone unturned with regards to understanding the relationships of power in 
the niche space that effect socio-technical transitions: the relationship between power 
giving and power taking.  
Theories of transition accept that some actors are more powerful than other actors. It 
has also been suggested that power can be transferred through networks and by 
association or by various mechanisms of discursive or behavioural intervention. 
However, all of the transitions theories that I have come across proceed to study the 
methods-, differences between- and effectiveness of power giving, and none of them 
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give much attention to the processes involved in power taking. The final question 
posed in this thesis is thus: what are the conditions for ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ within 
the niche environment? I study power taking (rowing) by firstly taking into account 
what we already know about power giving (steering), and secondly by borrowing 
from the governance literature to structure my exploration.  
Rhodes defines governance as “self-organizing, interorganizational networks 
characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and 
significant autonomy form the state” (Rhodes, 2007: 15).  There are various 
definitions for the term. There are however three basic correlations to be found across 
the board in different understandings of governance (Walker et al., 2010: 10). First, 
governance involves multiple actors that function in a networked system. According 
to Wood and Shearing, “governance takes place through programmes that articulate 
with institutions to produce practices” (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 7). They explain that 
governance is the outcome of a network that interacts toward a common goal. These 
networks include both living and non-living elements.  
Secondly, governance implies new forms of authority and power. Colin Scott, for 
example, argues for shifting the focal point of inquiries into governance away from 
simply looking at state law, toward a wider analysis that encompasses a variety of 
norms and mechanisms through which control is achieved, albeit indirectly (Scott, 
2004: 2). New forms of decentred regulation happens through different structures 
including the state, hybrid alliances of the state and the non-state, and private actors in 
the ‘post regulatory state’ (Black, 2002: 105). Dupont has found a diffusion of 
responsibility in networks of security governance where vertically structured 
hierarchal arrangements have been replaced with horizontal collaborative networks. 
(Dupont, 2004: 88).  
Lastly, governance demands a multi-level application and often deals with issues of 
scale.  The transformation of social and political order forces us to readjust our 
conception of the economic role of the nation state as shifts that take place at the 
macro scale are brought about and adjusted by technological shifts, economic 
efficiencies and international obligations for the nation state that are not comparable 
to those that took place in the past (Levi-Faur, 1999: 176). Simply put, governance 
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can be observed at different interactive levels from local to transnational, involving 
different actors at each level.  
Smith and Raven’s argument resounds in much of the modern governance literature, 
specifically when the governance relationships between the state and other actors are 
considered. The two types of empowerment, stretch-and-transform, and fit-and-
conform will be used as a foundation for distinguishing between rowing actors. Often, 
the modern state adopts a steering role, while other governing actors adopt a rowing 
role. Emphasising the complex relationship between those that steer and rowers 
allows one to consider regulation and governance beyond the (imagined) dichotomy 
that exists between the state and other actors. It is by no means a bipolar relationship.  
Where the law has acted as an organisational force rather than a stipulation of rules, 
other mechanisms of coercion are often used for the coercive power on the ground 
(Scott, 2004: 167). This conception of regulation resonates strongly with Foucault’s 
analysis of political power and his concept of ‘governmentality’. The latter, he 
explains, is the techniques and procedures that govern behaviour, and leads us, in an 
investigation of regulation, to research both the governed and the governing actors 
and, perhaps more importantly, to ask how governors govern and to what end (Rose, 
O’Malley & Valverde, 2006: 85). The end often proves more important than the 
means of governance, because, I suspect, that is how the niche is formed.  
Various authors have used Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) analogy of steering and 
rowing to understand how governance takes place in the world today.1 In 
criminological literature, studying governance rather than regulation has often been a 
means of getting past the dichotomy between the state and ‘the rest’ to arrive at an 
understanding of how pluralised forms of power governs a system. In this thesis I 
want to extend this train of thought by suggesting that viewing various actors and 
their modalities of governance could lead us to understand the relationships between 
the large conceptual boxes of theories such as the MLP better, in the same way that 
plural security governance is understood in criminological studies. The traditional 
conception of regulation by the state has been extended to ‘steering’, setting a course 
1 See for example: Braithwaite (2000); Shearing and Wood (2003) and Stoker (1988) 
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and monitoring the direction of the regulatory function (Crawford, 2006: 453). 
Steering or power giving entails the following according to Crawford:  
1. Explicit delineation of direction, meaning goals and values.
2. That this direction be conveyed clearly to the actors that row.
3. The establishment of monitoring mechanisms that measures performance
against the goals and value sets provided.
4. Using the jargon, resources and capabilities of those that row.
5. Designing regulatory institutions with the rowing actors, their institutions and
their capabilities in mind.
2.8 Conclusion 
The MLP considered how the rules of a regime work, how they are established and 
how they affect the flow of events within a regime. To a large extent the MLP 
considers a regime to be nothing more than a set of rules. These rules are difficult to 
change in isolation because they affect the rest of the rule system. Rules are created 
through the decisions of actors and become embedded in the artefacts within the 
system. The adoption of a rule is shaped by: the physical environment, by the action 
of other actors and by existing rules. Even though the rule system that underlies the 
functioning of a socio-technical system is largely dependent on the physical 
environment and technical aspects of that system, the actors within the system play a 
key role in rule maintenance. Ultimately the power to realise the goals of sustainable 
development in electrical and other socio-technical systems lies in the role that actors 
play in rule maintenance and rule adjustments in these systems.  
Actors reproduce and reinforce rules by acting them out or reshape rules through 
constant power struggles. The MLP considers rules as one of the analytic dimensions 
of the regime, together with actors and the broader socio-technical system. Once 
established, the rule set of a regime becomes a factor that actors need to contend 
within it. An established rule system effectively starts having a life of its own. The 
longer a rule is able to withstand change, the stronger it becomes. This strength is 
derived from two things: the accumulated functionality of the rule, meaning that it is 
beneficial to enough actors or powerful enough actors are protecting it. The second 
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reason why the longevity of a rule makes it stronger is because the longer a rule 
remains standing, the more offshoots of action and consequence will result from this 
rule. Reversing these pathways for action, or rules, becomes increasingly difficult 
once offshoots have formed.  
The MLP excellently sketches this holistic picture of actions and interactions by 
taking into consideration that the system is more than the sum of its parts and that 
outcomes within the system are not generated in a linear fashion but through the 
interplay of multiple dimensions within the system. This layered view of socio-
technical systems solves a critical issue for the study of complex systems: the 
delineation of boundaries.  By viewing a socio-technical system through the MLP 
lens, one is allowed to temporarily categorise the interaction of long-standing rules of 
the system (the regime level) with the rules and meaning within artefacts and physical 
aspects of the world (the landscape level) with the newer rules within the system (the 
niche level).  
This thesis aims to build on this by studying the role of human governance in the 
processes of rule formation within the socio-technical system. Guided by the MLP, 
this inquiry focuses specifically on the events and actions that take place at the niche 
level. The niche space is considered to be the primary location for the formation of 
new rules and the networks along which these rules govern. It is specifically regarded 
as the terrain where the rules that underlie radical system change are formed, and 
where these new rules result in temporary protection from the long-standing rules 
within the system. It is however not considered to be the only locations where new 
rules are formed as the formation of new rules take place in the context of the larger 
socio-technical system and the broader universe of actors, things and rules.  
My point of departure from the MLP is toward a better understanding of the role of 
actors in the processes of rule formation, specifically focussing on the formation of 
rules that could lead to radical system change and more sustainably secure socio-
technical systems. The MLP allows one to understand how actors contribute to the 
longevity of rules (path dependence) and how actors resist change through rule 
systems. However it does not adequately explain how actors govern to create new 
rules within socio-technical systems. This is a crucial issue and results in the MLP 
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failing to do justice to the sustainable orientation that underlies the perspective. If new 
rules are formed at niche level then one should expect that new sustainable electricity 
rules be formed there too, and thus the formation of rules at niche level should be at 
the centre of MLP studies. 
Agency can be viewed as a commodity within a socio-technical system. It becomes 
amplified when shared among a group of actors and it is by no means equally 
available to all actors of the system. This commodity allows actors to contribute to the 
creation of rule systems within a socio-technical system, bound by the realities, things 
and rules that exist in the system. As much as the physical aspect of a socio-technical 
system creates outcomes within the system, so too does the agency held by actors. 
Agency plays out within the socio-technical system in a non-linear fashion. 
Considering the outcomes created through agency as simple rule-making and rule- 
taking between actors, and between actors and the system, disregards the nuances of 
the flows of power in a complex system. Actors are reactive to one another, thus the 
process of rule creation can be viewed as a constant struggle between actors and this 
struggle must be viewed within the context of the system. 
In order to account for this constant struggle and the uneven distribution of authority 
between actors, I suggest viewing the governing behaviour of different actors as 
rowing and steering governance. Borrowing from the governance literature in 
criminology allows me to view the pluralised arrangement of agency between actors 
while considering the context provided by the system in which they govern. Agency 
has been considered in the transitions literature as taking various shapes, including 
framing and discourse, guided policy, the modification of adaptive capacity and the 
coordination of resources, through one or a group of actor’s alignment of more actors 
with their goals or through actors strategically aligning themselves with other more 
powerful actors.  The conceptualisation of steering in the governance literature, 
including the delineation and direction of meaning and goals, and the monitoring of 
these goals around a specific issue, resonates with forms of empowerment that is 
considered in transitions literature as one of the core attributes of niche environments, 
together with shielding and nurturing. Much of the groundwork has been laid for 
investigating the role of empowering or steering actors within the niche. Much less 
has been done toward understanding the role of rowing actors, or those actors that act 
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because of the ideology of another actor and follow the rules created by these actors, 
yet, in reaction to the actions of steering actors, contribute to the creation of new rules 





The previous chapter makes clear that there is a substantial need for empirical 
research to understand the role of actors in governing the processes of socio-technical 
transitions, especially at niche level. Transition theories focus primarily on two 
interlinked aspects of the socio-technical terrain: understanding the structure and 
functions of socio-technical systems and understanding how systems change comes 
about. This research is focussed on the latter. Various methodological practices for 
understanding how systems change comes about have been developed in the literature 
in recent years. One of the most prominent theories in this regard is the Multi-Level 
Perspective on Socio-technical Transitions (Geels, 2004c, 2005a, 2010; Verbong & 
Geels, 2007). The MLP is part of a class of theories focussed on analysing 
occurrences of low carbon transition. These are transitions that look at major changes 
in systems like construction, energy and transport in which substantial shifts in 
efficiency, demand or carbon emissions are taking place. Socio-technical change 
denotes that it is not only the technological aspects in the system that becomes altered 
but also the social components, which means that these types of changes are enacted 
by a wide array of actors. Because these actors have different interests, transitions 
often involve struggles, which are characteristically unpredictable in nature. As a 
product of the unpredictability of the outcomes of struggles between actors in socio-
technical transition, system innovations are generally characterised as having non-
linear dynamics (Geels, Berkhout & van Vuuren, 2016: 2).  
MLP studies typically consider the feasibility of low-carbon transition pathways by 
analysing the regime, niche and landscape levels and by considering the historical 
setting of the socio-technical system. This allows MLP theorists to identify barriers, 
or lock-ins and drivers of change. Essentially it is a qualitative framework that offers 
researchers the ability to: focus on different dimensions of socio-technical change at 
different levels; take account of groups of actors and the different behaviours that they 
might exhibit; analyse institutional change by looking at how the rule systems change 
in a socio-technical setting; and identify the sources of inertia in a system (Geels, 
Berkhout & van Vuuren, 2016: 5).  
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3.2 Methodological Foundations 
In this section I will discuss the theoretical perspectives and knowledge claims that 
form the basis for this research. I will firstly discuss the considerations that led me to 
a qualitative approach. I will then focus on my specific ontological and 
epistemological foundations for this study. 
3.2.1 Qualitative Research 
This thesis focuses on understanding the role of actors in governing socio-technical 
transitions by looking at how actors govern change in niche environments. The broad 
question that it aims to address is: How is agency constituted in the niche 
environment of transitioning socio-technical system, which enables the 
establishment and strengthening of alternate developmental pathways, and what 
are the implications for socio-technical transitions? 
In order to address this broad question, I have elaborated in the previous chapter on 
four sub-questions namely: 
1) At niche level, which are the categories of actors that can be differentiated?
2) What methods do actors use in niche environments to exert power?
3) Under what conditions do actors contribute to the formulation and strengthening of
developmental trajectories within niche environments?
4) What are the conditions for ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ within the niche environment?
These questions, guided by the debates in the literature, focus on establishing an 
understanding of agency in niche environments of socio-technical systems in 
transition.  This requires the exploration of a variety of issues, including the ways in 
which actors understand the system, shifting institutional arrangements, attitudes, and 
practices of actors. In essence, these questions aim to study the meaning that can be 
attributed to the actions and inactions of actors in governing socio-technical 
transitions. This is why a qualitative approach is most suitable for this investigation. 
According to Creswell, qualitative research begins with assumptions and utilises a 
particular theoretical framework that guides the process of researching problems 
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addressing the meaning that people ascribe to a human problem. This entails a 
collection of data in a natural setting, and data analysis that allows for both inductive 
and deductive reasoning and the establishment of key themes and patterns. The final 
product of qualitative research includes the voice of participants, reflexivity of the 
researcher and a description and interpretation of the problem being studied 
(Creswell, 2013: 44). 
Qualitative research today has many different modes, modalities, targets, functions, 
and uses. Creswell has summarised these as a few generalisable characteristics 
(Creswell, 2013: 45): First of these, he notes, is a natural setting. This means that 
qualitative researchers follow their participants to the area where the problem that is 
being studied occurs. They do not bring participants into a laboratory or ask them to 
complete instruments such as a survey, but rather observe them in their natural setting 
and gather up-close information through conversation and observation. Secondly, in 
qualitative research, the researcher is the key instrument. They collect data themselves 
through the examination of documents, discussions and observations. At most they 
might have a set of open-ended questions that guide their observations.  Thirdly, 
qualitative researchers often use multiple forms of data. Lastly, qualitative researchers 
employ complex forms of reasoning. Categories for research are most often built from 
the bottom up through cycles of data organisation into growingly complex abstract 
units of information. Researchers constantly go back and forth between data, literature 
and theory in the formation and refinement of these categories for research. This 
requires an ‘inductive-deductive’ logic and demands complex reasoning skills from 
the researcher. 
Perhaps some might argue that a quantitative approach could have been primarily 
employed in this study (using structured forms of observation such as surveys). I am 
of the opinion that it would not do justice to the research questions, because the 
questions posed in this thesis evoke narrative explanations that are better dealt with 
through natural observations.  
This thesis uses a variety of data sets, some of which include secondary quantitative 
data. These types of data sets include, for example, the number of municipalities that 
participated in a specific programme in the Western Cape and funding amounts or the 
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number and aggregation of PV instillations in a particular region. Quantitative data 
was thus used only to substantiate the story that was told by the qualitative data 
gathered.  
3.2.2 Knowledge Claims and Theoretical Perspectives and General Reasoning 
In any study, the researcher holds ideas about the nature of reality (ontology), ideas 
about how knowledge claims should be justified, and about what constitutes 
knowledge (epistemology), about the role of values in research (axiology) and about 
the processes of research that should be followed (methodology) (Creswell, 2013: 20). 
In this section I will discuss the ontological, epistemological and axiological 
underpinnings of this research. In order to contextualise the knowledge claims that 
underpins this research, I will also discuss the combination of deductive and inductive 
reasoning employed in this study.  
The knowledge claims of this theory are in line with that highlighted by Derek 
Layder’s Adaptive Theory, which represents a mixture of approaches to research and 
in so doing holds an epistemological position that is neither positivist nor 
interpretivist and encompasses both subjective and objective ontological expectations 
in research. It presupposes that the world is complex, multi-faceted and densely 
compacted and is excellent for research inquiries that focus on the interconnections 
between human agency, social activates and social structures and systems (Layder, 
1998).  
The research presented in this thesis adopts a reasoning process that employs both 
inductive and deductive reasoning in all of its processes, from defining the research 
problem at the very start, to sampling choices, data collection and analysis and results. 
This project assumed a general lack of understanding of the role of agency in socio-
technical transitions based on the critique of the MLP in the literature. Initially, the 
research question revolved around the role of the private sector as active agents in 
bringing about transition. However, upon initial data collection and concentrated 
literature review, the question and focus of the research was reformulated to rather 
include a variety of actors and move away from the state-private sector dichotomy in 
an inductive manner. However, deductive reasoning was employed based on the 
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inductive reformulation moving forward in the research project. This project included 
various loops of inductive, deductive refinement. In short, I made use of both 
inductive and deductive reasoning in much the same way that is suggested by Layder, 
who views inductive and deductive reasoning as frameworks of ideas, discourses and 
practices. Adaptive theory advocates adaptation to the research process, both in terms 
of theoretical explanations and emerging data (Layder, 1998: 135) 
Empiricism denotes that valid data or knowledge can only be gained from our sensory 
experiences. This notion can be described as a ‘correspondence’ conception of 
knowledge, as theory and concepts are thought to correspond in some direct fashion 
to facts and empirical data. Rationalism on the other hand puts its faith in the initial 
basis of knowledge. Rational theorists are of the opinion that knowledge is 
independent of our sensory experience and results from forms of debate and reasoning 
that is more valid than that provided by our sensory experiences. In this sense 
rationalism can be associated with a coherence conception of truth because the 
internal relationships between concepts in a theory is thought of as paramount for 
understanding the phenomenon to which the theory refers (Layder, 1998: 137). The 
epistemological premise for this research builds on an understanding of empiricism 
and rationalism as discourses that are open to the influences of one another, much in 
the same way that the link between deductive reasoning and inductive reason was 
approached. This is also in agreement with Adaptive Theory (Layder, 1998: 139). 
There are phenomena in the social world that bare similarities with those found in the 
natural world. Social phenomena, such as structures or processes, must not be 
confused with human behaviour even though they are directly impacted in analyses of 
human behaviour. Rather, Layder suggests viewing these phenomena as having their 
own emergent properties that set them apart from human behaviour and social 
activity, while at the same time holding very real ties with the world of social 
interaction (Layder, 1998: 140). Adaptive Theory thus conceives the world as being 
comprised of both objective and subjective aspects, meaning that both the world of 
social interactions and the world of context and social setting are considered to be real 
and connected features of the realm of social research. The moderate view of 
objectivism adopted by Adaptive Theory means that the interwoven nature of 
subjective and objective aspects of the world are seen to affect one another and thus 
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that social activity is conditioned by systematic phenomena (Layder, 1998: 41). This 
holds true in its entirety for my research, and it illuminates my ontological approach 
to the study. Studying human agency in a complex system, such as an electricity 
sector demands that one realise that humans affect humans and are affected by things. 
The meanings and understandings gathered by this research are informed by the 
critical distinction that is to be made between social phenomena and human 
behaviour. What is more, some of the most important insights are gathered from- and 
premised upon the interconnectivity between human behaviour and social 
phenomena.  
The axiological claims of value that underpin this research, is once again captured 
completely by Adaptive Theory. Adequacy and validity of knowledge is represented 
in two ways in Adaptive Theory: first, in an attempt to produce a better understanding 
of the nature of the social reality in question than we had before: and secondly, 
through the formulation of more powerful explanations for social phenomena through 
explanatory forms, theories and constructs that include more in their terms of 
reference than previous explanatory forms (Layder, 1998: 142). 
3.3 Strategies of Inquiry 
3.3.1 Adaptive Theory 
The goal of this thesis is to build on understandings of socio-technical transition by 
conceptualising the study in terms of the Multi-Level Perspective and elaborating on 
specific elements of the theory through empirical research. This requires that the 
research had to be undertaken within the analytical boundaries set by the MLP, 
however in such a way that further theorising could add to the theoretical basis. This 
is why the Adaptive Theory approach is suitable for this research. The main reason 
for adopting the Adaptive Theory approach is because Adaptive Theory is agency 
centred, and takes serious the notion that the world is made up of social connections 
and agency, together with systematic structures.  
Adaptive Theory is ‘adaptive’ in the sense that the theory adapts to the data being 
collected, while, at the same time, the data is being filtered through and thus adapted 
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to prior theoretical structures relevant to their analysis (Layder, 1998: 5). On the 
continuum of approaches to theory generation one can view grounded theory at the 
one end, and middle-range theorising at the other. The middle-range approach to 
theory generation dictates that the research needs to formulate a theoretical hypothesis 
before the commencement of research so that this can guide the research endeavour 
and give structure to subsequent theorising, based on the data collected. Grounded 
theory on the other hand emphasises that the researcher commence research with as 
little pre-theorising as possible to allow for theory generation during the research 
process (Layder, 1998: 15). Adaptive theory places equal emphasis on the processes 
of the discovery of theory and on the employment of prior theory, and these two 
aspects of Adaptive Theory research are considered to have reciprocal influence on 
one another (Layder, 1998: 20). 
This approach is especially applicable in research aimed at better understanding the 
linkages between agency and social structures, as is required by this thesis. As 
described by Layder, Adaptive Theory:  
…targets the multiplicity of forms of interconnection between social agency 
and social structure (or system elements). These elements are tightly bound 
together to form a complex and multi-faceted social reality. Adaptive theory 
attempts to abstract from this tightly compacted complexity to identify specific 
forms of connection (between agency and structure / system). (Layder, 1998: 
143) 
It is this focus on human agents in socially complex systems, together with the 
methodological needs presented in this thesis that requires both the incorporation of 
existing theory and the grounding of theory building (or rather theoretical elaboration) 
in empirical observations that resonates strongly with my research. In this sense, 
Adaptive theorising allows me to consider some of the claims that have been made in 
the literature about the role of actors in governing socio-technical niches and at the 
same time elaborate on the scope of the MLP.  
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3.3.2 Collective Case study 
Case study research, according to Creswell, involves the study of a phenomenon 
through one or more cases within a bounded system (Creswell, 2013: 73). He adds 
that case studies can be done in either one or many bounded systems and that it 
involves in-depth data-collection from multiple sources. Generally, case study 
researchers report a case description based on specific themes found within cases. 
Creswell distinguishes between three types of case studies (Creswell, 2013: 74) : 
Instrumental case studies (where the researcher focusses on a specific phenomenon 
with one bounded case for illustration); collective case studies (where the researcher 
selects one issue to observe through multiple bounded cases); and an intrinsic case 
study (where the researcher focusses specifically on the case itself as it presents as 
unusual or particularly interesting to the researcher).  
This thesis adopts a collective case study approach (or multiple case study approach), 
in combination with Adaptive Theory. The multiple case study approach offers two 
distinct advantages for the research conducted in this thesis: first, it offers the ability 
to explore actor agency at niche level in two different types of niches, and secondly, it 
offers a podium for replication, even in two distinctly different types of niches, which 
is more robust than the explanatory power that rests in a single case study (Yin, 2003: 
47).  
Yin explains that there are three general approaches that can be followed in case study 
research (Yin, 2003: 111). He prefers relying on the theoretical propositions that led 
to a case study. These propositions are reflected in one’s research questions, views on 
the available literature and within the researcher’s hypothesis and subsequent 
propositions. The data collection process would also be affected by these propositions 
and ultimately, ones analytical process would be focussed by them. The second 
strategy lies in thinking about rival explanations (Yin, 2003: 112). Generally this 
approach is taken when researchers are aware of rival explanations for the 
phenomenon under investigation, and include the search for alternate explanations as 
part of the research design. Rivals can take a variety of forms from rival theories to 
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societal rivals that explain a phenomenon better than it was noted by previous 
attempts.2 
The third analytical strategy discussed by Yin is the development of a case description 
(Yin, 2003: 114). This can be used in cases where the original purpose of the study 
was to be descriptive and can yield, for example, an embedded unit of analysis and 
patterns of complexity, which together can yield causal explanations for ‘why’ 
questions. This study is approached using theoretical propositions about 1) the actors 
involved in the niche environment, 2) the pathways of development within niche 
environments, 3) the modalities of actor governance within the niche environment, 
and 4) the relationship between power giving and power taking, which led to the case 
study as analytical strategy.  
3.4 Sampling 
3.4.1Theoretical Sampling 
Purposive sampling, or non-probability sampling is a sampling methodology in which 
there is no way of estimating the representativeness of the sample (Layder, 1998: 46). 
The power of purposive sampling lies in the rich information that is gathered from 
cases. There are no prerequisites for size of samples and flexibility is of utmost 
importance. Theoretical sampling is a subtype of purposive sampling designed under 
the Grounded Theory approach, however nonetheless useful for Adaptive theory to 
build upon.  Glaser and Strauss described theoretical sampling as the process of data 
collection towards generating theory by which the researcher simultaneously collects, 
codes and analyses her data and, based on the cycles of collection, coding and 
analysis, determines sites for further collection, coding and analysis in such a way that 
theory emerges and develops (Glaser & Strauss, 1980: 45). 
Layder suggests that theoretical sampling can be performed with Adaptive Theory’s 
primary theoretical focus in mind - a focus on the interconnectivities between agency 
and system elements that are central to social life (Layder, 1998: 48). Layder found 
2 Yin (2003: 113) names nine types of rivals that can be incorporated into one’s analytical strategy. 
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Glaser and Strauss’s account of theoretical sampling to be negligent by not taking into 
account the role of prior theory, and it is this that Adaptive Theory aims to include 
(Layder, 1998: 47). Maxwell took a similar stance to the inclusion of prior theory, 
noting that through the inclusion of prior theory in research endeavours means 
considering a wide array of concepts and ideas, which in some way captures or 
models something about the world (Maxwell, 2012: 48). This means that concepts 
and ideas can be borrowed from theoretical works and explanations can be built 
thereon. It does not indicate any prerequisite in terms of complexity levels and can 
include anything from grand narrative accounts of the world to conceptual 
elaborations in theoretical endeavours. 
The theorising that takes place in this thesis is highly dependent on this mode of 
selection. Even though the propositions for research are grounded in the MLP, much 
of the inspiration and direction for elaboration was attained from other theoretical 
models. I will demonstrate this by looking at an instance of theoretical sampling in 
this thesis, by considering one of the sub-questions (see chapter 2): “which categories 
of actors can be differentiated at niche level?” However it must be noted that theory 
sampling forms part of the on-going process of research adopted in this study and 
there are countless other examples to be found within the study. As for the 
categorisation of actors, this is an example of simple theory sampling. This sampling 
was based on the identification of a need for more detailed categories of actors that 
was not provided for by the MLP. I took note of the fact that the theoretical models 
that I borrowed from use these categorical boxes in ways that I might not use them. 
However, this was not regarded as a problem because I use them as concepts rather 
than conceptual clusters, while the MLP can be regarded as my base typological 
model, which provides a more holistic view of system change into which my concepts 
and conceptual clusters fit.  Layder explains the relationship between concepts, 
conceptual clusters and typological models as the three groupings of theoretical 
elements that are considered important by Adaptive Theory. Concepts are small slices 
of the social world and are understood as making up the building blocks for more 
holistic pictures of social reality (Layder, 1998: 159). Conceptual clusters, networks 
and frameworks are clusters of related concepts and can be categorised in terms of 
their theoretical underpinning. They can also be classified as having open or closed 
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boundaries with other frameworks or concepts and as being tightly or loosely 
integrated. 
There are four differences between single concepts and conceptual clusters: concepts 
can be temporary devices used to orientate a study. They can be employed in order to 
depict a phenomenon, which might later be abandoned or become less significant with 
time. This is indeed the case for this thesis in temporarily adopting, testing and 
building on the concepts of actor categorisations gained from other theories. 
 Secondly, a concept might have recently emerged from data or theorising or a 
combination of the two and because of its novelty might not yet belong to a larger 
grouping. Thirdly, groupings of conceptual clusters cover more ground than concepts, 
much in the same way that syntax covers more ground than single words. Conceptual 
clustering in this thesis was based on theoretical sampling to some extent. The MLP 
provides a structure for understanding certain aspects of development at niche level, 
however, the conceptual clustering used to differentiate between modes of agency 
within niches - fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform empowerment - can be 
viewed as conceptual clustering of a variety of elements, including the types of actors 
within each of the niches investigated and the methods of power exerted by these 
actors.  Lastly, the complexity and range of meaning covered by a concept is 
broadened by the conceptual cluster to which it belongs (Layder, 1998: 160). 
With regard to theoretical and typological models it is important to realise that many 
of the general models that exist have a lot in common with conceptual clustering, as 
considered by Adaptive theory. Often they consider and group specific aspects of 
social reality, for example models of social behaviour or interaction, such as symbolic 
interactionism; or localised practices, such as ethno-methodological models; or 
models could group basic topographies of social life (Layder, 1998: 161). Layder 
defines typological models beyond their ability to group certain aspects of the social 
world; as an interlinked series of models regarding related phenomena that identifies 
similarities and differences between them. He further distinguishes between 
behavioural or action typologies and structural or systematic typologies.  
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3.4.2 Selecting Case Studies 
As mentioned above, the sampling methodology of this thesis is a form of purposive 
sampling called theoretical sampling, by which the researcher decides who or what to 
sample next based on the data gathered, to make comparisons with former findings 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 47). Other purposive sampling techniques such as 
convenience sampling are also drawn on in the selection of case studies and 
interviewees. This research focuses on two specific case studies. These are two 
instances of socio-technical niches that have become evident within the South African 
electricity sector, namely the case of the Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) and the case electric security in the 
Western Cape.  
Theoretical sampling involves oscillating cycles between theory, data and analysis, 
which would be hard to represent as a fixed linear selection process. There are, 
however, three principles built into the sampling methodology for this thesis, and a 
discussion and elaboration of these three principles should serve to satisfy as an 
introduction to the processes of case selection for this thesis. Based on this discussion 
I will go on to consider some of the finer detailed sampling criteria for my case 
studies. 
1) Cases were selected based on their availability. This is similar to convenience
sampling (Neuman, 2014: 248). The goal of case selection in this research is to get in-
depth observations about agency at niche level. It is not to get a representative
sample, as this would be impossible to calculate based on the complexities of socio-
technical systems and the issues related to establishing the exact number of niches in
a specific socio-technical system. Such an exercise would be a waste of time and
resources because a socio-technical system cannot be regarded as a stationary
population - as soon as one has counted the niches, there are bound to be more or less
within a short period of time. What is more, defining the boundaries of a socio-
technical system would suffer the same issues as presented by the temporal and fluid
nature of the existence of niches, and in addition require immense resources, as the
influence and influences for any particular socio-technical system that would justify
the elements to be included as part of the system are innumerable.
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The research conducted towards this thesis benefited from and contributed toward a 
larger project entitled: “Transitions to Sustainable Energy Systems in Emerging 
Economies: A South African Focussed Comparative Project” (hereafter referred to as 
the SANCOOP project). The shared resources between the project and the thesis 
include interviews, literature and other data sources. The project was aimed at 
enhancing knowledge-based policies towards the facilitation of decentralised 
sustainable electricity systems in emerging countries, with a specific focus on the 
regulatory environment. The focus and aims of the thesis differs from that of the 
project in scope, variables and theory-building aspects. However, the fact that 
financial and other resources at my disposal for conducting the research was linked to 
the needs of the project was not a limiting factor, because my research can be viewed 
as a magnified section of the larger project. Nevertheless, it meant that I had access to 
and had participated in gathering data that I didn’t need. This privileged position 
allowed me to hand pick the sub-sections of data to be included into each case from a 
library of rich resources. 
2) In connection with the issue of sampling availability, cases were selected because
they met the criteria held in this thesis to be defined as socio-technical niches. This is
a complex issue as the problem that this thesis deals with directly relates to the way in
which the ‘niche’ is conceived of in terms of the MLP. Because of this, the working
definition adopted in this thesis towards the delineation of the niche environment
considers the MLP definition and builds on it, as far is it is necessary for the goals of
this thesis. It must be clearly stated that it is not one of the goals of this thesis to
redefine the ‘niche’ concept. The MLP defines niches as the ‘incubation rooms’
where novelties are shielded from the selection pressures at play within the dominant
regime and can include small market niches and technological niches (Verbong &
Geels, 2007: 1026). This idea of a niche as a protected space for novelties is sufficient
for the purposes of this thesis.
3) The cases were also selected based specifically on the insights that they could
provide in terms of the focus of the research. Most case studies are selected for the
power of replication, however this does not mean that the case studies need to be
similar in nature. Case studies can be selected deliberately based on the differences
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that they offer. In cases like these, the researcher generally does not seek direct 
replication but rather seeks to prove the hypothesised contrast between cases (Yin, 
2003: 54).   
One of the basic assertions made about the nature of niches by the MLP is that they 
house three core processes: the articulation and adjustment of expectations, the 
formulation of social networks and, lastly, processes of learning and further 
articulation. This forms part of the base structural/ systematic typology for the thesis 
and thus the basis for case selection.3 In order to build on this I further considered the 
properties of niches put forward by Smith and Raven (2012), namely shielding, 
nurturing, and empowerment, giving special attention to the latter and added to this by 
considering the two different types of empowerment discussed by Smith and Raven: 
fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform. The two cases are examples of fit-and-
conform empowerment and stretch-and-transform empowerment respectively (this 
will be discussed in more detail below).  
Ultimately the niche environments selected as case studies had to be representative of 
specific conceptual clusters, with the possibility of elaboration on some select 
concepts. They were selected to include: 1) special conditions that foster the growth 
of renewable electricity, which could include a number of conditioning factors such as 
regulation, special benefits, new consumption preferences, new business models or 
practices driving the market, and many more. 2) Evident growth of one or more new 
forms of renewable technology that could be linked to the special conditions. 3) The 
possibility for elaboration on actor categories, and the relationship between actors. 
This however means that my selection criteria does not include the following: 1) 
geographic delineation in all cases, 2) specified technologies, 3) specificity in actors 
‘present’, 4) and specificity about the level of technological or performance 
improvements. 
The	REIPPPP	niche	as	Case	study	
3 See Layder (1998:161) for a detailed account of theoretical groupings in Adaptive Theory. 
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This niche is more centralised than the second one and therefore most of the data 
collected toward this case required two trips to the Gauteng province undertaken in 
2015, because the headquarters of large firms and public institutions interviewed were 
mostly located in Johannesburg or Pretoria. 
The boundaries of this niche are relatively irrelevant as explained above. Studying 
this niche meant studying the development that was shielded from the dominant 
regime via the REIPPPP process. Thus no geographical or formal boundaries apply as 
this includes consumers, the entire value chain of renewable electricity, various state 
departments and any actor or thing or process that impacts the niche. As mentioned it 
is not the goal of this thesis to redefine the niche concept but rather to study it, in the 
way that it is presented in the MLP. Considering this, concrete boundaries set for the 
niches, as case studies are rather useless.  
The aimed insights to be gathered from the case studies hinged on power giving and 
power taking. Consequently the niches are differentiated by the modalities of 
empowerment, namely fit-and-conform empowerment and stretch-and-transform 
empowerment. The cases were selected because they displayed different types of 
empowerment with different types of actors. This could arguably have been phrased 
differently. One could consider centralised development and oppose that with 
decentralised development. The reason for my chosen focus is twofold: first, the 
implication of agency in the conceptions of empowerment serve my questions better, 
and secondly, this thesis builds on the work of other theorists and these were the 
terms that they came up with to describe specifically the issues with which this thesis 
deals. Thus I concluded that they were better suited as classifications for my case 
studies than, say centralised or decentralised development. 
The Western Cape Electricity Sector Niche as Case study 
Because of my geographical location in the Western Cape, gathering data in and 
around Cape Town was relatively simple for this case study. Even though this niche is 
geographically located within the Western Cape, some of the shielding, as I show in 
Chapter 6, comes from national level, outside of the geographical location. Thus here 
again setting concrete boundaries for the niche is a needless exercise  
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The second case study is represented across two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 
6 (and Chapter 5) focus on power giving, steering or empowerment. Chapter 7 
focuses specifically on power taking. Arguably, power taking or rowing could have 
been considered in finer detail for the first case study and this would be an excellent 
point for future research. Due to the data available to me and the resources at my 
disposal, focussing on rowing in the second niche was easier to accomplish. Some 
might say that this gives an incomplete picture of the steering and rowing that 
affected the niches studied. I would have to agree. However, any study has its 
limitations and this study takes note of this limitation. This is not to say that a 
discussion about rowing was completely left out of the first case study, just that it did 
not enjoy as much attention as in the second case study.  
3.4.3 Selecting Participants 
Various sampling strategies were employed in selecting participants for this research. 
As the project advanced, the methods of selection became more refined. This type of 
refinement is once again characteristic of Adaptive Theory. Neither the case study nor 
the participant selection processes included pilot studies. Taken together, the data 
gathered from interviewing participants was sourced from 24 in-depth, unstructured 
interviews of between two and three hours each. I will elaborate later on the process 
of interviews. The interviews took place in three sets, beginning-phase; mid-phase 















6 During the initial phase of research one of the 
main ideals of selection was to establish a base 
case. This was especially relevant for 
participants that were part of smaller businesses, 
because these actors do not generally publish 
4 Based on Creswell (2013: 127). 
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information from which one can gather a basic 
norm with regards to the variables of this study. 
This meant for example establishing the normal 
interconnectivities that these actors have with 
other private or public institutions, and their 
perceptions of their own, and other actor’s 
methods of exerting agency.  
This also included selecting participants that 
represent larger private institutions and public 
institutions to corroborate or dispute the picture 




Mid-phase 5 Including a broad spectrum of actors, mostly 
specialists in the field selected to: 1). Elaborate 
on the theoretical problems already identified 
through initial analysis, 2). Highlight other issues 
and 3). Identify variations that might exist 
Criterion Sampling Mid-phase 9 Some cases were selected because they 
represented a specific criterion that was 
important for the study. One example of this is 
the selection of a specific company that 
specialises in mid-size solar rooftop projects in 
the Western Cape. Even though I had by that 
time had a variety of interviewees with 
renewable energy companies, this one was of 
particular interest because it contributed to the 
stretch-and-transform model of empowerment 
that I wanted to study within the Western Cape. 
Stratified purposeful 
sampling  
Final-phase 4 The final phase of interviewees were sampled 
with the direct aim of illustrating subgroups or 
sub-categories within the two case studies.  
Intensity Sampling Throughout 3 The sampling criteria applied to a few cases 
because they represented information-rich, 
‘must-have’ participants. These include for 
example a representative from the REIPPP office 
and a representative from Eskom.  
Interviewees served a dual purpose in this research: they were a source of data and 
they were compasses directing both the subsequent collection of interviewee data and 
data from other sources.  
Interviewees can further be categorised by the actor roles that they assumed, which 
was important for the research. 
Table	4:	Interviewee	Categorisation		
Actor Category Number of interviews 
National government 5 
Local government 4 
Intermediary 3 
Private actor: small company 4 
Private actor: larger company 3 





3.5 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
3.5.1. In-Depth Interviewing 
Qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviewing, produces knowledge that is 
linguistic, narrative, pragmatic and most of all contextual. Typically in-depth 
interviews are issue orientated and employed by researchers to look for patterns that 
emerge from thick descriptions from their interviewees (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 
95). The logic of choosing in-depth interviews relates to the role that was played by 
my interviewees in this study. The interviews served as primary sources of data but 
also as structuring elements in data collection, as I will explain below. In this sense 
in-depth interviewing was a good method for accessing subjugated knowledge, 
meaning the experiences and knowledge that remains hidden from mainstream data 
sets (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 98). 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy noted the danger in degrees of deviation and hierarchy 
between researcher and respondent because it affects the way in which the research 
comes to reflect the ‘world view’ of the respondent (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 94). 
This was a major issue of concern in this study. Respondents in this study ranged 
from renowned experts in the field and high-level executives in government and the 
private sector to small business owners. The perceived degree of deviation on my part 
was thus often mammoth. Often I had studied materials produced by, or read news 
that discussed the respondents, which put them in a certain light in my mind.  
To mitigate this weaknesses of in-depth interviewing and to contribute to the validity 
of the research project I employed a technique called the triangulation of measure, 
meaning that I took multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Neuman, 2014: 
166). This was achieved through gathering data in two primary methods (interviews 
and document analysis) and substantiating this with a third form of informal 
observation. This last form of observation was through the attendance of seminars, 
colloquiums and talks regarding renewable energy issues in South Africa.  
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3.5.1.1 The Process of Interviews Throughout 
The interview process took place in three stages between November 2014 and June 
2016. The interviews were usually arranged at the interviewee’s place of business or 
at a restaurant, and recorded using a Dictaphone. After each round of interviewing the 
data would be transcribed and growingly focussed forms of analysis would be applied 
(discussed in detail below).   
One of the big concerns in the mind of any researcher is a possible ethical quandary 
that they might encounter in their research endeavours. This research was conducted 
in line with the ethical requirements set forth by the University of Cape Town’s Law 
Faculty’s board of ethics. In line with this, interviewees were required to give 
informed and voluntary consent. As a researcher I was also required to respect the 
privacy and confidentiality of participants. The following measures were taken to 
insure the ethical treatment of interviewees and data: 
1. Upon initial contact with possible interviewees, full disclosure was granted
about the research project, my professional affiliation with the University and
about the requirements set for interviews.
2. A formal interview time was scheduled with willing participants as it suited
them, as far as possible in advance.
3. Upon meeting with interviewees, they were presented with an information
sheet (which they could keep) that contained a delineation of the project and
their rights and my expectations of them, the intended use of interview data,
the safeguards set in place for them including privacy and anonymity as set
forth by the ethics committee. It also included the contact details of the ethics
committee and the researcher.
4. They were also presented with a consent form, which I required that they sign
and give back to me.
5. Interviewees were asked if they objected to the interview being recorded and I
respected their wishes in this regard. They were also verbally informed that
they were not obliged to answer any question that I asked and could retreat
from the process and withdraw their interview from the dataset at any time,
before, during or after the interview.
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Raw data, including recordings, notes and consent forms were kept in secure folders, 
either at the researcher’s home or at the Global Risk Governance Programme’s office 
at the University of Cape Town. They were not shared with any other parties save for 
the transcriber who was made aware of and agreed to respect the confidentiality and 
ethical guidelines of the university.  
As the interview data gathered for this thesis also formed part of a larger research 
project, I was not always the only interviewer. In such cases South African members 
of the SANCOOP project team accompanied me. Most of the interviews were with 
one interviewee at a time, however in two cases interviewees either pre-requested that 
a colleague join them in the interview or invited a colleague during the process of the 
interview to explain specific elements of the interview better than they could. In these 
cases, informed consent and information sheets were provided for the secondary 
interviewees and all of the ethical considerations mentioned above were explicated. 
3.5.1.2 Structure of the Interview and Questions 
The interview structure was different for each of the interviewees. I did not have a set 
question list that I wanted answers for from all of my respondents. The guiding 
factors in my interview process were threefold: 1) The emerging theoretical ideas, 2) 
my research questions, 3) the aim of eliciting their subjective worldview. This 
unstructured methodology by no means meant that I went in unprepared - as 
explained the selection of interviewees depended on the phase of research that I was 
busy with, consequently the content of the interview was largely dependent on the 
phase of interviewing. Nevertheless the process of preparation for each interview was 
similar. Before each interview I would create a profile for the interviewee, their 
company and what I could gauge to be their specific area of expertise as it relates to 
my research. Notably this could possibly have created a form of bias in that I was 
purposefully establishing preconceived ideas about the interviewee in question, 
however this was mitigated by the fluid and unstructured manner of the interviews. 
Should the interviewee not respond as initially expected to a topic raised, I would let 
the conversation flow, provided that it still attended to my research questions, 
theoretical concepts or that it was an explanation of the interviewee’s view of his 
world. I was also wary of maintaining any set notions about constructs, people or 
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topics of concern and would often reiterate a question in a different manner to make 
sure that I understood exactly what the interviewee meant, or I would respond to a 
statement by rephrasing it and asking if this was indeed what the interviewee meant. 
From the profile created for each interviewee, I created a set of information primers 
and theory primers to guide the discussion. This is similar to a probe as explained by 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy: a probe is a researcher’s method for getting a respondent to 
expand on a topic, relate back to a previous chain of conversation or expand on a 
marker that was picked up on by the researcher (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 107). 
 The information primers meant that the interviewee’s acted as guides and informants 
to the rest of my data collection, both in interviewing and in documentary analysis. 
They were also used to fill in the gaps that my literature review and previous sets of 
data collection failed to do, and to clear up confusing issues from my previous sets of 
data collection. The information primers generally consisted of the following types of 
points:  
1. Technical explanations. Because of the nature of this study, it often
demanded complex understandings of technical concepts from fields such as
engineering and economics that I am not an expert in. My interviewees on the
other hand often had first-hand experience and a working knowledge of these
concepts and were generally all too willing to explain them to me.
2. Practical content issues. Because most of the literature at my disposal does
not present in a narrative all-encompassing fashion, there were usually issues
of interest to me that were left out in the literature as it veered from the point
of articles, news and books in question.
3. World-views. These primers cover both theoretical and informative domains,
depending on the response that I received from the interviewee. At the start of
each interview I would typically introduce the research project and myself and
prime the interviewee to give an introduction to their position, their
experiences and their views. This was a crucial step to the rest of the interview
as it allowed me to establish how comfortable the interviewee was with me
and it also allowed me to identify preliminary markers that I would take note
of and possible use as subsequent primers in the conversation. A marker is a
passing statement or reference made to an important occurrence or the
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respondents experience of something, someone or some occurrence (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy, 2011: 106). 
4. Follow-up questions. Often I would probe either the point of view or an
elaboration of information from a respondent through statements like: “I read
in Engineering News that X is becoming a big problem in the industry”
Theory primers were established and refined throughout the course of the research 
through processes of analysis and reflection. Thus at the start the theoretical primers 
were broad and ill focussed. This included the world-view of interviewees but also 
possible connections between the interviewee in question and the theoretical 
components of the study. It included for example:  
1. Bringing up issues or asking questions related to the interviewees role within a
specific niche;
2. Their experience of power dynamics within their setting;
3. Asking about their network and their network relationships;
4. Asking about their philosophy on renewable energy;
5. Identifying selection pressures that might impact the interviewee and probing
a response in this regard;
6. Asking about their relationship with incumbents or the central actors in the
production of ‘Eskom electricity’; or, if they were one of the incumbents,
probing the question in the opposite manner;
7. Simply asking who holds the power in their area of operation and how this
power is transferred;
8. Establishing their goals and then priming a response to their main
methodologies of attaining these goals. This type of probe took various forms
and was only posed to some of the interviewees. For example: probing an
intermediary actor (see chapter 2) to describe their goals and methodologies is
different to asking this of an actor from a small renewable energy company.
Sometimes an actor’s goals (making profit in the case of the renewable energy
company) are more obvious, so the question would not make sense. It was an
important probe in cases where the ideology of the individual or company was
seen as a dictation of action, or as a contradiction of action for which further
investigation was needed.
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3.5.2 Documentary Analysis 
The documentary analysis was informed by and informed the interview processes, 
and a similar model for choosing useful documents was used as the priming model 
explained above. Interviews have the strength of being targeted and insightful as they 
are guided by the researcher, however documentary analysis provide other strengths 
that could counteract some of the weakness of interview research. Interviews are more 
subject to the bias of the researcher and the respondent. They can also become over 
reflexive as the interviewee might only give accounts of the issues and constructs that 
he or she thinks the interviewer wants to hear about (Yin, 2003:86). By contrast, 
documentary analysis can provide a stable, unobtrusive and exact account of an issue. 
Even though much of the information found in documents selected might not have 
been of initial interest to the researcher, documentary analysis has the added 
advantage of broadening the scope of interest of the researcher through wide coverage 
of issues related to and not-directly (or not thought of as directly) related to a 
construct, situation or event (ibid.). 
The types of documentary sources used in this thesis are as follows: 
1. Speeches and media statements. The main actors for whom speeches and
media statements were accessed were those that could not be interviewed, or
those that are not pivotal to an argument, but nevertheless provide a
substantiating case. An example of the former is the 2016 State of the
Province address made by the premier of the Western Cape (Zille et al., 2016).
An example of the latter is a media statement by NUMSA that was used to
substantiate an argument about the reaction of incumbent actors to the
possibilities of privately procured electricity in South Africa (NUMSA, 2012).
2. Company Reports. These were accessed for companies of interest in order to
obtain quantitative information such as consumption or production statistics
and carbon emissions measurements.
3. Project Reports. This included a wide array of documents, such as the reports
of successful or unsuccessful projects under the REIPPPP and reports for
renewable energy-related projects by state and non-state bodies.
4. Research Reports and Plans. Various actor groups published research
reports of pilot cases and studies conducted in the realm of renewable
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electricity in South Africa. An example of a research project report is that of 
the Western Cape Provincial Government summarising their responses to 
climate change (Isaacs, 2016). 
5. Legislation and Rules. This included formal legislation such as laws and bills
and the project rules of the REIPPPP, but also institutional guidelines.
Some of my theoretical concepts benefited more than others from documentary 
analysis. An example in this regard would be that of the role of narratives in 
governing socio-technical niches. This was found to be a determining factor in the 
case of the Western Cape, and it was clearly demonstrated in their project plans, 
project reports and speeches and statements. The additional depth that documentary 
analysis provides to interviews can also be illustrated by this example. One of the first 
interviews that I had was with a representative of the Western Cape Provincial 
Government (Interviewee 10). In this interview various markers indicating the 
institutional mentality or narrative of the provincial government were identified, 
however only once the transcribed interview had been read. Had I picked up on these 
markers during the interview, I would have probed for more information from the 
respondent, however, at that stage I had not yet identified the narrative as an 
important construct for investigation. The supplementary documentary analysis 
allowed me to build on the markers even though I could not probe the respondent.  
3.5.3 Observations 
The observational analysis conducted in this research had two purposes: first, it was a 
source of further information and added to the triangulation of my data. Secondly, the 
type of observational settings allowed for a number of informal conversations which 
acted as more of a reflective mirror for my research than a reference-able form of 
data. Notably, none of the data gathered from these functions was directly referenced 
in this thesis, however the influence of meeting and listening to speakers, participants 
and delegates directed the lines of inquiry in my primary form of data gathering 
(interviewing) and my secondary form of data gathering (documentary analysis). No 
formal recordings were made during these types of observations; only field notes 
were made in some cases. These types of observations took place in two primary 
settings: at the 2015 Powering SA with Cleaner & Smarter Energy conference hosted 
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by SANEDI and the 2015 SAIREC (South African international renewable energy 
conference). 
3.5.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
This section serves to give an account of the ways in which I made sense of, 
organised, coded and analysed the data that was collected towards this thesis. As 
described throughout this chapter, the research was not completed in a segmented 
fashion. Rather, analysis began as soon as there was data and theorising took place 
throughout. As discussed earlier, the research is approached through a dual strategy of 
inquiry inspired by Adaptive Theory and Collective Case Study methodologies. The 
general approach to the study relies on the theoretical approach that led to the case 
studies as reflected in the research questions (Yin, 2003: 112) and by the 
simultaneous collection of data and processes of analysis advocated by Adaptive 
Theory (Layder, 1998: 20). The discussion that follows outlines this process 
3.5.4.1 Initial Data Sorting, Concept Formation and Nvivo 
In quantitative analysis, researchers conceptualise variables and conceptualise them as 
a step in the processes towards measuring them. By contrast, in qualitative data 
analysis of new concepts are formed or refined, grounded in data, and concepts and 
evidence are mutually dependent especially when working with case studies 
(Neuman, 2014: 480). Cases are defined as such mutually through empirical units and 
theoretical categories. This initial process referred to by Neuman as ‘casing’ takes 
place throughout the research process, however can be regarded as the first step in 
data analysis. This includes sorting data into manageable categories and initially 
flagging links, categorisations, generalisations, similarities and differences. This was 
accomplished with the use of the NVivo software. Open coding (Neuman, 2014: 481) 
processes were used in this manner. It started with giving each transcribed interview 
an alias in the form of a random number from 1-25. Beyond this point I referred to 
interviewees according to this number in order to maintain anonymity. All of the 
interviews were transcribed completely and entered into a folder in NVivo. As 
described by Creswell, the advantages and pitfalls of a computer programme for 
qualitative data analysis are as follows (Creswell, 2013: 165): the single location 
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aspect of storing transcriptions and other forms of electronic data in a single location 
makes data retrieval more efficient. Computer programmes, through electronic 
coding, makes it easy for a researcher to store and locate similar data sets, ideas, 
concepts or references through built-in search functions. The biggest advantage is the 
concept mapping function provided by programmes like NVivo. This enables the 
researcher to visualise connections between concepts, issues, actors and cases. In 
addition to this I also found that the nested hierarchies that I could create in NVivo 
provided an excellent tool for making sense of large data sets in case study research. 
It also allowed for cross comparison and summarisation of ideas that could be 
exported and kept on file. This served as initial concept lists, which were revised as 
the research went on. The main pitfalls according to Creswell are related to the time 
and effort it takes to learn a computer programme and to the possible shortcomings of 
programmes.  
Internal resources were organised into folders for documents, field notes and 
summaries, and transcriptions. The programme further allows one to create ‘nodes’. 
Highlighting a section of text and selecting the node(s) to which it belongs can build 
up these nodes. This can be done through systematically going through text or 
searching through all of the resources imported, or a selection of the resources 
imported for a specific phrase or term. Thus the programme allowed for cross-coding 
from various sources while indicating in each node section where the coded section 
was sourced. Various initial nodes, or code categories were created, including a 
master node for actors, with 25 sub-categories indicating different actors. Another 
initial node was created for data that referenced policy as master node, with various 
policies as sub-nodes.  
3.5.4.2 Data Analysis and Coding 
After the initial coding (pre-coding), the next step was to formulate orientating 
concepts in order to introduce my data to my theory. Layder suggests three sources of 
orienting concepts. These are: existing theories including general bodies of theory or a 
specific theoretical framework. The second instance is particular concepts; here he 
gives the example of Foucault’s use of ‘power’, which was also one of the orienting 
concepts in my study. The third instance is concepts drawn from particular 
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substantive or social areas of analysis (Layder, 1998: 101).  Drawing on the 
theoretical basis of this study, including the MLP, additional theories of socio-
technical transitions and the governance literature, these orienting concepts were 
created and refined throughout the process of data analysis and gathering. Below I 
give an example of some of the types of ‘power’ as an orienting concept used as a 









Power Actors State “We haven’t stepped up to the plate” (interviewee 17) 
Private Sector 
and consumers 
“I think you going to find that with time those small-scale 
renewables are going to move out of the utility space and 
out of the IPP space completely. And they are going to 
empower consumers to make choices and quite frankly 
that’s what’s going to disrupt the industry	and that falls 
completely out of our regulatory domain. These are 
consumer choices” (Interviewee 2) 
Intermediary/ 
third sector 
“everybody believes that they own us and in fact we do 
not belong to anybody” (interviewee 1) 
Regime War room “That is where the real war is taking place and it’s 
largely over who knows where the bodies are buried. 
Who’s actually done corrupt deals here and how do we 
cover up this and stop them from uncovering this 
complete mess” (interviewee 4) 
Eskom “ Eskom is not adhering to the legislation at the moment 
in terms of emissions … In fact, the department could, 
has the legal right to close down Eskom at the moment 




“we always say there’s pockets of excellence and pockets 
of …” (Interviewee 4) 
After the processes of pre-coding and the creation of initial orienting concepts, I 
began memo-ing throughout the rest of the research project. ‘Memo-ing’ is the 
process of taking stock of the progress of a research project by writing down ideas, 
concepts that emerge and questions and considering how these data points fit into the 
project as a whole. This is a great technique for a researcher to become more reflexive 
about their own position within the research (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011: 123). 
Layder suggests that along the lines of Adaptive Theory, one must opt for a form of 
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theoretical-memo writing. He expands on the work of Glaser and Strauss (1980) once 
again by including elements of both substantive and general theory. Thus memo-
writing, as he sees it, must attend to the characteristics of the theoretical framework 
such as their roles in chains of reasoning and models of explanation and in so doing 
become more concerned with theoretical elaboration (Layder, 1998: 49).  
Beyond this point, cycles of coding, memo-ing and analysis resulted first in a high 
volume of conceptual categories out of which systematic macro-level coding concepts 
became evident relating specifically to each case study. These overarching themes 
included: selection pressure; the modification of behaviour; power giving and power 
taking.   
3.5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the iterative process of research adopted in this thesis. It 
described the various thought and action processes that laid the groundwork for the 
work done and the analysis shown in the substantive chapters of this thesis. This 
thesis did not follow a linear process - it was messy. Cycles of back and forth between 
data and theory informed further investigations of both data and theory that happened 
parallel to one another.  
The chapter focussed on the rationale behind opting for a qualitative research 
methodology and looked at the guidelines used for selecting cases, participants and 
data sets. The strategy of inquiry was a combination of Adaptive Theory and 
collective case study methods. Adopting the Adaptive Theory perspective allowed the 
research to be flexible. Often, scholars present their research in a series of steps 
clearly following on one another. I have found that the actualities of research are 
never as simple. In fact, the research question that I started out with was not the one 
that I finished with. This is partly because during my research process the theoretical 
landscape was being developed. Various theorists had started attending to the same 
criticisms of the MLP that originally primed my research. Based on their work and on 
my growing familiarity with the theoretical terrain, I was able to sharpen my research 
questions.  
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The iterative process followed in this work contributed to the quality and refinement 
achieved in the study. The question of agency is a tough one to answer. It necessitates 
certain categorical differentiations between the variables that are thought to add up to 
agency. Initially this was going to be done by looking at the outcomes of agency in 
the niche as identified by the MLP and by other theorists of agency in socio-technical 
transition. Initially I focussed squarely on the action and inactions of actors toward 
shielding, nurturing and empowerment, and looked at how this contributed to the 
three processes of the niche as identified in the MLP. Later I realised that further 
categorisation of actors, be it temporally, might add to the explanations because 
saying that actors shield, nurture and empower and in so doing contribute to the 
developmental trajectories of the niche could be explored in more detail by saying 
which actors contributed in which ways. As explained above, the branches of action 
followed in this study were based on what had come before it. 
The data was validated through a process of triangulation and the methodology of 
coding and memo-ing was incorporated after and during each step of data gathering. 
This thesis is both comparative and explorative. To a certain extent, the case studies 
were compared to one another; however, the main comparison was between actors 
within each case study. Thus the case studies served as terrains for action rather than 
bounded spaces. The informants served a dual purpose as both sources of data and 
sources for the identification of where to look next. Much of the data that was 
gathered through the interview process was followed up with documentary analysis.  
The class of data gathered made this relatively easy: the work focussed on the real 
world experiences of actors and their perceptions of the system under study especially 
as it informed their mentalities and ‘possible futures’. There was also a distinct focus 
on the role of discourse in the socio-technical niche and even though this is embodied 
in the way that people talk about the sector it is relatively easily available in the form 
of policy, plans and media statements. Because of the fact that studying discourse on 
the matter also includes interpretation of people’s opinions, reading between the lines 
complicates the claims made in this regard. The process of triangulation through 
documentary analysis in this and other cases served to add to the validity of this 
study. Further, as much of the action research here pertained to either plans, 
legislation, rules or institutional standpoints, the substantiation of documentary 
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evidence proved invaluable. Possible shortcomings of this work might be found in the 
non-holistic account of governance mechanisms at niche level. They are non-holistic 
because I only regard the regime as it interacts with the niche, and because of the fact 
that the data was gathered during the formative phases of the niche environments 
because neither had broken through into the regime. However this can rather viewed 
as one of the accomplishments of the thesis as it investigates a time and space in niche 
formation that was previously not considered in the literature. Another shortcoming 
relates to the relative neglect of the landscape level of the socio-technical system. 
This is viewed as an acceptable oversight because of the nature of complex system 
studies: the boundaries drawn between what is considered and what is left unattended 
facilitates a sharper explanation, albeit a non-holistic one.
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Chapter 4 
Contextualising the Case Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
South Africa’s energy policy has been locked into a coal power pathway since the 
early 1950s when the National Party strategically launched the country’s electricity 
production and so doing inserted the state into the wealth accumulation that came 
from minerals and energy developments. The National Party had its finger on the 
pulse of the energy sector, which they strategically operated in a way that created the 
perfect climate for industry growth due to low costs of electricity and relative 
independence from the international market in the early years of industrial 
development (Scholvin, 2014: 192). The end of apartheid’s sanctions meant rapid 
internationalisation and growth of the already energy intensive industry (Scholvin, 
2014: 194).5 These increases in demand put pressure on the grid, which Eskom has 
attempted to counteract through the construction of new coal power stations and the 
reconnection of mothballed stations. Parallel to the on-going expansion of coal-fired 
electricity production to make up for shortfalls, the country is also perusing other 
avenues for securing electricity supply. These alternate avenues of electricity supply, 
together with a magnitude of technological development is changing the ways in 
which South Africans consume, produce and understand electricity. This chapter aims 
to form a backdrop for understanding the two case studies that are dealt with in the 
substantive chapters of this thesis, the REIPPPP and the development of renewable 
electricity in the Western Cape. The aim here is to sufficiently explore the political, 
social, historical, technological and regulatory contexts for these two case studies. 
This chapter starts with an exploration of the historical development of electricity in 
South Africa, highlighting the development of the minerals-energy complex in the 
5Electricity consumption by the non-ferrous metals industry tripled between 1992 and 2004; consumption doubled 
for the production of non-metal minerals and it more than doubled in the metal and iron industries (Scholvin, 
2014: 194). 
87	
country and the path dependencies created by this method of wealth accumulation. 
The second section explores the alternatives to coal-fired electricity that have been 
introduced into the South African electricity market, focussing specifically on the 
procurement of renewable energy from independent power producers and some more 
decentralised methodologies, including embedded generation and energy efficiency 
measures. The main aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the context of 
electricity debates in the South African electricity sector and to the two case studies. 
4.2 Historical Development of the South African Electricity Sector 
During the late nineteenth century South Africa installed its first electrical lights at a 
railway station in the Cape Colony. In 1882 the mining town of Kimberly installed 
electrical streetlights, well ahead of the rest of the world, which was still using 
gaslight (Eberhard, 2004: 2). Following this, the electricity industry grew rapidly in 
the country, closely linked to the booming gold mining industry. The first commercial 
central power station in South Africa was erected in 1897 by the Rand Central 
Electric Works and supplied the mining industry around Johannesburg. Many mines 
had subsequently built their own power station and in some instances, were supplying 
electricity to neighbouring towns. The Victoria Falls Power Company was established 
in 1906 with the intention to provide electricity from hydro power stations, but this 
was soon replaced by coal-fired power plants, as it was cheaper.  In 1910 the British 
colonies of the Cape and Natal, together with the colonised Boer republics of 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State formed the South African Union. The grid 
however remained relatively decentralised as it was made up of a mix of municipal 
and private power producers and was governed by municipal bylaws.  
By the 1920s centralised electrification had been considered, as the availability of 
cheap and abundant electricity would be crucial to shape the iron and coal industries 
that had begun to flourish in South Africa.  ESCOM (the Electricity Supply 
Commission) was created by The Electricity Act (42 of 1922) (Eberhard, 2004: 3). 
This Act also legislated the creation of the Electricity Control Board (ECB) to licence 
both private electricity generators and ESCOM, and approve proposed tariffs (ibid.).  
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The Act also gave ESCOM statutory powers to establish both generation and 
distribution capacity, and they had to do so at the lowest possible cost. They received 
loans from government in the early years but they had to issue bonds to raise the rest 
of the money. Exempting ESCOM from tax was one of many mechanisms 
implemented to oil the wheels of the ‘no profit, no loss’ machine. This legal 
mechanism made it possible for ESCOM to become involved in the power production 
of various cities in South Africa, which in turn led to ESCOM taking over operations 
of the power stations of the Victoria Falls Power Company.  
By this stage ESCOM was bulldozing most of its competition by taking over smaller 
companies. It was able to do so with the help of increasing state involvement and 
support in growing the monopoly of the electric giant in the South African industry 
(Eberhard, 2004: 3). The government at that time was content with their anti-waste, 
anti-competition system of electricity production, as it boasted one of the cheapest 
power stations (in Witbank) by 1930. By 1973 South Africa had a fully functioning 
interconnected grid that was almost completely centralised. The 1970s were 
ESCOM’s heydays, demand was at a steady increase and so was production. 
However, by the 1983 ESCOM realised that they had over planned, and that they had 
in fact ended up with double the capacity needed.  
Funding for the massive expansions that the grid underwent came from commercial 
debt and bonds issued by ESCOM to the local and international markets. However, 
the cost of finance was increasing, which led to the amendment of The Electricity Act 
in 1971. The amended Act now allowed ESCOM to retain a percentage of their 
earnings in order to build up a capital development fund. ESCOM was now allowed 
to make a profit. This signalled price increases, public unrest and eventually a 
government inquiry in 1983. The end result of the inquiry was changes in the 
Electricity Act and to ESCOM becoming Eskom in 1987 (ibid). 
4.2.1 From Escom to Eskom 
The new Eskom was aimed at improving financial and commercial performance as 
they moved away from their previous aim of ‘no profit no loss to be made’. Eskom 
was to be governed on more ‘business-like’ principles. But these changes did not take 
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away any of the power that granted the old ESCOM a monopoly over the electricity 
industry. What is more, the new Act included a clause exempting Eskom from having 
their tariffs regulated by the ECB, which meant that the responsibility of governance 
now fell squarely on the shoulders of Eskom’s Electricity Council.  
Despite the efforts at downscaling, maximum generating capacity still exceeded the 
peak demand by 40% in 1992. Eskom then decided to promote electricity usage by 
offering electricity intensive, industrial consumers low-cost contracts.  Eskom went 
into one such agreement with an Australian company, BHP Billiton, in 1992 
regarding the sale of electricity to their smelter located in Richards Bay (Manuel, 
2013). This agreement linked their tariff to the aluminium price on the London Metal 
Exchange, which meant that, should the price of aluminium drop globally, so too 
would their operating costs in South Africa. The arrangement was for 25 years, of 
which the first few were profitable for Eskom as the Rand had weakened.6 The 
economy was growing rapidly at that stage and Eskom’s capacity was fast 
approaching equilibrium with the national demand. Both parties were so happy with 
the agreement that BHP Billiton made another agreement of the sort for a smelter in 
Mozambique. By 2001 the Rand had weakened to R13.84 to the Dollar and soon there 
were plans for smelters close to Port Elizabeth and increases in the capacity of 
Hillside (BHP’s Richards Bay smelter) as Eskom was now pocketing over 400% 
more than when the deal was signed in 1992 (ibid.).  
The political shifts that South Africa underwent during the early 1990s also reshaped 
the industry. The African National Congress (ANC) had a broadly socialist economic 
philosophy, which signalled immediate efforts at social and economic advancement. 
Their Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) promised, among other 
things, the provision of water and electricity to poor households, through the catchy 
slogan, ‘electricity for all’ (Fowles, 2004: 2). There were various stumbling blocks to 
the implementation of the new electrification objections that including a fragmented 
industry; financial concerns; significant differences in tariffs charged across the 
country and discrepancies putting certain municipalities at a disadvantage in terms of 
purchase tariffs and electrification funding (ibid.). During the ANC’s first election its 
6 Part of the agreement was that BHP pay Eskom in US Dollars. 
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aims were for boosting employment through the creation of state-facilitated housing 
and infrastructure and various other poverty alleviation strategies through the RDP. 
By 1996, when the ANC had full control over government, managing the burden of 
debt and stabilising the economy became a key priority. The Minister of Finance at 
that time introduced the GEAR framework, which was intended to boost private 
investment. Already, this was seen as the ‘1996 Class Project’ by various labour 
unions - an attempt to cooperate with White Monopoly Capital towards the 
weakening of the democratic revolution (Nattrass, 2014: 16). 
The National Electricity Regulator (NER) was established in 1995 and an Electricity 
Working Group (EWG) was established to formulate proposals on structural changes 
to the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI). Another group, the Electricity 
Restructuring Interdepartmental Committee (ERIC) was formed to assess the 
recommendations made by the EWG (Fowles, 2004: 3). In 1997, based on a cabinet 
report, government, decided to introduce cost reflective tariffs, an electrification levy 
and a cap on tariffs for necessary municipal development. 
Governance of the electricity sector has always been a somewhat murky matter, with 
Eskom historically responsible for most of the governing, although, legally, the 
responsibility for oversight had shifted between national departments. The 
Department of Mines and Industry was involved in the governance of the electricity 
sector until the creation of the Department of Commerce and Industry in the late 
1930s. After the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Department of Industry 
was involved from the 1960s until the Department of Minerals and Energy took over 
in the 1980s. The Office of Public Enterprise was also involved at the end of the 
1980s. In reality, there was very little actual departmental oversight up until the this 
point (Marquard, 2006: 129). Early oversight of the industry by government, however 
limited, was accomplished through three main bodies (Marquard, 2006: 133). First, 
the electricity control board established in 1922 in terms of the Electricity Act that 
was responsible for the licencing of ESCOM and commercial producers. The board’s 
control effectively stopped with the issuing of licences. Instead they fulfilled a 
meditative role in terms of supply rights and infrastructure issues. Secondly, the De 
Villiers Commission was tasked to investigate the effectiveness of the Board, 
however they ended up focussing on ESCOM (Steele et al., 2012). Under the De 
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Villiers Commission the licensing system was done away with which meant that 
Eskom was effectively granted full control of the industry once again. The major 
changes that came from the De Villiers Commission was the corporatisation of 
Eskom and the end of the ‘no loss no profit’ formula for the utility.  The last early 
regulator was the National Energy Regulator that was established separate to Eskom, 
however comprising of ex-Eskom employees, including a retired Eskom CEO. The 
Regulator was established as part of the country’s economic regulation and the post-
apartheid transformation of the industry as part of the process of national 
electrification between 1993 and 1995(Eberhard, 2009: 237).  
In 2003 a blueprint created by PriceWaterhouseCoopers regarding the reconstruction 
of the EDI was to be operationalised by government. In line with the blueprint, 
government decided on the creation of six Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs) 
under the management of EDI Holdings (Pty) that would serve to rationalise pricing 
structures and manage distribution across municipalities. In terms of distribution, 
ownership of the networks as set out would remain in the public sphere. The idea of 
‘contestable consumers’ was also actualised (electricity intensive consumers that 
would be given the option to choose their electricity supplier) (Fowles, 2004).  
Former president Mbeki announced the deadline for the establishment of the first 
RED, with the City of Cape Town as its industrial centre, in his 2004 State-of-the-
nation address. The venture at restructuring electricity distribution in South Africa 
was not successful. Government realised that it would be more effective to retain the 
electricity generation assets that had historically been at the centre of the state’s 
accumulation of wealth. The private sector realised the risks inherent in privatising 
parts of the electricity sector in South Africa. (McDonald, 2011: 79).  
Costs for electricity services are currently spread out amongst the consumer base, 
with a portion of electricity subsidization for poor households built into pricing 
structures. Most of Eskom’s assets are paid off and there is still an abundant reliance 
on coal to produce electricity. This still translates into relatively cheap electricity, 
especially for industrial consumers (Tsikata & Sebitosi, 2010: 1282). South Africa has 
an extremely electricity intensive economy and the country’s dependence on this 
model of financial accumulation resonates in policy.  
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Eskom Currently operates 27 power stations with a collective capacity of 41 919 MW 
most of which is from coal-fired electricity generation plants (35 650 MW) (Creamer 
Media, 2014: 1). Almost two-thirds of Eskom’s power stations are in need of 
maintenance that has been delayed. Eskom has two new large-scale coal fired plants 
on the way and one hydro pumped storage station. The Medupi (4 764 MW) and 
Kusile (4800 MW) coal fired plants will be brought online in the near future, however 
they are already behind construction schedule. The utility has also completed the 
return to service program, which brought online 3700 MW of power from three 
mothballed stations.  Eksom has also invested 2.4 billion Rand in the 100MW Sere 
Wind farm and they have started a solar project to the value of 9 billion Rand that is 
expected to yield 500MW- 1000MW in capacity within the coming years (Creamer 
Media, 2014: 2). 
Despite the efforts at staying ahead of the demand curve, Eskom is in trouble.  
In 2008 South Africa experienced its first electricity crisis due to antiquated power 
stations resulting in technical breakdowns. Again in 2014, the electricity sector found 
itself in a state of crisis due to similar conditions (Wentworth, 2014: 7). The price 
readjustments proposed during the first attempts at electricity restructuring described 
earlier also never realised. The price that consumers pay is determined by NERSA, 
and the level of output and capital investment in electricity is determined by the 
Department of Energy. This has resulted in a demand-supply equilibrium issue for 
Eskom (Wentworth, 2014: 8). Initial shortages in reserve margins started appearing as 
early as 1995, however this was only acted on in terms of price increases in 2007.  
Eskom’s CEO at the time, Tshediso Matona, reported in November 2014 that the 
utility was at its worst economic and operational position since its birth. This due to 
inflated costs of coal and diesel, municipal debt and various maintenance issues that 
dropped the energy availability factor to 76% at the end of September 2014 (Creamer, 
2014a). The utility requested an average yearly increase in electricity prices of 16% 
but Nersa only granted them 8% average increase for the period April 2013 to March 
2018.  Eskom’s financial dilemmas led to the creation of an interdepartmental task 
team to probe the issue, consisting of officials from Public Enterprise, the Department 
of Energy and National Treasury. The probe concluded that Eskom needs support to 
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safeguard its sustainability in the coming years with the immediate priority being the 
securitisation of short-term resources as the utility is facing short-falls of up to R25 
billion over the next two years (Creamer Media, 2014: 2).  
4.2.2 The Minerals-energy Complex 
Historically production and transmission of electricity in South Africa was separate to 
the distribution of electricity with the exception of distribution of electricity to mining 
companies and large industries. This led to a close relationship between electricity 
intensive industries and Eskom with its abundant cheap electricity, which underlies 
the development of the South African economy growing from a trickle-down effect of 
the networks of mining industries in the country. The mining and energy sectors, with 
their related industrial subsectors, constitute the main site of financial accumulation in 
South Africa through a complex web of interdependencies described by Fine and 
Rustomjee as the minerals-energy complex (Fine & Rustomjee, 2007: 71). They argue 
that the developmental trajectory of South Africa’s economy rests upon the strong 
linkages that are to be found between a set of closely-knit industries and the 
consequent lack of linkages that these industries have formed with other sectors. 
Almost all of South Africa’s electricity was generated by coal-fired power plants up 
until the early 1980s when the first nuclear plant was commissioned (Marquard, 2006: 
122). This meant that electricity remained cheap, as it had mainly been sourced from 
the country’s abundant coal reserve, which left the market relatively isolated from 
outside influences such as the oil price increases of the 1970s.  
The developmental trajectory of the electricity market is tied into this relative 
independence in terms of two phases of development according to Marquard (2006). 
The state was able to strategically insert itself into the regional development of 
mining and industries through the electricity industry as there was a continuous 
supply of coal and cheap labour to sustain a growing monopoly in the production of 
electricity, with relatively high levels of autonomy from the rest of the world. Mining 
and minerals processing already accounted for around 40 per cent of the country’s 
electricity consumption in the mid-1900s, with related industrial consumption 
accounting for a significant proportion after that (McDonald, 2011: 67). The second 
phase is the development of a national grid and the institutionalisation of relationships 
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between the electricity monopoly and energy intensive industries in South Africa 
(Marquard, 2006: 123).  This resulted in the characteristics of the electricity sector in 
the country, which can be observed to this day. The South African economy has been 
built on this intrinsic link between private capital and public utilities. The complex 
has adjusted over time to include other related sectors and remains heavily dependent 
on electricity and mining at the centre, with the industries at the epicentre becoming 
reliant on the service sector due to the crisis of financial accumulation that the country 
was facing at the end of the Apartheid era. Mining-minerals and related firms were 
increasingly seeking protection in financial markets both locally and globally, which 
in turn contributed to the financialisation of the local market and a secondary 
connection added to the minerals-energy complex (McDonald, 2011: 67).  
As illustrated by the failed attempt at restructuring the sector into REDs, discussed 
above, the economic developmental trajectory of South Africa that culminated in the 
minerals-energy complex means that the country is limited in terms of developmental 
paths that it could take in the future. The state will, for the foreseeable future hold on 
to assets that it deems crucial to providing for the financial accumulation demands set 
by the minerals-energy complex. For the time being, South Africa’s options for ‘base-
load’ electricity are locked into coal. The country also has limited capacity for 
hydropower because of low rainfall. It is only the Orange River that carries enough 
water to power a hydropower station (Scholvin, 2014: 191). The potential for 
hydropower in our Southern African neighbour states are relatively high, however 
their demand for electricity is much lower than that of South Africa. There have been 
attempts at regional cooperation with Mozambique to share the output of the Cobora 
Bassa station located in the Zambezi River. However, the conflict in Mozambique 
made the high voltage transmission lines easy targets for anti-government guerrilla 
movements in the 1980s and 1990s (ibid). There are however various other lucrative 
possibilities in the area of regional cooperation in hydropower, however the main 
reason for not acting on this is, once again, the country’s abundance in coal (ibid). 
Privatisation in the electricity sector, based on a withdrawal from the sector by the 
state, will be highly contested as it holds serious ramifications for both the industries 
at the heart of the minerals-energy complex and for the state’s ability to profit from 
the complex (McDonald, 2011: 79).   
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4.2.3 The Politics of Electricity in South Africa 
The creation of energy policy has been described as a balance struck in terms of the 
energy ‘trilemma’ (Rhodes, Skea & Hannon, 2014: 5603). This trilemma consists of 
three broad policy objectives: energy security, energy affordability and the 
management of environmental impacts. The trilemma has both reinforcing and 
opposing elements. This trilemma is clearly evident in the South African case; 
however, policy decisions are currently made out of necessity to regain electricity 
supply security. Renewable sources of electricity have been considered as a beacon of 
hope if South Africa is to reach its carbon mitigation targets. To date, however, they 
have remained marginal in the grand scheme of things. The reasons for the slow and 
partial uptake of renewable energy technologies into the South African energy sector 
have been ascribed to institutional shortcomings, social factors and market-based 
barriers set by Eskom’s monopoly over the industry. The most powerful explanation 
is probably the minerals-energy complex, according to which the country’s economy 
is effectively locked in by the long-standing ties that have formed between industry, 
energy and finance (Scholvin, 2014: 187).  
Political players in South Africa are not only linked to the electricity sector through 
the creation of policy. They are often active players in the sector and their reach and 
influence goes much deeper than the cosmetic policy level. This can be attributed to 
the political value that has been created by the minerals-energy complex in the 
country, but sadly, also to the high levels of corruption and nepotistic arrangement of 
politics in the country. The involvement of South African politicians in areas such as 
energy and electricity is highly sensationalised by the media; however, it remains an 
important avenue of exploration as it serves as one of the lock-ins that I will describe 
in more detail below.  
Politicians in South Africa have often occupied the grey area of owning or holding 
personal stakes in the mechanisms underlying the dominant regime. The Daily 
Maverick’s Mandy De Waal quoted columnist and political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi 
as saying:  
Understanding who is in charge of this country means understanding the 
nexus between money and politics, and which interests are hegemonic in 
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South Africa… I think one has to look at it in those terms. And you have to 
look at which logic these companies support in the decisions they take – they 
can be powerful, but at the end of the day whose logic do these companies 
support? (De Waal, 2013)  
Indeed, the economic and political influence of these personal buy-ins to the energy 
and electricity sector and the political alliances formed have definitive ramifications 
for the creation of policy in the country (Scholvin, 2014: 188). Leading politicians in 
the ANC sit on the boards or hold a significant amount of shares in mining 
companies, most significantly, Cyril Ramaphosa (ibid). Another example is that of 
Bridgett Radebe, wife of Jeff Radebe (the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development) and sister of Patrice Motsepe, one of South Africa’s wealthiest citizens. 
Bridgett Radebe is the chair of Mmakau mining (a company with many coal interests) 
and the president of the South African Minerals and Mining Association (that advises 
the Minister of Energy). Her brother Patrice Motsepe, also has mining interests and 
has been linked to President Jacob Zuma and various other ANC elites. There are 
countless other examples of political networks that hide under the surface of the 
electricity market of South Africa. What I attempted to highlight with these two 
examples is the lobbying power that lies within these networks. I was by no means 
commenting on their legitimacy. It is important to understand that these networks 
often exert their influence on the formation of policy and on the developmental 
trajectories of the sector and that, through these networks, the development of 
electricity policy and infrastructure is linked to a variety of other interests. Why 
would one lobby to move away from coal power if one owns a coalmine?   
International political pressure has also had a significant impact on energy policy and 
practices in South Africa. In 2012 South Africa stopped importing oil from Iran under 
pressure from the United States. The decision to implement Eskom’s Medupi coal- 
fired power station is another example of South African electricity in the international 
political arena. It will be Eskom’s largest single investment in its 84 years in 
operation and will provide up to 10 per cent of the country’s electricity needs (Rafey 
& Sovacool, 2011: 1141). Medupi is, however, expected to push around 30 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide into the South African air annually. The project is dependent 
on major funding obtained from the World Bank (albeit in a questionable manner) 
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(ibid.). The World Bank loan was surrounded by an outcry from civil organisations 
and environmental groups, which led to a firestorm of rhetoric. Support for the 
mammoth new build cited economic imperatives as South Africa’s number one 
concern, which was reason enough to go ahead with the project. Medupi was even 
framed as environmentally friendly due to its cleaner coal technologies (Rafey & 
Sovacool, 2011: 1144). 
4.2.4 Electricity policy - toward the inclusion of alternative energy 
technologies 
Almost half of the electricity capacity added globally in 2012 was from renewables 
(Msimanga & Sebitosi, 2014). By 2012, 138 countries worldwide had set in place 
renewable energy targets and 127 had already implemented some form of renewables 
policy, the most common of which was feed-in tariffs and renewables portfolio 
standards. There are various countries that have transitioned from a monopolised EDI 
model. There are a few identifiable models of transmission ownership in existence 
(Pollitt, 2008: 704).  
1. The independent transmission system operator model, of which the UK national
grid is an example, where the transmission system is completely unbundled from the
rest of the system and privatised.
2. The legally unbundled transmission system, of which France is a good example,
where two separate boards have control over transmission and distribution.
3. The independent system operator model requires an external body monitoring and
controlling, but never owning, the transmission assets.
4. A hybrid model between independent system operator and the transmission
ownership where these become unbundled from the rest of the system.
The South African transition is being shaped not only by a need to decarbonise, but 
also by the immediate challenges of electricity security. The transition will however 
be shaped by much more than this, as there are various path dependencies that block 
certain avenues of transition in the country. The political imperative to include the 
private sector and renewable sources of electricity in the South African electricity mix 
can be seen in the following policies: 
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1. The 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy was drafted during the initial phase
of the National Electrification Programme and set out to define energy and
electricity objectives in post-apartheid South Africa. This paper had the
ambitious (failed) target of unbundling the electricity distribution from
generation and transmission with the aim of introducing competition into the
market through the outsourcing of 30 per cent of the current generating
capacity held by Eskom (Morris & Martin, 2015: 11).
2. The 2003 Renewable Energy Policy White Paper set the first target of 10 000
GW of renewables to be procured by 2013, however this target was not met.
3. The Integrated Energy Plan of 2003 drawn up by the Department of Minerals
and Energy, aligned energy policy with other national development strategies,
international commitments and long-term climate change strategies. This
report was to be updated annually over a 20-year period, however; this was
not followed through. The second Integrated Energy Plan was released for
public comment in 2013 (Morris & Martin, 2015: 12).
4. The Electricity Regulation Act of 2006 was initially established to create
NERSA in replacement of NER and to clarify the regulatory body’s
relationship with Eskom. However, it also held major implications for the
establishment of independent power procurement programs. NERSA was
effectively separated from Eskom and charged with the mandate to licence
new generating activities, while Eskom was charged with purchasing new
generation in terms of the Act. This meant that the two bodies had to be in
agreement before any new external capacity could be connected to the grid,
effectively giving Eskom the power to delay the process as the Act enabled
them to be the sole purchaser of electricity (Morris & Martin, 2015: 13).
5. The Long Term Mitigation Scenarios Paper (LTMS) of 2007, commissioned
by the Department of Environmental Affairs, to assess the country’s GHG
emission mitigation strategies was conducted by a multi-stakeholder team that
included representatives from the private sector, civil society and government.
Its research findings have had a significant impact on commitments made by
government towards lowering carbon emissions, which in turn creates a
positive outlook for the private sector and renewable electricity markets.
President Zuma committed to reductions at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference
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of Parties, and the LTMS also informed future energy planning policy (Morris 
& Martin, 2015: 14). 
6. The New Generation Regulations of 2009 outlined the process for the creation
of power purchase agreements for all technologies, including renewables. This
was accompanied by the Electricity Regulation Amendment Bill that
stipulated that in terms of formulating power purchase agreements for
independent power producers, the power should be stripped from NERSA and
handed over to the Department of Energy. The Bill also made it possible for
the Department of Energy to instruct Eskom to purchase power from
independent power producers (Morris & Martin, 2015: 15). This was an
important milestone in the acceleration of private sector entry into the South
African electricity market.
7. The Integrated Resource Plan of 2010 was set to establish South Africa’s
electricity mix for the next 20 years. This document was to be revised every
two years, however there has only been one such revision in 2013. This
document included a significant allocation of renewables to be added to the
electricity mix, however the mix was still dominated by coal electricity. The
2013 update happened together with the update of the Integrated Energy Plan
and took a more practical stance to electricity developments as it had taken
more current factors into account in its scenario planning (Morris & Martin,
2015:17).
8. The National Climate Change Response White Paper of 2011 gave a broad
overview of South Africa’s climate change response strategies and set
priorities based on the LTMS.
9. The Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) Bill was another
attempt at liberalising the electricity market. In terms of this Bill, a separate
entity would be created to control generation and resource planning. This
entity would also then take over Eskom’s role, as sole purchaser of electricity
and it would also be tasked with overseeing general system operations. The
Bill was presented to Parliament in 2013, but was abandoned.
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4.3 Procurement of Electricity from Independent Power Producers 
There are a few widely cited reasons for the inclusion of cleaner technologies in the 
South African electricity sector: first, governmental recognition that Eskom does not 
have the financial or technical capability to meet the country’s demand and ensure 
electricity security (Montmasson-Clair, Ryan & Moilwa, 2014). eREACT is an 
activist group within parliament that came about in response to a lack of results, after 
tireless debates about issues such as the energy crisis, the country’s carbon footprint, 
and the reality of the construction of new power stations (Meyer et al., 2011: 46). 
eREACT stands for the e-Parliament Renewable Energy Activists. In light of the 
energy crisis in 2008, this group was able to influence parliamentary opposition to 
include clean energy. This contributed strongly to the decision to introduce REFIT in 
2009.  
Secondly renewable energy technologies are becoming more and more effective and 
competitive because of various factors, including the possibility of carbon tax being 
introduced in the country. Thirdly the government’s climate change mitigation and 
green economy strategies have set out the need for clean electricity as a main priority. 
The Integrated Resource Plan states that 42 per cent of the South African electricity is 
to come from renewables by 2030 (Scholvin, 2014: 199). Terence Creamer reported 
in October 2014 that the country had already attracted over $10 billion in clean 
energy investments (Creamer, 2014b).  Solar has accounted for the largest segment of 
this with $6.7 billion. The inclusion of renewables in the South African energy mix 
has been a long time coming. Despite the various failed efforts and risks involved, 
most renewable projects have delivered on time with no budget overruns (Schwab, 
2014).  Daniel Schwab of Business Day suggested that scaling up renewables is the 
best solution for our current electricity dilemma as this will not only lessen our carbon 
emissions but also create jobs and transform the South African economy from a 
commodity-based economy to a knowledge-based economy (ibid.). Lastly the 
creation of a renewable electricity industry has, as one of its sub aims, the mission of 
contributing to the country’s local economic development through job creation. 
Globally, the path toward the inclusion of renewable sources of energy has taken 
different forms in different countries. Denmark - Europe’s renewable energy pioneer, 
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for example, had a movement motivated by a need to evade the risk of an over- 
dependence on fossil fuels after the oil crisis of the 1970s, just like many other 
European countries (Roselund & Bernhardt, 2015). The Danish government 
considered the implementation of a nuclear build program as an alternative, however, 
this was strongly opposed by a citizens movement that began building small locally 
owned wind powered turbines. Government policy soon followed this with a program 
that subsidised 30 per cent of the cost of instillations of renewables, which signalled 
the beginning of Denmark’s renewables industry (ibid). The initial motivations 
underlying the inclusion of renewable energy technologies and the private sector 
actors in South Africa stemmed from a need to liberalise the market in an attempt to 
overcome some of the issues inherent in having a monopolised industry, such as 
discriminatory tariff structures and inefficiencies in supply. At a later stage, global 
pressures, directing the electricity sector toward greening strategies, also added to the 
list of arguments for the inclusion of renewable energy. Even though initial attempts 
at market liberalisation failed, the list of reasons for the inclusion of renewables and 
the private sector into the energy field grew when the electricity sector entered a time 
of crisis due to Eskom’s production shortfalls and unmaintained equipment  
The National Cogeneration Programme 
In 2007 Eskom launched the Pilot National Cogeneration Programme (PNCP) to test 
the market for independent power producers (Montmasson-Clair et al., 2014: 40).  
The initial aim was to procure 900 MW of commercial cogenerated electricity by 
2007. Eskom was specifically looking for projects that could utilise energy from 
processes that would otherwise be wasted; projects that produced by-products of other 
energy types (in addition to electricity); and projects using renewable fuel sources for 
the generation of electricity. The PNCP aimed at commissioning projects that could 
deliver more than 1 MW and had a ceiling price for bidders. The focus was on 
obtaining the cheapest bids in terms of technical and commercial specifications with 
power purchase agreements to be signed up for any period between seven and 25 
years. Eskom received 15 bids with a projected output capacity of 5000 MW by June 
2008, however they offered power purchase agreements totalling only 50 MW. The 
bidding process was said to be complex and too risky and finally no power purchase 
agreements were signed under the PNCP. However the Medium Term Power 
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Purchase Program, in the pipeline for the following year, 2008, seemed more 
promising.  
The Medium Term Power Purchase Agreement 
The Medium Term Power Purchase Agreement (MTPPA) was submitted late in 2008 
with the focus on changing Eskom’s short- and medium-term power supply and 
catering for projects that were not included in PNCP. The maximum planned capacity 
of the project was 30 000 MW (Montmasson-clair & Ryan, 2014: 41).  It would 
include projects ranging from 5-10 000 MW and was open to all technology types 
including new build and capacity increases. Bidders could sign either a power 
purchase agreement or participate in Eskom’s Power Conservation Programme. 
Eskom guaranteed a minimum price for buy backs that declined from 2009 annually.  
However the plans were short lived as issues with lower than anticipated tariff 
increases granted by NERSA, together with external costs of commitment, forced 
Eskom to step back and abandon the project. Despite being scrapped, the MTPPA 
received more positive feedback from bidders than its predecessor. The publication of 
predicted prices allowed bidders to better determine whether their project would be a 
success (Montmasson-clair & Ryan, 2014: 41).   
The Multi Base-load Power Procurement Program 
The Multi Base-load Power Producer Program (MBIPPP) was established in 2008 
with the aim of specifically procuring 2100 to 4500 MW of base load power 
(Montmasson-clair & Ryan, 2014: 42). Eskom pre-qualified 27 national and 
international developers out of the 76 that had applied. Pre-qualification was 
essentially based on the companies’ having 25 per cent black shareholders. Requests 
for proposal were issued and successful projects would have to sign a long-term 
power purchase agreement with Eskom. The project was suspended by Eskom in 
2009.  
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The Renewable Energy Feed In Tariff 
The Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff policy (REFIT) was the first policy outside of 
ESKOM. Even though the PNCP included the procurement of clean energy in its 
initial criteria for developers, REFIT was the first to focus solely on renewables. 
NERSA designed and administered the project and Eskom was the designated buyer 
of electricity. Set prices had been established for different technologies by NERSA. 
(Montmasson-Clair, Moilwa, & Ryan, 2014: 45).  REFIT was approved in 2009 with 
its first phase kicking off in March that same year. It was designed to generation costs 
and real return equity of 17 per cent fully indexed inflation (Eberhard, 2014: 36).  In 
phase one, NERSA published guidelines for the regulation of various technologies 
including wind, biogas and CSP parabolic through storage. For Phase Two, in July 
2009, NERSA published further guidelines for large scale on-grid PV systems, solid 
biomass, biogas and a few other CSP technologies. The evaluation criteria for 
renewable projects under REFIT were published in early 2010. In its initial form, 
REFITs power purchase agreement had various issues: it allocated too much risk to 
IPPs and there was no stabilisation clause for legal changes (which created unrest 
among possible developers as previous procurement processes and agreements were 
abandoned leaving IPPs involved without compensation). NERSA then attempted to 
redraft the problematic power purchase agreement with the help of a private legal 
firm, Webber Wentzel. The risk that IPPs expressed as reservations to the first draft of 
REFIT were largely based on the pre-established price for which Eskom would 
purchase their electricity (Montmasson-Clair et al., 2014: 98).   
The tariffs were revised in March 2009. The new tariffs were regarded as generous by 
the private sector, however this time they expressed concern about whether South 
Africa would be able to sustain these new tariffs over the 20-year lifetime of the 
power purchase agreement. They were concerned that the higher tariffs could result in 
costly electricity for the consumer and in so doing, halt development within the sector 
in favour of cost-cutting (Montmasson-Clair et al., 2014: 99). The last revision of 
tariffs was published in March 2011 by NERSA and this time, it they seemed to get it 
just right. Unfortunately this small success was short lived, as National Treasury 
announced in 2011 that REFIT was illegal, based on an audit done by Webber 
Wentzel, citing that the tariffs predetermined in the way specified by REFIT would 
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fall outside of South Africa’s public finance and procurement laws. REFIT was 
abandoned without any power being procured under the program (Eberhard, 2014: 
36). 
4.3.1 The Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme 
The implementation of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Project 
Procurement Program put its predecessors to shame. The historical and institutional 
shortcomings of the South African energy sector would have suggested that this 
would be yet another failed attempt, however, the program has exceeded expectations 
all round (Eberhard, Leigland & Kolker, 2014: 9). The Department of Energy (DOE) 
realised, however, that they too would encounter capacity issues when attempting to 
run the program. The DOE decided to learn from ESKOM’s mistakes. They sought 
the assistance of the National Treasury’s Public-Private Partnership Unit (PPP) to 
manage the program. The DOE PPP office was assembled with technical staff from 
both departments and with a few legal and technical experts from outside government. 
This unit effectively functions outside of the formal structures of these departments, 
with a focus on assisting the REIPPPP process (Eberhard, Leigland & Kolker, 2014: 
9).  
Familiarity with the structures and practices that are to be found within the private 
sector meant that they knew to include the private sector in dialogue regarding key 
structural issues of the program design and implementation. The REIPPP’s private 
sector consultant’s list includes international reviewers such as Ernst & Young, 
project management reviewers, legal evaluation, technical evaluation and financial 
evaluation. High standards were set and maintained throughout the bidding processes 
and most of the deadlines were met (Eberhard, Leigland & Kolker, 2014: 9).  A 
request for proposals was issued in August 2011. The REIPPPP initially envisioned 
3625 MW of power to be procured from a maximum of five tender rounds and a 
further 100MW was reserved for smaller projects. Caps were set on the maximum 
capacity to be produced by a single technology with the largest allocation going to 
wind electricity (Eberhard et al., 2014: 11). Bids were due within three months of 
request for proposal and financial close would take place six months after the 
announcement of preferred bidders. The Request for Proposal comprised of three 
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main sections: general requirements; qualification criteria and evaluation criteria. The 
documentation also included a standard power purchase agreement; an 
implementation agreement and direct agreements (providing step-in rights for lenders 
in the event of default). Contracts were set to have a 20-year tenure. Project selection 
was based 70 per cent on price and 30 per cent on economic developmental 
considerations. The REIPPPP is not subject to the National Treasury Regulation 16 
for evaluating and approving public private partnerships, however the IPP’s are 
required to complete a list of 24 preparation steps, including being evaluated by 
specialised analysts. This is because Eskom, who has to sign off on all of the power 
purchase agreements, is considered a state-owned rather than government enterprise. 
More than 130 advisors were used to develop the Request for Proposal and also to 
evaluate bids. Private sector advisory costs were estimated at US $ 10 million 
(Eberhard, Leigland, & Kolker, 2014: 12).  
By June 2015 a total of 92 projects had been signed under the REIPPPP with a total 
investment value of R193 billion (Creamer, 2015). The process for the procurement 
of electricity from independent power producers is at an all-time high in the country, 
amidst the on-going state of crisis in 2015. Together with the announcement of 13 
preferred bidders for round four of the REIPPPP came an unexpected announcement 
of a mopping up exercise aimed at securing another 1800MW from previously 
unsuccessful bids and other new bids as part of round 4 (ibid.). The tender 
documentation will be redesigned for round five to include a redefinition of ‘local 
community’ and further mechanisms to ensure early, equitable benefits to local 
communities and more serious considerations for local content requirements. The 
reviewed tender documentation will also draw in closer considerations of constrained 
distribution and transmission in the country. In addition to this the Minister, Joemat-
Pettersson, confirmed the Department of Energy’s commitment to procuring an 
additional 6300MW of renewable electricity in future bid rounds. Deputy Director-
General of Policy Planning and Clean Energy, Ompi Aphane, stressed the scope 
extensions of IPP procurement in South Africa beyond renewables to include coal, 
cogeneration, gas and demand-side management initiatives (Creamer, 2015). 
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4.4 Non-utility Scale Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: the Case of the 
Western Cape 
4.4.1 Renewable Energy at Provincial Level 
For South African provinces, changing the way that electricity is produced and 
consumed within their jurisdiction is a difficult task, because most of the juridical 
power to affect electricity matters sits with national and local government. At city 
level, municipalities control their distribution grid, and the profit made from the 
distribution of electricity is a pivotal part of most South African municipal financial 
models. The goal of sustainable development has in recent years however translated 
into sustainable energy plans and roadmaps for many of the provinces in South 
Africa, and a part of this always includes making the electricity sector within their 
regions more sustainable. It must be understood that altering the electricity sector is 
hardly ever regarded as one of the main outcomes of these strategies. Even though 
these documents and plans are aimed at sustainable development across industries, 
this is made to fit into the socio-political ideology of the province and usually 
includes aspects of energy poverty, economic development and overall sustainability. 
Most of these policies and plans are not directly aimed at growing the renewable 
energy sector. Even though all provinces have the same mandate and relatively 
similar legislative power within their region, they cannot be considered to have equal 
opportunities to impact sustainable development in general and the renewable energy 
space in particular. The reasons for this include the unequal distribution of economic, 
social and environmental resources (Department of Energy, 2015: 39).  The table 
below represents the renewable energy activities per province in South Africa.  
Notably, this information is adapted from a report by the Department of Energy on the 
State of Renewable Energy in South Africa, and consequently favours utility scale 
electricity and is biased from a national standpoint (Department of Energy, 2015).7 
Regardless, it offers an interesting presentation of the types of activities that are being 
undertaken at provincial level. The table is divided into action categories that include 
both broad focal areas in policy, identified technological developments and 
technological developments that have been acted on. Not included in this table are the 
7 Minimal data is available regarding the activities of the Free State provincial government, thus it is not included 
in this table. 
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general areas of influence that are a part of the energy or sustainability strategies of all 
provinces. These are: job creation, the facilitation of a green economy, energy 
security, energy access, energy cost issues and addressing consumption patterns 
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8 A target of 100 MW has been set for CSP. 
9 Additional information regarding small-scale embedded generation also obtained from a report published by 
SALGA, GIZ, AMUE and GreenCape  (SALGA et al., 2016) 
10 With the support of GIZ, a REIPPPP permitting and authorization process was published for projects in the 
Eastern Cape. A support study was also conducted.  
11 Additional information was also adapted from the Climate Group summary of the Western Cape and the 
Province of Kwazulu-Natal (The Climate Group, 2017b). 
12  Special Economic Zone for solar themed projects in the Khara Hais Municipality. 
13 Limpopo has substantial silicon reserves and the second largest silicon smelter in the world. Limpopo’s Green 
Economy Plan identifies the development of silicon for component solar panels, solar chargers and small-scale 













The ‘top green planner’ provinces, identified in a study by the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) and GIZ, were Gauteng, the Western Cape and 
Kwazulu Natal (Ferry & Von Kalm, 2015:11). This study analysed the Integrated 
Development Plans of municipalities to determine how many municipalities had 
incorporated renewable energy, energy efficiency and climate change into their 
planning modalities and categorised municipalities as top green planners if they have 
prioritised renewable energy and climate change issues by identifying green projects 
and allocating budgets towards these projects. In 2015 only 60 of the 278 local 
municipalities fell into this category (Ferry & Von Kalm, 2015: 3).17 
The Western Cape 
The province houses approximately 6.1 million citizens, covers an area of 129,370 
square kilometres and is the fourth largest province in South Africa (Musango et al., 
2015: 3).  The policy response for the province stem from the National Climate 
Change Response White Paper, published by the Department of Environmental 
Affairs in 2011, which mandates provinces with developing a climate change 
response strategy that should evaluate the risks and impacts of climate change (ibid). 
The Western Cape Government established its Green Economy Strategic Framework 
in 2013 and with that, aimed to become the lowest carbon province in the country and 
the green economic hub of South Africa.  
14 Through the creation of a center or an energy office within the Gauteng Provincial Government towards the 
coordination of investors, municipal and sector departments and to deal with energy issues, including renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. 
15 KZN sustainable energy Forum and the renewable energy hub 
16 The Eastern Cape Provincial government established an energy forum to facilitate the implementation of and 
investment in sustainable energy. 
17 Of the total 278 municipalities in South Africa, 44 are district municipalities and 226 are local municipalities. 
Of these, eight are considered to be Metropolitan (Buffalo City, City of Cape Town, City of Johannesburg, City of 
Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, e Thekwini, Manguang and Nelson Mandela Bay) All eight metros were identified as Top 
Green Planners.   
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The Western Cape has three key target areas for affecting climate change-related 
issues: GHG emissions reductions, energy efficiency and energy productivity and 
renewable energy. Targets have been set for all three of these areas by the Western 
Cape Provincial government (The Climate Group, 2017a). Crucial for the success of 
the Western Cape Government has been the identification of ‘levers for change’, 
which include the facilitation of instillations of embedded generation, solar water 
heaters and other energy-efficiency measure on both public and private buildings. The 
table below offers a summary of the initiatives taken on by the Western Cape 
Government in the sustainable energy and electricity space.18 The crucial formula to 
success, which is discussed in great detail in Chapter 6, includes the identification of 
the issues of sustainability, the identification of levers for change, the implementation 
of these levers and the quantification and measurement of the implemented levers 
over time. 
Table	7	Sustainable	Energy	Activities	of	the	Western	Cape	Government19		
Activity Period Main Outcomes 
Climate Change Mitigation 
Scenarios for the Energy Sector 
2015 Mitigation scenarios considered best outcome 
identified: replacing coal-fired electricity with 
renewable energy and natural gas 
Western Cape Provincial 
Strategic Plan 
On-going Reduce reliance on Eskom by 10% by 2018 
Levers for change include small-scale embedded 
generation, solar water heaters and reduction in energy 
usage for buildings 
Small-scale embedded generation 
(SSEG) focussed work 
On-going Collaboration with municipalities and other key 
stakeholders to facilitate SSEG with a specific focus 
on the necessary guidelines, by-laws and tariff 
structures 
Solar PV on public buildings On-going Installing solar PV on government buildings, and 
feasibility studies in this regard 
Western Cape Modernisation 
Programme 
On-going Relating to office space- the promotion of metering 
technology in order to measure consumption and 
calculate potential savings 
Climate Change Municipal 
Support Programme  
From 2012 Support municipalities in realising and setting 
sustainable goals, climate change frameworks and 
action plans 
Annual Integrated Development 
Plan assessment of local and 
districts 
On-going Monitoring and evaluation of the progress of 
municipalities in responding to issues of climate 
change 
18 This section provides a preliminary overview of the renewable electricity developments in the Western Cape. 
The topic is discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
19 Adapted from the Climate Group (The Climate Group, 2017a). 
110	
4.4.2 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency at City and Municipal Level 
Above I described how provincial governments guide and facilitate the uptake of 
renewable energy in municipalities. National government also has a substantial hand 
in guiding the production and consumption of electricity at municipal level. They 
affect this through programmes such as the Energy Efficiency and Demand-Side 
Management Programme (EEDSM). This programme was established by the 
Department of Energy and currently delivers grants to 68 municipalities in South 
Africa (Joemat-Pettersson, 2016: 17). Most of these funds are directed toward 
retrofitting streetlights. The Local Government Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy Strategy set up in 2013 provides a framework for local governments to 
develop an energy efficiency framework tailored to their own needs. National 
government has set two basic targets for municipalities in relation to energy 
efficiency: firstly a 20 per cent reduction in energy intensity, indicating the 
consumption of energy per person residing in the municipality and secondly, a 30 per 
cent reduction in fossil fuel intensity of the municipality’s own vehicle fleet (ibid.). 
By 2016, 18 municipalities in South Africa already had approved SSEG application 
processes in place, a further three had application processes under development 
(SALGA et al., 2016). Seventeen municipalities had already allowed customers to 
feed into the grid, three of which had not yet established approved SSEG application 
processes. Fourteen municipalities had either approved tariff structures for SSEG, 
were in the process of approving these structures and a total of 25 municipalities were 
keeping track of the SSEG instillations in their jurisdictions (ibid). The municipalities 
in the Western Cape make up: 13 out of the total 25 that lists their instillations; 12 out 
of the total 18 that have approved SSEG application processes; 13 out of the total 17 
municipalities that allow customers to feed into the grid; and 11 out of the total 14 
municipalities with approved tariff structures in place, or having tariff structures 
under development (ibid.).  
There are a few identifiable pioneering renewable energy projects at municipal level: 
eThekwini municipality owns a landfill gas-to-electricity project that was 
commissioned between 2006 and 2008. Capital and operating expenditures for this 
project come from the sale of carbon credits and the sale of electricity (Department of 
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Energy, 2015: 61). Bethlehem Hydro established in 2009 and 2012 at two sites is 
commercially managed in the same way as the eThekwini’s landfill gas project, 
through the sale of carbon credits and electricity fed back into the municipal grid. It 
was the first commercial hydro power station established in South Africa in 22 years 
(Department of Energy, 2015: 65). Both of these projects had to overcome various 
regulatory hurdles, including obtaining long-term power purchase agreements 
between municipal actors, other departments (the Department of Water Affairs in the 
latter context and the Cleansing and Solid Waste Department in the aforementioned). 
Notably these types of innovations were pioneers in municipalities becoming 
competitors with Eskom on commercial terms. The Darling wind farm in the Western 
Cape has a long-term power purchase agreement with the City of Cape Town and is 
another pioneer in this light. It was the first large renewable energy project in the 
country that acted as a testing ground for various new policies, including the wheeling 
of electricity (Department of Energy, 2015: 64). In addition, all of these cases had to 
contend with relatively low electricity prices affecting the viability of projects. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Gwede Mantashe was quoted in late November 2014 as saying: “Electricity remains a 
public good and therefore, if you privatise it, it will have problems”(SAPA, 2014). 
The electricity market is undoubtedly becoming a shared space. Private investment 
and the technical abilities of the private sector are at the basis of the success of the 
current IPP procurement project. This ‘shared space’ has trickled down into local 
electricity markets and has translated into a growing level of decentralisation in the 
electricity market of South Africa. Transitioning away from the centralised dominant 
regime that is firmly rooted in the minerals-energy complex is a complex process. 
This chapter has introduced the successes and challenges of the South African 
transitioning electricity sector. In the following chapters (5-7) I provide a substantive 
analysis of the interactions and governance modalities of actors at niche level.	
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Chapter 5 
The Case of the REIPPPP 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how actors govern change toward the breaking of 
lock-ins in socio-technical transitions. More specifically, I consider the dynamics of 
governance that takes place within protective spaces, or niches, as the primary 
location for the formulation of new rules in socio-technical systems.  In order to 
contribute to this debate, three specific interrelated areas are discussed in Chapter 1 
and built on in Chapter 2. Collectively these topics are dealt with in each of the 
substantive chapters (5, 6 and 7). Toward this goal, two niche environments have 
been identified in the South African electricity sector in chapter 4 of this thesis: the 
IPP project (discussed in Chapter 5) and the Western Cape electricity sector 
(discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). In this chapter I focus on modalities of fit-and-
conform empowerment (Smith & Raven, 2012: 1030),  specifically considering the 
categorisation of actors, the methods of steering and empowerment and the 
contribution of actors to the developmental trajectories of the niche. 
The REIPPPP unit (hereafter referred to as the IPP unit) was set up in 2010 
collectively by the DOE and the Public Private Partnership Unit of National Treasury. 
The unit effectively functions outside of the formal structures of these departments, 
with a focus on assisting the REIPPPP (hereafter shortened to the IPP Process) 
process (Eberhard, Leigland & Kolker, 2014: 9). Even though the establishment and 
success of the unit was a mammoth accomplishment, it cannot really be considered to 
function in strict opposition to the dominant regime. Eskom is the sole purchaser of 
electricity generated from this programme and the levels of procurement are 
controlled by the DOE. Arguably, the programme would not have existed if not for 
the various incidents of electricity shortfall experienced by the country, the 
international pressure toward lowering the country’s carbon footprint and the 
availability of alternative technologies. The existence of the programme is legally 
mandated, however, as I will show in this chapter, there are various actors that 
influence the niche created by the programme beyond the regulatory actors.  
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5.1.2 The Interpretation of Policy  
The programme is mandate by the IRP 2010, which states that around 42 per cent of 
the electricity generated in the country needs to come from renewable sources. 
According to the DOE, the IPP programmes’ existence confirms the state’s 
commitment to the implementation of the IRP, in fact, the Department stated that the 
implementation of the programme was essential if the country wanted to maintain its 
credibility:  
In terms of the IRP2010, about 42 percent of the electricity generated in the 
country is required to come from renewable resources. The forthcoming 
launch of the Renewable Independent Power Producers (IPP) Programme, 
confirms the commitment by the South African government to implement the 
approved IRP2010… It was essential for the department to proceed with the 
implementation of renewable energy initiatives to maintain credibility of the 
country (Department of Energy, 2011). 
Prior to the IRP, the 1998 White Paper was the first policy document that signalled 
changes to the electricity mix in South Africa, and the possible unbundling of Eskom. 
Even though the White Paper was a bold step towards a renewable energy economy, 
the execution of its suggestions remained relatively unsuccessful for a very long time. 
The interpretation of the White Paper was one of the first points of misalignment that 
occurred within the electricity sector of South Africa. From Eskom’s point of view 
the White Paper did not necessarily instruct the breaking up of the utility, but rather 
that the distribution industry needed to be sorted out. It said that transmission and 
distribution needed to be separate and that generation should include private sector 
participation in one form or the other. 
Since the White Paper there have been various interpretations of what the electricity 
sector should look like, primarily because the White Paper was published before the 
political debates accepting the implications thereof had taken place. In 2004, 
government employed a team of consultants who effectively designed a Nordic model 
for the country’s electricity system. An interviewee who was part of this process 
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explained that the White Paper was never really implemented because the debates had 
never really taken place within the ANC and within the broader sector (Interviewee 
6). According to this interviewee, there was definite discomfort in what the 
consultants were proposing, around unbundling and particularly around the 
participation of the private sector.  
Post 1997, financial crisis’s in the developing world together with the collapse of 
companies such as Enron influenced European and American investor confidence in 
developing markets. Development Finance Institutions also reconsidered their 
position with regards to restrictions place on infrastructure investments (Gratwick & 
Eberhard, 2008: 310). The open market liberalised industry model, suggested by 
policies such as the White Paper, came into question after international financial 
crises prompted a reconsideration of the national goals for the electricity sector. This 
would be the second point of de-alignment for the electricity sector of South Africa. 
The perception now, 17 years on, is that the country doesn’t have a clear vision 
guiding the electricity sector, and that it is becoming increasingly difficult to update 
the vision because of the amount of contesting streams of development. The 
regulatory structures of the electricity market have essentially become de-aligned. 
5.1.2 The Unforeseen Circumstances of Changing the System 
Eskom understood that it would not necessarily be the vehicle for future capacity 
within the power industry. This is why they created a business diversification vehicle 
called Eskom Enterprises (Interviewee 2). This was easier said than done as some of 
the normal operating methodologies that the electricity sector functioned on for so 
many years, now started to become issues. One such issue came in the form of cost 
reflective tariffs. This and other issues started surfacing when the utility tried to ready 
itself for the structural changes proposed by the White Paper. Eskom also predicted 
issues with the supply of electricity in the future. The utility had re-adjusted after a 
period of over-supply in the early 1990s and realised that they had to invest in their 
infrastructure if they were to survive in the future. Eskom asked NERSA for a tariff 
increase, which was opposed, based on the White Paper. NERSA’s argument in 
response to Eskom was that the utility was in top financial shape, and seeing as they 
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would not be the vehicle for future growth in the electricity sector, raising the price of 
Eskom electricity did not make sense.  
It seems that the crisis needed to reach a critical point (which it subsequently has) for 
political dialogue to follow. After 1998 there were various attempts at industry 
liberalisation that took place in South Africa. The case of the Independent Systems 
Market Operator bill (ISMO) was mentioned by a few of my interviewees. In terms of 
this Bill, a separate entity would be created to control generation and resource 
planning. This entity would also then take over Eskom’s role, as sole purchaser of 
electricity and it would also be tasked with overseeing general system operations. The 
Bill was presented to Parliament in 2013 but was rejected. The perceptions around the 
(unsuccessful) Bill, was that the state, through Eskom, was not ‘exposed to the 
market’ in any real way; they have a captive market, which they are not willing to 
give up without a fight. The IPP office is viewed as a possible precursor to an open 
market. This widely-shared sentiment is clearly indicated in the following quote: 
So, we were going to liberalize completely in the 90s, we didn’t go that way, 
and it just got stuck and Eskom was the hierarchy on its own and wanted to 
maintain its own ways and then they started to talk about the ISMO Bill. The 
IPP office could be a precursor of a sort of independent system and market 
operator. They are outside of all those other bounds but it’s all long-term 
agreements and electricity isn’t traded in real time and the government isn’t 
exposed to the market on any specific day. They like that! They have now 
retired the ISMO Bill. (Interviewee 3) 
Around the same time that the ISMO Bill was proposed, Eskom was in crisis.  
A ‘War Room’ was set up late in 2014 by the President with the aim of addressing the 
electricity crisis and facilitating coordination between the various departments that 
hold a stake in matters of electricity security. The perceptions of various of my 
interviewees around the happenings within and around the War Room shed light on 
the issues that were surfacing regarding the de-alignment of the electricity sector.  In 
addition to NERSA, Eskom and the DOE, the Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, the Department of Mineral Resources and the Department of 
Trade and Industry were all included in the discussions that took place in the War 
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Room. It was Chaired by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and co-chaired by the 
Minister of Energy and the Minister of Public Enterprise. Various high-level 
academics and private sector actors in finance and business acted in an advisory 
capacity to the War Room. Even though the War Room was set up to address a 
national crisis, the discussions happened behind closed doors.  
The interviewees that spoke about the War Room did so with disdain, saying that it 
was not serving its purpose. It was perceived as a last attempt at saving Eskom rather 
than resolving the electricity crisis, and that it was used to drive alternate political 
agendas in the electricity space, that had very little to do with solving the immediate 
problem at hand.  
Not many people really know what is going on in the war room that’s part of 
the problem. They are very insular, they do not share a hell’uve lot. What they 
firstly seem to be concerned with is the financial sustainability of Eskom. 
Rather than how do we actually resolve this energy crisis… (Interviewee 4) 
And this is actually to allow big vanity projects such as nuclear and shale gas 
which dominates at the level of the Executive, the Cabinet sub-committee on 
energy security, they seem to think that energy security is something for 2030, 
but they better do something about it now. Nuclear and gas are not pertinent 
to the short-term prices and then we have this whoa! And I do not know if you 
guys have managed to pick up whether the war room is an Eskom war room or 
a DoE war room?... (Interviewee 5)  
The messy politics that is illustrated by the War Room is the result of poor execution 
of the plans and policies that are in place, and ignorance of these plans through which 
the political elite drives alternative agendas, such as the procurement of large-scale 
non-renewable electricity. Ignorance and alternative agendas alone cannot, however, 
take all of the blame for the lack of push behind policies and political action that 
could have been aiding the development of the renewable electricity industry. By now 
pull factors had resulted due to: 1) the dominant regime mind set lobbying for big 
energy projects and centralised control over electricity resources; 2) the kick back of 
previous attempts at market liberalisation, including a shift in the global financial 
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climate; 3) a need to resolve the issues highlighted by the structural shifts that had 
already taken place in the industry, such as problems with cost reflective tariffs; 4) 
indecision in the political space about the best way to move forward after policies had 
been drawn up, partially through the influence of non-politicians.  
The resulting mistrust in government’s capacity to solve the electricity supply crisis 
worsened and the fact that various high-level government officials had been involved 
in the incumbent industries that form the nucleus of the minerals energy complex, 
such as major mining houses, contributed to the private-sector suspicions regarding 
the factors that drive electricity decisions. 
Another example of the divisions that exist in government was discussed by various 
interviewees, that of nuclear power, which is yet another instance where the DOE has 
functioned as a mere backseat driver, if that. The presidency has strongly advocated 
for nuclear new builds and has been involved in questionable deliberations on the 
matter with Russia. President Zuma also restructured his cabinet in such a way that 
allowed him a close relationship with the new minister in energy, who herself is an 
avid supporter of the nuclear programme (Morris & Martin, 2015: 32). A renewable 
energy activist interviewed in 2015 said that this type of policy over-ride is not a 
matter of bad planning, as the fragmentation issue has been resolved through 
assigning the authority of energy governance to the DOE and through the creation of 
the Integrated Resource Plan. According to him, there is now a problem of an 
“authoritarian” approach to planning because energy policy and energy decisions are 
governed from the centre (the presidency) in complete disregard of planning systems 
that have been put in place. This perception is shared by those privy to the discussions 
and deliberations that happened in high levels of government. One interviewee, who 
was part of the National Planning Commission (NPC) explained that there were 
rational discussions taking place, which looked at the timing, cost and need for 
nuclear electricity. This interviewee also explained that there was another voice, that 
of the President, pushing for nuclear regardless of the cost, finance and timing. This 
issue was of grave concern to many of the key actors in renewable electricity that I 
interviewed. It was seen as a clear sign of corruption and that certain actors within the 
state were prepared to act in a completely irrational manner in the pursuit of alternate 
agendas, be it personal enrichment or the refusal to let go of a captive market. One 
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important fact became clear throughout this whole debacle: that the South African 
government has a variety of different voices, driven by contradicting ideals for the 
electricity sector, and the actors supporting big new builds such as nuclear, powerful 
as they might be, remain in the minority. 
Perhaps if the political will existed during the deliberations around ISMO Bill or 
during the initial unbundling of Eskom, the country would have never entered a state 
of crisis. The electricity sector was in a catch-22 situation. There was some political 
will to introduce IPPs, however this was overridden by agendas aimed at maintaining 
the Eskom monopoly. These incumbent agendas had nevertheless started 
deteriorating, which meant that the tariff increases requested by Eskom were also not 
allowed. The early introduction of IPP’s or an allowance enabling Eskom to expand 
and repair its fleet could arguably have prevented the electricity crisis starting in 
2008. The political will toward the inclusion of IPP’s grew and resulted in 
procurement programmes such as REFIT and its predecessors, however the state was 
still not willing to level the playing field as was evident by the retirement of the 
ISMO Bill. The state has since made commitments toward carbon reductions, both 
nationally and internationally, which have to be honoured. 
 The incident of the War Room sheds light on the fact that there are still strong 
alliances that act toward keeping the Eskom as monopoly intact, even when there is a 
successful procurement programme underway. The nuclear deliberations showed that 
there are also powerful government officials that have no issue with overriding policy 
to serve stock electricity plans. However, it also clearly started showing the fractions 
in government. The REIPPPP was born out of these issues of electricity governance. 
It happened because of shifting tensions that had been looming within the dominant 
regime for quite some time. The new ideals portrayed by this misalignment do not 
necessarily have to be in favour of a decentred, or renewable electricity market. They 
merely have to provide enough stagnation or resistance in the incumbent 
developmental trajectories for other possibilities to be considered.  
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5.2 The Placement of the Programme 
The programme was strategically placed outside of the direct mandates of its parent 
departments, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Treasury. Their 
instructions were simple: find the barriers to private participation in the production of 
electricity in South Africa and remove these barriers, as explained by an interviewee 
representing the IPP office: 
At the Inter- Ministerial Committee it was very clear, in fact the instruction, 
was to go and look at the barriers, why is the private sector not participating 
in the SA energy space and the further instruction was to remove those 
barriers and make sure we get the programme going. (Interviewee 1) 
Even though the DOE credits itself with the promotion of renewable electricity, this 
too has been done through the outsourcing of regulatory responsibilities to the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme office. 
From the examples discussed above one should come to realise that, even though the 
programme had been mandated by law, this was by no means the reason for its 
creation or for its success, as there were various prior attempts (two mentioned above) 
at liberalising the market that had failed. Secondly, the reason for its creation or its 
success could not possibly have been the country’s reaction to electricity supply 
issues alone. The War Room example illustrates clearly that, even in a conversation 
aimed at resolving the electricity crisis, the paramount issue for certain political actors 
remained saving Eskom. One could argue then that the War Room was aimed at 
solving the short-term issues with the ‘devil we know’, however, the political will to 
do so was interrupted, and trumped by the presidential will to procure nuclear 
electricity, which would not have yielded a single MW for many years to come.  
Why then does the programme exist? Perhaps it’s a combination of heightened risk of 
electricity supply shortfalls coupled with the political will that does exist to lower the 
country’s carbon footprint. Neither of these reasons explains why it has been so 
successful. The success of the programme and of renewable efforts outside of the 
programme, and the breaking of lock-ins in the electricity sector can be explained 
when paying careful attention to how actors have been aligned around the programme 
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and how the actors within the programme, and those aligned with the programme 
have exerted governing influences within these alignments and the broader electricity 
sector. The way in which the programme is structured and the reputable employees of 
the IPP office has meant that, while the programme functions, it has had a significant 
effect on renewable electricity developments. 
Because of the space that the electricity sector occupies in South African, the work 
that they do affect a wide set of state and non-state actors. Even though the affected 
parties have divergent interests in the growth of the industry, the programme office 
has become a point of alignment between these divergent interests. These divergent 
interests are not always in favour of renewable electricity and in some cases could 
even be considered as a lock-in for development within the sector. The main 
methodology of the programme has been to find and build on those interests that are 
conducive to the growth of the renewables industry. The programme has aligned 
actors along two main objectives: Social development objectives and financial 
objectives. 
5.2.1. Alignment along Social Objectives 
The IPP Programme has a strong social development agenda that is enacted through 
minimum compliance thresholds that bidders need to adhere to in order to obtain 
preferred bidders status. The criteria include: South African Entity Participation 
requirements of 40 per cent; job creation targets that have been escalated in each 
consecutive bid round; local content requirements; black ownership requirements; 
local community ownership requirements and socio-economic development targets. 
The bidder is to identify the needs of the society surrounding the project site and 
contribute to the alleviation thereof. Beyond this there are socio-economic drivers set 
in place that are not a prerequisite to obtaining preferred bidders status, however, 
complying with this set of requirements enhances the competitiveness of the bids. 
These include a commitment to black South African management within the 
company; enterprise development targeted at black-owned businesses and preferential 
procurement targets through which goods and services are procured from businesses 
owned by black South Africans (Clean Energy Pipeline, 2015: 7).  
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These requirements are in line with the Industrial Policy Action Plan of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (Department of Trade and Industry, 2014).   
This alignment has meant that the project and the industry have enjoyed 
overwhelming support from the Department of Trade and Industry. An interviewee 
from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) explained how the programme is in 
line with their directive. They have taken a keen interest in all areas of development 
that pushes the mandate of re-industrialisation. Energy is one such area. The DTI 
looks specifically at what can be produced locally and at local job creation. They have 
been involved with renewable electricity along those lines since the DOE started the 
REFIT programme, and their involvement has been heightened because of the 
REIPPPP programme. The requirements for local content and job creation set by the 
programme played an important role in their levels of involvement.   
The level of involvement from the DTI in the programme means that they now hold a 
stake in the success of the programme. They have put a lot of work into attracting 
investors to the programme and it would be detrimental to their mandate if the 
programme should fail. A quote from my interviewee with the DTI clearly illustrates 
this sentiment: 
It’s very important, because if you just deliver the electricity and you do not 
meet the other requirements as an industry then you are running the risk of the 
plug being pulled and the programme being stopped. And we do not want to 
see that because we are right in the middle now, we have done a lot of work 
trying to attract investors and some have invested and they are looking at how 
far is this going to go, for our investment to be successful it needs to go as far 
as possible. (Interviewee 9)  
The DTI and other supporting organs of the state are not the only actors that bought 
into the social ideals of the programme. Independent power producers recognise that, 
even though they might be taking on the socio-political responsibility for which the 
onus traditionally falls on the state, the addition of social and economic development 
aspects of the bids provides a basis for legitimacy within communities and in the eyes 
of government. A representative of SAWEA, the wind industry association, 
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interviewed in 2015, explained how they view this additional social developmental 
role in the role of electricity developers in South Africa: 
It is almost an acknowledgement by government that they cannot do service 
delivery as they want to and so they are outsourcing service delivery in rural 
areas to renewable energy developers. It’s a fantastic opportunity for us. So 
what I am saying that the government generally has a huge job of trying to 
create jobs for how many millions and create education for people without 
proper schooling so they are looking for all the help they can get. And it’s a 
great opportunity for us because if we get it right we will always be their 
favourite solution. (Interviewee 3) 
What is more, this approach has made the programme more attractive to large 
multinational corporations. Energy & Sustainability director Rick Needham explains 
what prompted Google to invest more than $1 billion in clean energy in South Africa 
(Clean Technica, 2013). According to him, the company looks for projects that have 
‘transformative potential’. By this he means that a project becomes more attractive to 
them if it holds the potential to change society for the better, and according to him, 
the Jasper wind farm that Google invested in, and other projects under the IPP 
programme offer exactly this - an opportunity to invest in sustainable growth while 
creating jobs and enriching communities. 
5.2.2 The Alignment of Actors along Economic Objectives 
Investments such as those made by Google, speak volumes about the trust that the 
programme office has built between private sector financiers, banks and businesses 
that have chosen to invest in the programme. At the end of 2016, the programme had 
attracted over R194 billion in investment. 
The relationship between investors, developers and the programme office hinges on 
the legitimacy that the staff of the IPP office has been able to maintain through the 
effective and transparent bidding processes and the legal structures which underlie 
these processes and effectively removes the programme office from the direct control 
of its parent departments. High-level engagements with government representatives 
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and the constant welcomed input of the private sector also resulted in a financial 
structure that promotes affectivity.  
Negotiating this position was not an easy task on the part of the IPP office. Initially, 
the Development Bank was to fund their appointments and pay for their consultants, 
and they would have a 25 per cent stake in each project. The Development Bank 
withdrew and they had to make another plan. The IPP office decided to go to NERSA 
and proposed that they (the IPP office) should charge a 1 per cent development fee for 
every project brought to financial close. NERSA accepted these terms of operation for 
the programme. The interviewee representing the IPP office also explained that 
mistakes are extremely costly to the project office themselves and so their motivation 
for meticulous attention to detail and reaching financial close in every single project 
that received a bid is of paramount importance: 
So we cannot choose the wrong one because then we lose our money. And we 
spend money before we get money. So if we spend money on something that 
doesn’t close that will be to our detriment. During that time, and I think it is 
still the same, we realized that South Africa cannot have a programme that is 
not successful and the reason for that is we didn’t have a programme before, 
so it was our opportunity to convince political decision makers that we need to 
do this, but then we were also very scarce as far as our reserve margin was 
concerned so we had to - every project that we announced as a preferred 
bidder must close , there was no doubt in our minds that that project needs to 
close and we couldn’t let project megawatts be sterilized because of our 
reserve margins. (Interviewee 1)  
Beyond the IPP office’s targeted action toward successful bids, they also gained 
legitimacy through their engagements with state and non-state agencies. One example 
is that of the DTI, as discussed above. Another engagement that was crucial for 
building legitimacy after previous failed programmes was with National Treasury. 
Treasury serves as transactional advisor for the REIPPPP programme, which means 
that they asses the financial standing of project companies and evaluate the 
company’s financial modelling, underpinning the price offering of each bid 
(Montmasson-Clair, Ryan & Moilwa, 2014: 98). Treasury also backs the power 
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purchase agreements made between Eskom and the IPP’s, which significantly lowers 
the risk of investment for independent power producers. Their engagement with 
Treasury has helped them in selling the programme to the private sector.  
The programme has been able to provide a very secure podium for private sector 
investment, which has aligned the interests of various multinational companies toward 
growing the sector. By this I mean that the profit-driven actions of companies were 
realised as renewable projects through the programme. Granted, these companies act 
with individual interests in mind, but the programme has been able to align these 
individual interests toward projects that build the industry. The success of the project 
has lowered the risk for investors and financiers further through its significant impact 
on the price and profitability of renewables in South Africa (Eberhard et al., 2014). 
The project is widely credited for bringing about a dramatic drop in the price of 
renewable electricity in South Africa and in stimulating the growth of the industries 
that underlie it. The relationships between the programme office and the private 
sector, including IPP’s banks and developers resulted in a level of trust from the 
private sector that had previously been absent.   
The private sector and those state actors looking to ensure social and economic 
development are not the only actors that have changed their behaviour based on 
possible financial gain. Another interesting example of an actor aligned through the 
REIPPPP toward building the sector is the Western Cape Provincial government. 
Because the procurement and control of most facets of the programme is located at 
national level, one would expect that local and provincial government actors would 
not necessarily go to great lengths to support the programme. In fact, provinces are 
probably the least mandated authority in South Africa to deal with or profit from any 
form of electricity development (Technical Assistance Unit and Western Cape 
Government, 2014). However the Western Cape Government realised very early on in 
the process that there is a valuable opportunity for developing the industrial sector of 
the province, and actively sought to cluster renewable energy development within the 
Western Cape. Premier Helen Zille said in a media statement in 2014 that the Western 
Cape provincial government aims to grow the renewable electricity industry in the 
province in such a way that it offsets the costs and consequences of climate change 
with economic growth and job creation.  
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Just over two years ago, I announced our government’s intention of becoming 
the green economic hub of South Africa. Our aim was to build a dynamic 
green economy, which offsets the costs and consequences of climate change 
with economic growth and job creation.  
Since then there has been further foreign direct investment. Most notable is 
the R220m investment in the manufacture of wind turbine towers – as part of 
the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
(REIPPPP)– by Spanish company, Gestamp, located in the Atlantis Green 
Manufacturing Hub. This will create 200 permanent jobs in the area. Chinese 
based Jinko Solar has also just made the decision to set up a solar panels 
plant in Cape Town. (GreenCape, 2014) 
The Western Cape Government saw that their economic development portfolio could 
benefit from the industrially intensive renewable energy economy, so they created a 
special purpose vehicle, GreenCape, which is funded by and reports to provincial 
government but that sits outside of the direct mandate of government. The initial role 
of GreenCape was to promote the growth of the renewable energy market in the 
Western Cape, specifically around the IPP programme, in such a way that it attracts 
investment to the province.20 GreenCape facilitates the interaction between 
government and the private sector. They have been described as a middleman 
between the state and the private sector because they provide government with an 
opportunity to engage with the sector on neutral ground. Since GreenCape doesn’t 
have to adhere to the red tape that the organs of state have to, and because they do not 
carry the stigma attached to the state, it is a lot easier for them to solve problems for 
both sides.  
5.2.3 Spill-overs of Agency 
The legitimacy gained from alignments along social and developmental objectives has 
recently provided IPP’s with a strong argument for reigning in Eskom’s negativity 
20 The role of GreenCape has since broadened substantially. The growth of the renewable electricity industry in 
the Western Cape is now not only tied to the REIPPPP. Various other renewable electricity developments outside 
of the project, and the role of GreenCape in these developments are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. For the 
purposes of this chapter, only their role in developments around the REIPPPP is discussed. 
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regarding the signing of power purchase agreements with them. Brenda Martin, chair 
of SAREC explained in 2016 that there are 26 preferred bidders with whom Eskom 
was refusing to sign power purchase agreements. These projects represent a total of 
R50bn investment into the country. According to Martin, these projects also represent 
over 13,000 jobs during construction and over 1,900 jobs for the 20 years of operation 
(Biz Community, 2016). SAWEA, the wind energy association also lodged a 
complaint with NERSA over Eskom’s failure to comply with ministerial 
determinations. According to them, approximately R19.3 billion in social 
development and around R6 billion in enterprise development will be ploughed back 
into the South African economy once these agreements have been signed. SAWEA 
pointed out that 12 new industrial facilities have been established as a direct result of 
the IPP programme and that Eskom’s refusal to sign power purchase agreements is 
inexplicable in light of the current financial climate (Moyo, 2016). Webber Wentzel is 
of the opinion that the delays in signing the PPA’s is unlawful. SAREC is willing to 
take Eskom to court over the matter but would prefer to settle the disagreement out of 
court (Creamer, 2017).  
At the end of 2016, around the same time that Eskom indicated problems with signing 
power purchase agreements, the utility and the DOE entered into rush determinations 
for nuclear procurement once again. This time the nuclear new builds were to be 
controlled by Eskom. The determinations came as a great surprise as the (yet to be 
completed) IRP 2016 signalled that nuclear was not a foreseen addition to the 
country’s energy mix for at least the next 13 years (Duvenage, 2017). The South 
African public would not entertain this, according to Duvenage.  
Since the crisis in 2008 there have been several incidents that have seriously damaged 
the trust that the country has put in the utility. Above the supply shortfall, the utility 
was also implicated in the State Capture Report issued by the previous Public 
Protector, Thuli Madonsela, in which Eskom was mentioned a staggering 916 times 
(All Africa.com, 2017). The report linked Eskom to the infamous Gupta family in 
several ways, most notably through the major coal contracts with the Gupta family 
and the President’s son; the personal relationship between the Guptas and former 
Eskom CEO Brian Molefe and lastly the case of Shiva Uraniam, which used to be a 
subsidiary of Rosatrom, a Russian company, but had subsequently been bought by 
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Oakbay Resources. Oakbay belongs to the Gupta family and the President’s son is a 
major shareholder. The buy-out was a steal at R270 million, and even though it had 
been deemed relatively unattractive by other mining companies, it could potentially 
become very attractive should the country need a new uranium supplier (ibid.). The 
contestation between the centralised nuclear agenda of the presidency and the push 
for the longevity of renewable procurement was never more evident. In the midst of 
Eskom’s refusal to sign further power purchase agreements, the Minister of Energy, 
Tina Joematt-Petterson defended Eskom’s actions. This, however, at the same time as 
the utility announced that it would be able to fund their nuclear procurement ideals off 
their balance sheet. The refusal to sign power purchase agreements was argued by 
Eskom to be related to the unsustainable cost of renewables that would start affecting 
the consumer. Various institutions including the CSIR have since challenged this 
sentiment. The CSIR showed in a study in late 2016 that, if one considers the cost 
reductions in the first three bidding windows, PV and wind electricity is now 40 per 
cent cheaper than new coal (SAREC, 2017). 
The CSIR further showed in their study entitled Least-cost electricity mix for South 
Africa by 2040 that the country could drastically reduce its electricity costs if it aimed 
for 70 per cent renewables by 2040 (Cloete, 2017). Further, the Minister of Energy 
recently presented the draft of the IRP 2016 to the Ministerial Advisory Council on 
Energy. The Council decided to pose it to a subcommittee, comprising of Prof. Anton 
Eberhard, Dr. Tobias Bischof-Niemz, Prof. Johan van Dyk and Mr. Mike Levington 
for further analysis. Interestingly, this committee, much like the one that birthed the 
White Paper, consists primarily of academics and external consultants. Both the 2016 
IRP draft and the CSIR study answered the questions of future capacity. Much of the 
current coal-fired power stations will be non-operational by 2050 and decisions need 
to be made about which type of electricity would be responsible for which component 
of future supply. Both documents argue that coal usage will lessen while renewables 
will increase. 
5.2.4 The relevance of alignment in the case of the REIPPPP 
The REIPPP office had the difficult task of aligning the interests of civil society with 
the interests of the state in such a way that creates a secure podium for private sector 
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investment. They did this through stringent planning and the proper execution of 
those plans, and through the involvement of respected individuals. The fact that they 
were removed from the direct mandates of the state simplified this process of 
alignment. Being mandated by government regulation means that they have enough 
political support to remain active. Being removed from their direct mandates of their 
parent Departments means that they can actively pursue a single goal, which means 
that ,unlike state departments, they can seize all of the opportunities provided by the 
cracks in the dominant regime, with little political rebuttal. It allows the IPP 
programme office to be able to grow the renewable electricity sector by acting on the 
weaknesses of the incumbent regime. This sentiment is clearly illustrated by a 
statement made by an interviewee from the IPP office: 
…it’s a funny way of saying things, but what I keep on saying to the team is 
that the challenges that Eskom are dealing with now is in fact now our 
opportunity so we just need to use it as much as we can, so we need to bring in 
as many IPPs as we can, as soon as possible, and we just need to entrench this 
position so that there is no turning back. I do not think there is turning back, 
it’s too late. (Interviewee 1) 
This meant that the channels for cooperation were open to the private sector, and the 
dialogue that happened with the private sector shaped the programme. Dialogue with 
the private sector was however not aimed at serving only their interests. The IPP 
office managed to create a podium for the type of knowledge exchange that would 
lead to a balanced outcome, where no point of view outweighs another. They 
explained to us that maintaining this middle ground, between comfortable and 
uncomfortable, is where they operate best: 
The refit, rebid thing was big in the newspapers, but we kept on talking to the 
market. And then we had special sessions with the banks, so I had many 
Friday afternoon discussions with the banks to say: “what is it that you would 
do? If we do this, what will be your reaction? If we do that, what will be your 
reaction?” And that is how we came up with the documents and we said we 
are not going to negotiate on anything... Because between comfortable and 
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uncomfortable that’s where we should all be. So nobody should be too 
comfortable (Interviewee 1)  
The creation of the cracks in the dominant regime that might lead to breaking lock-in 
thus cannot be considered as strategically caused. The cracks were however 
strategically filled. Alignment here has two important components: it must be around 
the risks posed by the failures of the dominant regime, and it must fit in with the 
broader socio-political climate of the day.  The risks posed by the dominant regime 
were initially related to electricity security issues and public mistrust of Eskom. Later, 
the risk of supply shortfall had been addressed and the major risk of the day became 
the projected tariff increases of Eskom electricity. The programme succeeded in 
driving down the price of renewable electricity to the point that the business case to 
be made for renewable energy no longer hinged on fulfilling environmental 
responsibilities and adhering to international standards but rather that the renewable 
electricity will be cheaper for businesses than Eskom electricity in years to come.  
In a developing country, one crucial alignment made was with the interests of state 
development. The success of the programme to date required both the strengthening 
of developmental trajectories that led to its creation and the creation of new 
developmental trajectories that could become integrated into the social structures 
surrounding the electricity sector, to such an extent that breaking free from these new 
developments would be hard.  The buy-in of stronger, more vested interests can result 
in a spill over of agency for newer less powerful actors. This is evident from the 
social developmental objectives adopted by the programme, which aligned it with the 
interests of other departments, such as the Department of Trade and Industries. IPP’s 
and industry associations who acted along this developmental trajectory effectively 
adopted the power that rests in this type of alignment, thereby being able to fall back 
on this powerful alignment and make the case against Eskom for refusing to sign 
further power purchase agreements. 
Further, in a developing nation, the alignment of non-state entities with state entities 
is simplified when the centre of action is removed from direct state mandates. Even 
though the REIPPP programme was mandated by the DOE, the execution of this 
mandate happens in isolation from the Department. This means less red tape, higher 
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investor confidence and a higher level of input and debate from the private sector, 
which resulted in a programme that was effectively formed by various key actors in 
the sector, not just by the state. This recipe for success is scalable, as proven by the 
successes of GreenCape in the Western Cape.  
Lastly, when considering the alignment of actors, the importance of technological 
specification falls away to a large extent. This is not to say that it is not important for 
the entirety of socio-technical transition, but perhaps the social shifts that happen need 
to be afforded more weight in a discussion on transition as they might not always 
follow from technological changes. Technological changes or choices might follow 
from social shifts.  
5.3 Discussion 
5.3.1 Power and Agency within the Niche 
5.3.1.1 The Misalignment of Core Regime Members 
The deterioration of the dominant regime created a few clear windows of opportunity 
for the success of the programme. It is clear that the deterioration of the dominant 
regime had to reach breaking point before these types of windows could be created 
and that it hinged on the misalignment of incumbent actors. External selection 
pressures, such as the international push toward market liberalisation and more 
sustainable energy systems, and the availability of new technologies, contributed to 
the creation of regulation that mandated the development of the programme. However 
for the initial misalignment the internal inconsistencies appear to be more important, 
yet not disconnected from the external forces, as the more inconsistencies appeared, 
the more opportunity opened up for alternative action, and, perhaps more importantly 
in this context, the more opportunity was created for actors to question the 
developmental paths of the dominant regime.  
The actions of actors that deviated from the pathways set forth by the dominant 
regime did not do so because they realised that the “rules of the prevailing regime 
would be productive” (Schot & Geels, 2007: 612). Much of the misalignment was not 
aimed at supporting the prevailing regime. Some key factors to the misalignment of 
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the dominant regime can be concluded from the data presented in this chapter: an 
unequal perception of selection pressures by the core members of the dominant 
regime; the formulation of regulative rules underpinned by new normative goals; and 
the availability of alternatives to the dominant regime. 
The unequal perception of selection pressures by the core members of the dominant 
regime is evident through different levels of response that actors exhibited toward 
renewable electricity. Geels found that socio-technical systems are stabilised by the 
fact that core regime members become blind to the negative externalities produced by 
the system (Geels, 2011). This attribute of relatively stable regimes has however also 
proven to be the root cause of much of the misalignment of regimes in socio-technical 
transition. Because of this inherent blindness, the perception of newly realised 
selection pressures will almost certainly not be a global perception within a regime. 
This leads to new tensions between the core regime actors, which results in 
misalignment of the dominant regime. Schot and Geels (2007) have considered the 
importance of ‘de-alignment’ as a transitional pathway. According to them, larger 
landscape pressures that occur suddenly and in a divergent manner coupled with 
increasing regime problems cause regime actors to lose faith in the dominant regime. 
Crucially they neglect to take account of the effect of unequal perceptions of selection 
pressures, and the role that this plays in misaligning a regime. The loss of faith in the 
dominant regime only occurs once the accumulation of perceived negative 
externalities and selection pressures are so high that the consequent misalignment has 
led to more blatant problems within the regime. In this case these blatant problems 
came in the form of the electricity crisis. Thus the ‘big’ problems of the dominant 
regime of not producing the outcomes that its occupants have come to rely on do not 
cause the misalignment; rather the misalignment is caused by the diverging responses 
of actors to different selection pressures and negative externalities in different ways 
because of the loss of shared perceptions of selection pressures and negative 
externalities.  
When regulative rules adopt new normative goals (such as sustainable development) 
that deviate from the dominant regime it will often have misalignment as 
consequence. The creation of regulative rules that contradict the rule sets of the 
dominant regime is one of the expressions of the diverging perceptions discussed 
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above, and particularly dangerous for the dominant regime. These regulative rules are 
manifestations of specific actor perceptions in the state about the negative 
externalities of the dominant regime and of the selection pressures at play within the 
dominant regime. As discussed in this chapter, the normative goal of sustainability 
entered state institutions from the outside (from academia and the international 
market). They were not formulated and completely accepted within state structures. 
Geels’s internal games never took place (Geels, 2004b). Thus the institutional 
acceptance of these new normative goals had not yet occurred. This is probably one of 
the most potent misaligning actions that core regime members can take.  
The way in which regulative rule play out becomes an increasingly messy affair when 
the framing underpinning these rules are not shared by enough actors. The hegemonic 
agency that allows for the creation of regulative rules withers in the play out of 
contestations over the prognostic framing of these rules.  An integral aspect of the 
deterioration of the positive feedback loops, where the diagnostic framing that 
predates and underpins the creation of policy is not accepted by the majority and 
consequently, the prognostic framing of policy becomes contested terrain after its 
creation, is the interaction between policy and human activity. The resulting issues 
expose the problem with scholarship that maintains that policy responses can be used 
to guide the flow of sustainable development. The issue here is further complicated by 
the fact that the responses to policy are not always second order reflexive (Grin, 2012: 
73). Policy-makers have to contend with first order reflexive responses to policy; 
these are unintended outcomes and thus harder to anticipate. The role of actor agency 
in the misalignment of the dominant regime leading to the breaking of lock-ins lies to 
a certain extent with the diminished ability of prominent incumbent actors to 
articulate selection pressure and align the majority of actors in favour of the dominant 
regime.  
The availability of alternatives to the dominant regime only came into play in the 
story of regime misalignment once the shared perception of problems reached a 
critical juncture. Only then did the availability of alternatives contribute to the internal 
misalignment of the dominant regime. One must differentiate here between external 
misaligning factors and internal misalignment: those factors that primed responses 
from some core regime members, while not yet having an immediate effect on the 
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ability of the regime to create positive feedback loops, can be viewed as external 
misaligning factors. The availability of alternatives to coal-fired electricity might have 
been one of the factors here, but the effect of realisations around the negative 
externalities of carbon-based electricity generation and the effect of international 
pressure to change does carry more weight. International pressure and negative 
externalities might have resulted in the creation of novel technological solutions to 
these problems. So at least initially, the availability of these solutions did not have as 
big an impact as the ideologies and problem framings that led to their existence. 
Factors of internal misalignment take effect once substantial damage has been done to 
the positive feedback loops in the dominant regime. These are the factors that become 
contested within the dominant regime, such as the use of new technologies, the 
direction of policy and ultimately the prognostic framing for mending the system. 
This prognostic framing might then include the creation of incubation room policy 
measures, such as the procurement programme.  
What is the function of this instability in the transitional process? In this case the 
answer lies in understanding the selection pressures at play at a specific time, and the 
ability of actors to align those selection pressures in such a way that the programme 
could function effectively. Notably, the effective functioning of the programme 
required that it solve more problems for the dominant regime than it created at its 
point of inception; it needed to be able to function with minimal contestation in order 
for it form pathways and dependencies within the sector. Acting on the risks of the 
dominant regime allowed the IPP office this initial foothold. Both landscape pressures 
and the failures of the dominant regime created these risks. In turn, the failures of the 
dominant regime, the misalignments and disconnects within the network, allowed for 
the windows of opportunity for the programme. Thus an external risk such as climate 
change and internal misalignment of the regime are intimately connected to one 
another and to the possibility of acceptance of new developmental trajectories within 
the sector, or at the very least to the possibility that the contestation of these new 
developments by the incumbents won’t be strong enough to stop development along 
this trajectory. This is because the role of risk in affecting the dominant regime in this 
way is directly related to the inability of core regime members to control possible 
futures in the minds of the broader socio-technical system. In this case then, policy is 
both the manifestation of misalignment in the dominant regime and a support 
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structure for alignment outside of the dominant regime. Policy then contributes to the 
deterioration of the agency within dominant regime networks and fosters the 
development of agency through the alignment of selection pressures both inside and 
outside of the regime, but in both cases harmful to the dominant regime. It provides 
windows for alternative developmental trajectories.  The diminishment ability of 
incumbent actors to align other actors and articulate selection pressure is not so much 
the result of the decay of their own agency, but rather of the decay of the network that 
surrounds them. 
5.3.1.2 The Alignment of Actors in Fit-and-Conform niches 
Alignment takes place both through the articulation of selection pressure and through 
the enrolment of actors in networks. In order for non-core regime members to 
successfully bring about change, coalitions have to form that actively seek to change 
strategies, initiatives and power relationships in the existing regime (Smith, Stirling & 
Berkhout, 2005: 1505). In this way the programme was able to align regime interests 
with non-regime interests. These alignments firstly acted to create pathways for 
development of the external and non-core regime, whilst only acting on the 
shortcomings of the regime and thus not yet entering into competition with the 
regime. In doing so the programme managed to create a broad enough network of 
developmental paths that, if reversed, would be detrimental to the system as a whole. 
Both the articulation of selection pressure and the coordination of resources took 
place within the boundaries of the dominant regime. From this case study, a few 
important conclusions about the processes of fit-and-conform empowerment can be 
made around the following: the shielding role of policy; the characteristics of the 
networks created and the importance of relational agency.  
The same policy that resulted in the misalignment of the dominant regime, acted to 
shield the niche environment from the selection pressures within the dominant 
regime. The initial market- and political protection quickly translated into cultural 
protection. The interpretation of policy laid the foundations for this niche. The 
mandate for the inclusion of renewable energy sources in the electricity mix of South 
Africa no doubt exists in policy, however the policy that exists is not very prescriptive 
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regarding how this goal was to be achieved. The effect of this was that the goals of 
the niche, the prognostic framing, was very broad. 
The networks that were created through these broad, open-ended goals required some 
ingenious considerations of how to make use of the windows of opportunity created 
by policy, whilst not disturbing the regime too much.  Smith, Stirling and Berkhout 
suggested that the degree to which regime change can take place depends on the 
positions held by “coalitions of prime movers” (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 
1497). Within fit-and-conform niches, these coalitions of prime movers prove to be 
just as important. The formation of these coalitions requires that niche advocates align 
themselves with the ideals of key regime actors. This is not toward changing the 
dominant regime, but rather a way for the niche to take root within the dominant 
regime. In Chapter 2, I discussed how long-standing rules in socio-technical systems 
become something to contend with; they start having a life of their own. Often times 
the offshoots from these rules come from either the actual or envisioned social, 
political or financial benefit that could be produced or aided by the socio-technical 
system. In this case, one of these offshoots that already existed within the dominant 
regime was socio-political benefit such as job creation and black empowerment. The 
role of coalitions with prime movers at niche level is to tap into these offshoots and 
feed off of the relational power that exists within them. The result of this type of 
action is the solidification of the niche environment within the broader socio-technical 
system. This makes it more difficult to reverse the progress made by the niche 
because now the niche contributes to an existing system of outcomes that is important 
to more than just the regime. The success of this type of action also depends on the 
degree to which these outcomes have shaped the dominant regime.  
5.3.2 Developmental Trajectories within the Niche 
The example of the IPP programme as basis for a niche in the context of the South 
African electricity sector is a complex amalgamation of circumstances, events and 
actions. In terms of the suggested niche developmental trajectories by Schot and 
Geels (2007), it is most closely related to their conception of a ‘breakthrough niche’. 
Even though one cannot regard the deterioration of the dominant regime as being so 
progressed that it has completely seized in its functioning, one has to realise that the 
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deterioration that has in fact occurred is directly caused, at least in part by the 
stabilisation that has taken place within the niche. It can be regarded as an active 
niche in which some of the developmental trajectories have built on the path 
dependencies forged by the dominant regime. A good example of this is the use of 
existing practices of reindustrialisation to motivate the processes adopted by IPP’s. 
 The regulatory boundaries set for the programme intended it to exist alongside the 
dominant regime; to fit in the dominant regime box. However, this meant that if the 
addition of electricity provided by the programme no longer served to mediate the 
problems within the dominant regime, or if the goods produced by the programme 
started changing the regime too much, it could easily be stopped.  
The alignment of new actors, such as the independent power producers and 
multinational investors is important in a different way: practically, investment and 
private sector buy-in is needed for the programme to succeed.  However, ‘buying in’ 
to the network that exists around the procurement programme takes various shapes, 
two of which were discussed in the data section of this chapter. The more actors ‘buy 
in’ or rather become aligned with a certain goal, the more powerful the goal becomes 
in rooting the non-dominant regime in the existing socio-technical system. The 
alignment of actors along the same lines as the incumbent regime actors lengthens the 
chain of agency. These lengthened chains of agency are characterised by agency spill-
overs from stronger actors to weaker actors. This chain of alignment also becomes 
very important when the non-regime develops to the point where it either challenges 
the regime, or is no longer an immediate necessity for the regime and therefor poses 
some threat of competition to the dominant regime, as demonstrated by SAREC 
challenging Eskom’s refusal to sign power purchase agreements. 
Third sector buy-in to the interests of the niche, represented by the role of academia, 
is to some extent an example of the triadic relationship represented in triple helix 
theories (see Etzkovitz, 2002). However, here, and possibly in other instances an 
important disjuncture in this relationship becomes clear: the fact that knowledge 
exists and even the fact that it is being disseminated in the policy space, does not 
mean that the state, market and private sector function harmoniously. What is more, 
in this case, it is exactly this disjuncture that might have caused some of the initial 
deterioration of the dominant regime through the establishment of policy: political 
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actors had not all bought into and consequently were not all prepared to act upon 
knowledge translated into policy. Regardless, the unintended consequence of such 
policy remained positive for the development of the niche.  
The state in this case is the most bi-polar actor of them all. It is difficult to find clear 
examples of ‘steering’ here. Even though there was a clear delineation of action for 
the IPP unit, this did not extend to the rest of the state. The IPP unit is a rowing actor 
and IPP’s are the only actors with clear rowing guidelines. Other rowing actors often 
acted in spite of the state or with little consideration for the guidance given by the 
state as steering actor. The Gupta debacle is a key example of this. The only rowing 
actors that were truly steered by the directionalities toward the development of the 
niche given by the state were those actors that bought into the two main alignments: 
along social developmental trajectories and along financial developmental 
trajectories. A good example here is Google.  
Long chains of aligned actors produce and reproduce the same results in the same 
way that path dependent development takes place within an established regime. Thus 
processes of positive reinforcement begin to form. However, for the empowering 
actor to be successful in its mandate, it must create as many of these positive 
reinforcing cycles as possible. Because of the success of existing cycles, some paths 
might even self-formulate around the actor.  
Initially alignment often takes place overtly, through the formation of alliances with 
strong actors in the dominant regime. Later self-alignment might take place as the 
positive reinforcement cycle becomes more productive. One example of an actor that 
self-aligned was the Western Cape Government. This alignment resulted in the 
clustering of renewables industries that act as a physical and technological support 
network for the programme. The existence of these industries further creates 
pathways for development, such as new jobs, which further entrenches the network 
around the REIPPPP into the electricity sector of South Africa. 
Consider for instance some of the shifts accomplished by this niche, defined as a 
protected space for development that goes against the dominant regime, by looking at 
the programme’s position relative to the dominant regime. It allowed core, non-core 
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and external actors to actively align themselves and the programme with the state 
interests that serve the programme, and distance themselves from those ideals in 
government that did not serve the best interests of the programme. 
Secondly, it allowed them transparent contact with the private sector and enabled 
them to level the playing field for input from key actors across the spectrum without 
having to give any external ideals primacy over their narrow mandate. Lastly, they 
could situate the programme within the sector in such a way that it posed no 
immediate threat to the dominant regime, whilst creating enough stability and new 
developmental trajectories that abolishing the programme and the related industry 
developments would make difficult. The institutional setting of the programme, the 
programme office, is the result of the alignment of selection pressures on the non-
regime and the regime toward the inclusion of independent power producers in such a 
way that balanced the interests of all of the parties involved. 
A few conclusions can be drawn from the above: one of the key factors in fit-and-
conform empowerment, as Smith and Raven (2012) have asserted, is improved 
alignment with existing industrial norms. In addition to this, this case study has shown 
that in developing nations, an alignment with the developmental goals of the nation 
proves to be just as important. Secondly, one of the crucial factors in the longevity 
and success of the niche from this type of empowerment is the balancing of trade-offs. 
As explained by my interviewee from the IPP office, everyone should be kept 
between comfortable and uncomfortable. This however ultimately means that there 
are no real winners and no real losers, which brings into question the longevity of the 
outcomes, should the protected space disappear.  
5.3.3 Steering Actors and the three Core Processes of the Niche 
As I mentioned above there is no clear steering actor within this niche. This is a 
strange realisation as law technically mandates this niche. The processes through 
which the regulatory rules were set in place can explain the absence of a champion 
niche steerer. This niche resulted from different levels of acknowledgement of the 
negative externalities and problems of the dominant regime. The rules that allow for it 
within the dominant regime are not normal regime rules. They are not the result of 
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majority consensus over the issues in the regime but rather the outcome of complex 
first and second order reflexive responses and actions. Within the niche, the IPP unit 
achieved the articulation and adjustment of expectations. The type of agency that 
these actors hold cannot be considered to be hegemonic, but rather relational. They 
fulfilled the role of steering actor, including monitoring and evaluation and the 
delineation of direction through relational agency rather than through hegemonic 
agency. The only recourse for actors that do not adhere to their prescriptions is 
exclusion from the programme. The second and third niche processes, the formation 
of networks and further learning and articulation was aimed at solidifying the place 
that the niche occupied next to the regime. It was not aimed at growing the market or 
increasing the outputs. The main work of the steering actors in fit-and-conform niches 
is thus to fit-and-conform to the dominant regime.  
5.3.4 Conclusion 
Even though fit-an-conform niches rely on process of alignment with the dominant 
regime, this can only happen once the dominant regime has deteriorated and windows 
of opportunity have been created for the niche. These niches require a level of core 
regime actor participation, however this does not have to include majority support. 
These niches also thrive on ‘distracted’ regime actors that do not necessarily support 
the rules that are forming at niche level but nevertheless have stopped or slowed down 
their participation in the positive feedback loops within the regime by acting in ways 
that do not contribute to the path dependencies of the dominant regime or by merely 
stopping or questioning their previous contributions.  
This chapter found three core contributing factors to the misalignment of the 
dominant regime. The unequal perception of selection pressures by core regime 
members causes new tensions between regime members and between regime 
members and regime benefactors. The crux of this lies not in the perception of big 
problems, but rather the emergence of diverse responses to selection pressures and 
negative externalities that were previously responded to in relative unity by members 
of the dominant regime. 
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One of the tangible ways in which these divergent responses become overt is the 
creation of regulation that contradicts the rules of the dominant regime. The 
normative goals of sustainability cannot possibly be shared by the entire dominant 
regime, if it were, the regime would collapse in an instant. The misalignment that 
results from this is a complex matter, because even if a wide array of actors support 
these normative goals, they won’t support them to the same degree or with the same 
implication. Even though they might share the diagnostic framing of the problem, 
their prognostic and motivational framings might differ drastically. This results in 
further tensions within the dominant regime. These tensions lead to windows of 
opportunity. The windows of opportunity created by policy might seem like an active 
shielding action, however it is more complicated than that. The creation of policy 
does not mean that the entire policy-creating institution is in agreement about the 
prognostic and motivational framing of the problem. All that is needed for the 
creation of policy is a level of diagnostic framing agreement. This exposes a very real 
issue with hegemonic power in socio-technical transition, especially as it relates to 
state power. If the state is a core regime member, then it is rather the deterioration of 
hegemonic power that leads to transition or to the creation of niches than the effect of 
hegemonic activity. To some extent it is required that the actors that hold hegemonic 
agency within the dominant regime relinquish some of this agency. This is not 
necessarily an active relinquishment of power but rather the outcome of messy 
divergent reactions and selection pressures. One of the core factors of success for the 
IPP unit was their removal from their parent departments. This allowed niche actors 
to act in the vacuum of responses from the dominant regime that resulted from their 
growing inability to respond to selection pressures. 
The availability of alternative sources for electricity production contributed to the 
misalignment of the dominant regime in two ways: internally and externally. 
Externally those factors that primed responses from some core regime members of the 
regime, while not yet having an immediate diminishing or retarding effect on the 
ability of the regime to create positive feedback loops, can be viewed as external 
misaligning factors. Only once these factors accumulate and cause problems for the 
dominant regime can the availability of alternatives contribute to internal 
misalignment in the form of a broadened search function of regime actors, new 
actions and new mentalities. 
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The biggest challenge for niche advocates in fit-and-conform niches is to grow roots 
within the existing outcomes of the dominant regime. This is done not by linking 
niche outcomes with regime rules directly but rather linking niche outcomes with the 
offshoots that have resulted from regime rules. These offshoots relate to the broader 
social, economic and political environment within which the socio-technical system 
functions and makes it difficult to reverse progress made within the niche. 
Within this niche the triadic relationship between state, market and academia was not 
a success where the creation of policy is concerned. Perhaps this relationship is better 
suited to technological outcomes than policy outcomes.  
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Chapter 6 
The Steering of Decentralised Electricity Development 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the work of scholars that have studied agency in niche 
environments, especially as it relates to what Smith and Raven call stretch-and-
transform empowerment (Smith & Raven, 2012: 1030). This chapter focuses on 
uncovering the role of steering, or empowering actors in the governance and creating 
of rules in this type of niche. Once again special attention is given to the 
categorisation of actors so as to provide depth to the analysis. Secondly this chapter 
considers the methods that these steering actors use to exert an influence over the 
sector and lastly, this chapter considers the implications that these forms of 
governance and the rules created hold for the formulation and strengthening of 
developmental trajectories and networks within the niche. 
The case of the electricity sector in the Western Cape is used to study how actors 
govern through stretch-and-transform empowerment in niche spaces. The renewable 
electricity sector has clustered in the Western Cape, initially as a result of the 
industrial development within the province surrounding the IPP programme. 
Renewable energy industries, including assembly plants and renewable energy 
developers, have established their business within the province because of the 
favourable environment created for them within the province. Subsequently the 
province has also become a pioneer in the South African electricity landscape 
especially in relation to non-utility scale, decentralised forms of electricity production 
such as small-scale embedded generation. Within the province there is also a high 
prevalence of energy efficiency measures being implemented by both state and non-
state actors.  
At first glance, the renewable energy sector in the Western Cape appears to be a spill 
over from the national shifts in policy and the inclusion of utility scale renewable 
energy technologies into the national energy mix. However, upon closer examination 
it becomes clear that the Western Cape Government and its municipalities aren’t only 
being steered by National government but have in fact actively implemented steering 
methodologies of their own toward the growth of a suite of renewable energy and 
143	
sustainable energy practices and technologies. By creating a conducive environment 
for the development of decentralised energy generation practices that are beyond the 
control of the dominant regime they have actively articulated the selection pressures 
at play in the broader electricity landscape and coordinated the resources of the actors 
within the province to produce solutions that pose a greater threat to the dominant 
regime, albeit only within the boundaries of the province and smaller cumulative 
financial value to that of the utility scale developments discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
6.2. The Green Ideology 
The position of the Provincial government of the Western Cape in relation to 
electricity governance is a complex one. As provincial authority they guide the policy 
decisions of municipalities and also the overall ideology adopted by the province. 
Municipalities have more power than provincial government in controlling the actual 
commodity that is electricity, because of the power that they wield in their 
distribution jurisdiction. Provincial government needs to see to it that the production 
and consumption of all goods, including electricity, happens in such a way that is 
beneficial to the province’s economy as a whole and does not counteract the 
boundaries set by the National government. The actions and ideologies of provincial 
government affect both state (national and municipal government) and non-state 
entities (business and citizens). It also affects the non-human facets of society 
(biodiversity, natural resources and infrastructure).  
Unlike municipalities the biggest affect that provincial governments have on the 
contents of their provinces is not through directly impacting ‘things’ or ‘people’ but 
rather in their effect on ways of doing things and ways of thinking about things, 
which then leads to direct impacts on and for people and things. The electricity crisis, 
the pressure to lower the economy’s carbon footprint, and the availability of 
alternative electricity technologies has been push factors for ideological shifts in the 
Western Cape. The resulting ideological shift adopted by the provincial government is 
captured in the ‘green economy’ concept.   
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The Western Cape’s Green Economy Strategic Framework is aimed at lowering the 
province’s carbon footprint and becoming the green economic hub of Africa. The 
framework is an holistic plan that rests on five principles or focal areas, driving action 
(Western Cape Government, 2013(a): 08). The first principle is a market-focussed 
approach to green economic action, dictating that all action taken needs to be based 
on the dynamics that exist in the local and global markets. The second principle is that 
investment toward the support of green growth needs to be predominantly private 
sector driven. The third principle is that the public sector must be the enabler of the 
green economy. The fourth principle is a move toward new forms of collaboration, 
and the final principle is inclusion, as climate change challenges often threaten 
economic exclusion. The framework is made up of five drivers supported by the 
identification of five enablers. The enablers either fall within the public sector or are 
part of the results of collaboration efforts. The drivers are: the living and working 
environment; mobility; eco-systems; agriculture and enterprise. And the enablers 
identified are: finance; regulation and rules; knowledge management; capabilities and 
lastly infrastructure.  
Transformation of the electricity sector is thus not always a goal in itself for the 
Western Cape Government but often a means to an end. The actions of the provincial 
government with regards to the electricity sector must be understood in this way. 
Within this context there are key areas of involvement for the Western Cape 
provincial government in the electricity sector, namely: sustainable electricity 
consumption and resource efficiency including a zero-waste economy; green 
economy finance and investment; research and development; electricity security; and 
most importantly, enabling municipalities.  
The areas of action resulting from the ideological shift of the Western Cape provincial 
government has been twofold: firstly, they acted to mitigate the risk posed to the 
Western Cape’s economy by the external and internal pressures relating to renewable 
electricity and climate change. This includes the risk of electricity shortfall and the 
rising cost of electricity but also the risk that shifts in the consumption and production 
of electricity holds for municipalities in the province and the looming adverse effects 
on the environment of continued reliance on fossil fuels for the production of 
electricity. Secondly, they acted to identify and pursue opportunities for economic, 
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social and environmental growth in a transitioning electricity sector. They realised 
that ‘making it work’ is crucial for the survival of the economy in the province.  
6.3 Western Cape Government Facilitating Institutional Change 
Provincial officers know that they have limited capacity to regulate the use and 
incorporation of renewable electricity in South Africa, especially at utility scale. Their 
main area of influence lies in affecting the sustainable development of the Western 
Cape’s economy and in affecting the reformulation of municipal electricity practices. 
The targets that they can set are those accomplishable by municipalities and 
businesses in their jurisdiction. This relates mainly to energy efficiency and small-
scale renewable electricity developments, such as embedded generation.  
The inclusion of alternative sources of electricity into the municipal mix and the 
rising cost of electricity meant that municipalities and provincial government had to 
re-evaluate what the future of the electricity sector in the province would look like. 
Not only did it dictate change to the financial model of municipalities, it also meant a 
re-evaluation of skills. Fundamentally it meant new regulatory structures in the 
electricity sector and within the sectors that surround and support new electricity 
technologies such as transport and environmental management.  
Striking the balance between clear, transparent, safe and legal mechanisms and the 
effort to streamline the processes involved in growing a new market has been 
extremely challenging, according to an interviewee representing the Western Cape 
Provincial Government. Provincial and municipal governments have to manage these 
issues very carefully as they constantly have to evaluate their position in relation to 
that of national government. One of the biggest challenges faced at regional level has 
been the risk of their decisions not being in line with the decisions made at national 
level. The policy discrepancies found between the different levels of the state and the 
contested ideologies found at national level, make it incredibly hard for provincial 
governments to commit to changing their municipal structures in a specific way 
because of the indecisions and contestations at play within national government. Their 
concerns around policy discrepancies are captured by this quote from a Western Cape 
Provincial Government representative: 
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But National Government, well…. It’s a big concern for us. Is our policy being 
taken seriously or is it just a document? Because other than the wind, the IRP 
update is a really great document that has been very well received by the 
industry. And by players that have been fighting for renewables and energy 
efficiency... We do not know what we need to do around that because it’s just 
such an awkward space.  (Interviewee 10)  
Part of the challenge is also accounting for the repercussions that any changes to the 
regulatory structures within the province might have. It is difficult for municipalities 
to commit to changes in their business model because  they are dependent on the 
income generated by the resale of electricity. As explained by an interviewee from the 
City of Cape Town, the initial up takers of alternative technologies will be high-
income consumers, the same pool of consumers that use the most electricity. This is 
damming for the City’s traditional method of financial accumulation. The two main 
challenges in regulating the use of small-scale embedded generation and similar 
technologies are thus the risk of falling out of line with national requirements, 
regulations and future decisions and secondly the risk posed by these shift to the 
municipal revenue model.  
Before implementing new policies, the Western Cape provincial government started 
working with municipalities to first understand the actual impact that allowing 
embedded generation, energy efficiency and other changes, might have on their 
business models on a case-to-case basis.  Initially they implemented various pilot 
projects such as a feasibility study for alternative and sustainable infrastructure and 
services in settlements. These studies tested alternative technologies for municipal 
infrastructure services at two sites which included an evaluation of alternative 
financial models taking into account the constraint that the Municipal Finance 
Management Act places on private sector involvement. Another example is a study 
focussing on the demand for PV in agriculture in the province that identified the key 
factors informing PV installations in the fruit and wine sectors, also looking at the 
financial models that work best (Hermanus & Ely, 2015: 14).  
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Despite the risk posed by change, and the lack of clear mechanisms for change from 
national level, the Western Cape Government decided to look for ways in which 
municipalities could respond to climate change in line with the national strategy that 
exists in policy. Between 2005 and 2008 the province implemented mainly 
adaptation-focussed and vulnerability-focussed assessments upon which an action 
plan could be constructed (Isaacs, 2016). One example of this is their Climate Change 
Municipal (CCMSP) Support Programme. 
The Western Cape Government realised that the effectiveness of the National Climate 
Change Response Policy (NCCRP) depends to an extent on the actions of local and 
provincial governments. Their development of sustainable energy plans for 
municipalities is contextualised by the NCCRP. The CCMSP is aimed at building 
partnerships, putting new processes in place and designing new tools for its 
implementation with municipalities. This project initially consisted of two groups, 
one working on the development of climate adaptation plans and another that worked 
on four pilot programmes with specific municipalities.  
The process included taking stock of the existing knowledge and tools within a 
municipality needed to accomplish a plan of action and sustainable change. What they 
found through the initial phases of the CCMSP was that the level of awareness of the 
issues at hand in municipalities was high, but that they had shortcomings in terms of 
skills and finances in implementing the changes required. Their approach to these and 
other issues related to climate change adjustments in municipalities and the province 
as a whole became continuous cycles of evaluation and implementation of changes. In 
this way they focused on two processes: adjusting the electricity master plans of 
municipalities and balancing normal services such as infrastructure development with 
demand and supply forecasts. These conceptual changes were tested in two small 
municipalities that had been due for new electricity master plans. The approaches 
under the CCMSP are summarised in table 8 below.  
6.3.1 Testing Phase 
In 2013 the team in the Climate Change Unit of the Western Cape provincial 
government consisted of five staff tackling questions around the best processes for 
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supporting municipalities in mainstreaming climate change into their planning. At this 
point the Provincial Government was not only asking how they could assist 
municipalities, but also distilling what their role as provincial authority should be in 
this process (Price, 2013). From inception, the CCMSP was on an ‘only for the 
willing’ basis. The team sent out letters to municipalities, inviting them to express 
interest in the project. At this stage, the programme was running two consecutive 
outcomes: the development of sustainable energy plans and the development of 
adaptation plans. Eleven local municipalities showed interest in both of these 
programmes and one district municipality asked to be included as well (ibid). The 
unit’s capacity at this stage was very low, with two staff members focusing on the 
programme and a budget that only covered their basic travel costs. They could only 
commit to supporting four municipalities in each sub programme. Even though they 
had hoped that they would be able to develop both of the sub programmes for at least 
one municipality, they decided to split it up because of the large response size. The 
unit selected the four municipalities in each sub programme based on the information 
provided by municipalities around interventions that were already in place and a need 
for the best geographical spread, ensuring that the program implementation reaches as 
far as possible.  
In the first year the team assisted municipalities in developing draft plans, followed 
by mainstreaming and implementation in the second year, while assisting additional 
municipalities with the draft process during year two. The municipal support 
programme (MSP) included mapping key stakeholders and partners of the 
programme; devising different approaches to support and engagement and interfacing 
at local and district level to learn what the most effective approach would be to 
providing support. Inception meetings were set up with key actors in municipalities in 
the form of presentations and discussions with mayoral committees, or meetings with 
key actors (Price, 2014). Out of this, multi-stakeholder groups were established for 
each case, in which timelines and deliverables were discussed. At this stage the 
differences in approaches, capacities and needs were emerging across municipalities. 
According to Penny Price, it became quite clear early on that a ‘one size fits all’ 
solution would never work (ibid.). This flexible approach yielded various success 
stories, one of which was the Bergrivier Municipality. One of the main success factors 
here was the participation of experts in the field in producing the municipality’s 
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Climate Change Adaptation Plan. Among others the following actors participated in 
the multi-stakeholder workshops: the joint CSIR/UCT project focusing on climate 
change adaptation and planning in the West Coast region; UCT’s Climate Systems 
Analysis Group (CSAG) working on methods of sharing technical climate change 
information and UCT’s African Climate & Development Initiative (ACDI) focusing 
on interdisciplinary climate change research in the Bergrivier Municipality.  
Table 8: Western Cape Government Climate Change Municipal Support Programme21 
Phase Time span Outcomes 
Testing Phase 2012-2013 The development of sustainable energy plans for 
George, Mossel Bay, Cape Agulhas and Saldanha Bay 
The development of adaptation plans for Drakenstein, 
Bergrivier and Eden District 
Testing methodologies with partners 
Consolidation 
Phase 
2014-2016 The development of integrated response frameworks for 
districts (West Coast; Central Karoo; Overberg) 
Conducting the barriers to municipal finance study with 
Treasury 
The development of a database and the implementation 
thereof 
Integrated Development Plans review tools developed 
Case studies conducted 
Implementation, 
fast tracking and 
readiness phase 
2015-ongoing Mainstreaming results and methodologies into the fiscus 
Annual 
Adjustments 
Annually Greenest Municipality Award 
30 IDP assessments 
Spatial Development Framework reviews 
SALGA and COGTA municipal support program 
MIGs- new focus 
On-going ad hoc support in the form of meetings, 
comments and so forth. 
6.3.2 Consolidation Phase 
The brunt of the work done under the first phase was in adjusting the missions and 
visions of municipalities in terms of sustainability. Even though electricity 
consumption formed part of this, the work was spread over various sectors affected by 
climate change issues. Part of phase two included a study conducted by the Western 
21 Adapted from Western Cape Climate Change Response: Approach and Key Projects (Isaacs, 2016). 
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Cape Government and National Treasury toward increasing investment in climate 
change related projects at the sub national level. This study consisted of three phases: 
1. Diagnostic Report: Barriers and Challenges to Implementing Climate Change
Projects (National Treasury & Western Cape Government, 2013).  2. Towards a
Financing Framework for Implementing Climate Change Projects (Technical
Assistance Unit and Western Cape Government, 2014); 3. Energy Efficiency
Guidelines (Technical Assistance Unit & Western Cape Government, 2013).
This study specifically looked at the regulatory challenges faced by municipalities, in 
particular the challenges posed by the Municipal Finance Management Act and the 
Public Finance Management Act, which directly apply to the integration of renewable 
electricity technologies into municipal grids. The tables below summarise the key 
Barriers in the Diagnostic Report. 
Table	9:	Legislative	Barriers22	
22 Adapted from National Treasury and The Western Cape Government (2013: 11) 
23 Section 24 (1) of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or wellbeing. Section 7 (2) of the Constitution states that the state (including provincial and local 
authorities) must respect, protect and fulfill the Bill of Rights. Section 152 further stipulates that municipalities 
have the objective of providing a safe and healthy environment, and section 152 (1)(b) compels municipalities to 
provide services, including electricity, in a sustainable manner. 








Provincial and Municipal mandates to engage in 
climate change related projects are prescribed 
by the Constitution. Interviewees expressed 
concern that there are no funds allocated for 
these responsibilities23  
The Constitution suggests that 
environmental powers should be 
embedded within municipalities, and 
that municipalities have an important 
role in mitigating the effects of 
climate change. Further, the National 
Climate Change Response Strategy is 
implicit in the responsibilisation of 
municipalities and local governments 





The novelty of processes implementing climate 
change issues in municipalities means that they 
do not yet have the necessary funds or skills. 
This has resulted in the establishment of 
In its current state, the system of 
financial checks in place for the 
establishment of a public private 
partnership (PPP) provides inherent 
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24 The Municipal Systems Act; the Municipal Finance Management Act and the Municipal Public-Private 
Partnership Regulations govern these transactions. Broadly speaking, the following is required: a review of the 
way in which the service is currently being provided by the municipality, a process for considering an external 
service delivery mechanism culminating in full council approval, a feasibility study, and a process of competitive 
bidding. In order to set up a public private partnership, the municipality has to adhere to specific requirements for 
the feasibility study and in addition to this the PPP must be approved by the council only after comments from 
National Treasury.  
25 Raising long-term loans at municipal level must comply with the Borrowing Powers of Provincial Government 
Act, which requires consultation with the National Loan Coordinating Committee. Further the Municipal 
Management Finance Act requires further consultation and evaluation including a public participation process.  
26 The City of Cape Town has since the publication of this report made great steps toward solving this problem. 
This is discussed later on in this dissertation. 
partnerships for ‘outside agency help’. The rules 
guiding these processes are complex and hinder 
development along this path.24  
tension with a municipality’s ability 
to provide sustainable services in the 






Usually, climate change related projects have 
payback loops of longer than three years. 
Legislation as it stands complicates 
municipality’s ability to generate debt of over 
three years. The affordability and sustainability 
of long-term commitments need to be 
established in order for municipalities to 
properly leverage private capital and establish 
partnerships toward innovative solutions (such 
as grid wheeling and municipal procurement of 
electricity form IPPs)25 
The contracting process needs to be 
simplified in order to encourage the 
implementation of fiscally sound 
projects, especially as it relates to 





Uncertainty regarding procedure for 
municipalities to invest in sustainable 
technologies such as lighting and water heating, 
in infrastructure that lies on property not 
belonging to the municipality hampers 
development along these lines. For effective 
demand-side management, it has become clear 
that municipalities will need to invest in 
upgrading privately owned property. This is 
retarded by three factors: first a lack of clarity 
regarding the regulatory allowance for investing 
in private property, the payback of longer than 
three years demanding funding for that duration 
and responsibility of maintenance.  
Most municipalities opt for rather 
supporting companies and NGO’s in 





This relates to the issues of carbon trading by 
cities. As carbon credits generated from these 
projects are considered to be municipal assets, 
trading must comply with legislative 
requirements. The objective of the legislation as 
it stands is to protect municipal assets that 
provide a basic service. 
There is uncertainty regarding 
municipality’s rights to trade in 
carbon credits. The argument that can 
be made for carbon credits not being 
sold so that it does not have an 
impact on the municipality’s ability 
to perform its functions is a simple 
one. This issue simply requires clear 
methods of accounting for the 
process of carbon trading and 
ensuring that it does not place undue 






Currently, the policy framework at national 
level, governing provincial and municipal 
procurement of renewable electricity and energy 
efficiency technologies is not in place. Some of 
the facets are governed by existing policies but 
only by proxy.  
A clear overarching policy is required 
in order to streamline and standardise 
municipal and provincial 
programmes. 
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Table 10: Process Barriers27 
Issue Summary Conclusion 
Procurement 
Challenges 
As discussed above the processes for procurement 
are lengthy and costly for municipalities. In 
addition to this the legislation guiding 
procurement places great emphasis on the best 
price, which hampers the procurement of newer 
technologies as no concession is made for the 
value of externalities in relation to this cost.  
A generic procurement policy 
for climate change related 
projects is inappropriate, as it 
does not factor in the 
environmental and sustainability 
cost over the long term. 
Performance 
Management 
Performance management outcomes are required 
from all municipalities. This leads to the executive 
level making decisions in terms of these outcomes, 
which neglects sustainable outcomes.  
Provincial and municipal 
outcomes should be aligned 
with sustainability goals.  
Budgetary 
Processes 
Responding to climate change at provincial and 
municipal level is not an imbedded imperative in 
their planning methodologies. What is more, 
logically municipalities will shy away from 
projects such as embedded generation that will 
lower their income. The main focus on municipal 
expenditure is providing basic services. The 
budgetary deadlines set for municipalities place 
staff under immense pressure resulting in them not 
taking the time to consider the long-term 
implications of decisions made regarding their 
Integrated Development Plans. 
Climate change issues need to 
be stipulated in provincial and 
municipal policy, or they will 
not translate into the budget.  
Community 
Participation 
The trade-offs between socio-political and 
environmental needs of a municipality means that 
climate change related project are a difficult case 
to make in the eyes of the public. There is an 
inability in the three spheres of government’s 
capacity to link these projects with social goals 
and this has resulted in further marginalisation of 
these projects.  
Budgetary decisions are affected 
by a lack of community support. 
A meaningful space needs to be 
created for community 
participation and acceptance of 
these projects before they can 
succeed. 
Table 11: Systems, Information and Organisational Barriers28 
Issue Summary Conclusion 
Institutional 
Hierarchy 
The staff involved in climate change related 
projects in provincial and municipal governments 
usually sit in environmental departments. These 
departments are usually low on both funding and 
staff, and when considering the daunting task of 
implanting a successful project as described 
above, it becomes clear that these departments 
often do not have the capacity or the reach in the 
hierarchy of the state to fulfil these requirements.  
Environmental departments are 
often marginalised in big 
decision-making processes 
because of the hierarchy that 
exists. Classic infrastructure 
programmes end up being 
favoured. There is thus also a 
need for sensitisation of 




The nature of these projects and the legislative 
requirements for their fulfilment are complicated 
by the silo mentality of different departments of 
the state at different levels 
Climate change projects are 
multi-disciplinary. The state is 
simply not set up for this which 
reduces the appetite for these 
27 Adapted from National Treasury and The Western Cape Government (2013: 19) 





The consumption data needed to build a strong 
case for these projects does not yet exist. This is 
not a problem of willingness, but again rather an 
issue of capacity and monitoring ability.  
The absence of data severely 
restricts the ability to build a 
strong case for climate change 
related projects, the expertise 
and resources to create these 
systems for municipalities and 
provinces should be a priority. 
In addition to the identification of barriers, the diagnostic report also outlined the 
characteristics found within municipalities that have managed to successfully 
implement sustainable goals (National Treasury & Western Cape Government, 2013): 
1. The ability to design innovative projects for which different stakeholders in a
municipality gets on board;
2. Senior political and institutional buy-in;
3. The ability to utilise networks to source donor funding;
4. A high public and media profile of the projects that de-risk the projects
implementation;
5. Bottom-up advocacy for project approval and social acceptance;
6. Highly skilled project management.
6.4 Monitoring and Evaluation Toward the Alteration of Regulations 
Rolling blackouts, rising electricity prices and shifting incentives in the electricity 
market of South Africa over the past 10 years have created the ideal environment for 
growing embedded generation and energy efficiency markets. General market forces 
affecting the behaviour of consumers including the fear of penalties such as carbon 
tax and blackouts and projected increases in electricity price have spurred consumers 
to invest in energy efficiency, self-generation and storage technologies. Another 
reason for consumers defecting from the centralised model of electricity production 
and consumption is a heightened awareness of the knowledge skills and technologies 
that exist within alternative markets. Even though this type of activity could 
potentially disrupt the way in which electricity has been provided in the country 
historically, certain factors closely related to electricity security and increasing 
amounts of negative externalities within the electricity sector resulted in national 
policies that not only condone but reward certain types of energy-saving behaviour 
through tax incentives, energy saving initiatives and cost reductions (Didiza et al., 
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2016: 15). The South African market is regulated by The Integrated Resource Plan 
primarily, which accounts mostly for the generating practices of utility scale 
electricity.  Changes have however been made to energy service policies, which has 
had a positive effect on the energy efficiency and embedded generation market. The 
Department of Energy and SANEDI have introduced the 12 L Income Tax Allowance 
on Energy Savings. Businesses can, in accordance with this allowance, offset their 
energy savings against their annual corporate tax. The offset allowance is calculate as 
28 per cent of their tax rate. Various standards exist for construction requiring energy 
efficiency initiatives in new buildings; apparatus, measurement and labelling; testing, 
safety and minimum standing heat loss for water heaters; certification of buildings; 
solar water heater instillation requirements; measurement and verification of energy 
savings; measurement and verification of local content and smart meter standards 
(Didiza et al., 2016: 17). All of these measures are certainly conducive to 
decentralised electricity markets but they have not been enough to fast track the 
development of these markets. Consider again the findings of the Diagnostic Report 
presented in Tables 9, 10 and 11 above. The practicalities of small-scale embedded 
generation and energy efficiency technologies will first and foremost impact the 
owner of the grid to which they are linked. In most cases, especially where residential 
consumers are concerned, these grids fall in municipal jurisdiction. Provinces and 
municipalities have been mandated by the Constitution to engage in climate change 
related projects, further the NCCRS holds municipalities and local governments 
responsible for these functions. As far as the electricity system is concerned in 
municipal and provincial jurisdictions there are three apparent options toward 
becoming more sustainable electricity users: defect at least to a certain extent from the 
Eskom model through own (municipal) production; procure renewable electricity 
from a third party IPP or allow the customers within the network to implement own 
production and energy efficiency measures. 
Despite being mandated in this regard, provinces and municipalities do not have the 
necessary funds allocated to perform these functions. However, even if they had the 
funds the legislative barriers that have to be overcome to accomplish sustainable 
development in the electricity sector would make the first two options incredibly 
difficult to attain. Legislative issues including the lengthy process of establishing 
public-private partnerships, the further issues relating to the extension of these 
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partnership contracts beyond three years, and the absence of an over-arching national 
policy to guide and standardise provincial electricity programmes means that 
investing time and effort into any directed action might end up being voided by later 
adjustments at national level, or might simply be too expensive to pursue.  
The responses of the Western Cape Provincial Government and that of their 
municipalities, as discussed above, have been captured in their green ideology. They 
have essentially opted for a holistic response to the regulatory mandates provided by 
National government, the negative externalities of the electricity sector as a whole and 
the market pressures at play. According to the Western Cape Government’s Green 
Economy Report, “the green economy offers a lens through which the 
interdependencies between human and natural systems can be managed differently” 
(Hermanus & Ely, 2015: 3). This report considers two aspects of cardinal importance 
to growing the green economy: the improvement of resource efficiency in such a way 
that mitigates the environmental risk to the economy and the identification of new 
value chains that manage natural resources in a better way.   
Driving renewable energy policy is thus not one of the major aims of the Western 
Cape Provincial Government, rather it is using policy to shape the supply chain of the 
electricity sector so that it remains beneficial to the province. This cautious approach 
has resulted in three interlinked processes with the end goal of policy adjustments that 
pose the least amount of risk to the province. First, they crystallised their overarching 
goals in the form of quantifiable, measurable constructs. Secondly, they set in motion 
processes through which municipalities, other key actors and the province as a whole 
could report on the development of the goals for the green economy, using the 
constructs created; and lastly, based on the loops of monitoring and evaluation, they 
started setting targets for specific technologies within the province and they started 
lobbying at national level toward the alteration of crucial national policies governing 
the procurement of renewable electricity at municipal and provincial level. 
6.4.1 Quantification and Measurement 
Because of the relative novelty of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in 
municipalities and provincial governments, one of the most important first steps to 
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altering the legislative environment was the quantification and measurement of the 
goals that had been put in place through the green ideology. This included the 
identification of barriers that was accomplished through the thorough research 
conducted by the Western Cape Provincial Government and National Treasury 
discussed above. Secondly, indicators for progress and avenues for development 
needed to be quantified and measured. Within the Western Cape Infrastructure 
Framework the province clearly set out three targeted shifts in the energy sector: the 
introduction of natural gas processing infrastructure; the promotion of renewable 
energy including the promotion of the associated manufacturing capability for 
renewable energy systems within the province; and a shift in transport patterns aimed 
at reducing the provinces reliance on liquid fuel sources (Western Cape Government, 
2013b: 31). 
Sustainable consumption and resource efficiency is echoed in most of the provinces 
planning focuses on greening infrastructure, including more energy efficient buildings 
and the transformation of design standards; the promotion of green energy in 
businesses through the enhanced uptake up rooftop PV and efficient water heating 
mechanisms; enhancing the management of the electricity grid and lastly the 
minimization of waste which factors into all of the above.  In this regard, the Western 
Cape Government developed Green Economy Indicators. These indicators fall into 
five categories: natural resource base; resource productivity; socio-economic; 
environmental quality of life; and policy and finance (Western Cape Government, 
2015: 39). The indicators that apply to the electricity sector are summarised in the 
table below. The mitigation of risk took place at various levels and included the 
mitigation of climate change risk in the long term and the risk that non-adaptation 
held for the economy. It also included mitigating the risk posed by the inefficiencies 
of the dominant electricity system, and of the Eskom monopoly. As shown above, this 
was done through careful evaluation of the system as it stands and an umbrella 
philosophy that opted for large-scale ideological shifts rather than smaller tweaks to 
the system. This also included quantifying and measuring indicators to keep track of 
progress.  
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Carbon % Change in energy 
sector emissions 
against 2009 baseline 
-12% No data 
Resource 
Productivity 
Carbon Carbon emissions for 
energy sector 
3634575300 tCo2e No data 
Resource 
Productivity 
Carbon Carbon Emissions per 
unit GDP 





Energy Total Energy 
Consumption 
276,333,250.00 GJ No data 
Resource 
Productivity 
Energy Energy Consumption 
per Sector 
Industry: 85,383,982.29 GJ 
Transport:146,296,369.73GJ  
Agriculture:6,968,221.23 GJ 
Commerce and Public 
Services: 10,921,301.41 GJ 
Local 
Government:2,111,886.GJ  




Energy Energy Consumption 
per unit GDP 
977.65 GJ/ Million units GDP No data 
Resource 
Productivity 
Energy Energy Consumption 
per Capita 
52.14 GJ/ Capita No Data 
Resource 
Productivity 






133. 40 MW 421.82 
MW 
Environmental 
Quality of Life 
Energy % Of households with 




Energy Annual Value of 
renewable energy 
projects funded by 
national and 
international green/ 
R3 220 00 Million R8 024 00 
Million 




A limited amount of data was published on the sustainable energy plans created for 
municipalities during the testing phase of the project. The effects in municipal policy 
in terms of climate change and energy usage in Western Cape municipalities are 
however quite evident. SALGA reported in 2015 that 10 out of the 30 municipalities 
in the province had the following: processes and policies in place that set climate 
change/ energy sustainability as a priority in their Integrated Development Plans; 
Specific climate change/ sustainable energy projects in their Integrated Development 
Plans and Climate change/ sustainable energy included in their budgets (Ferry & Von 
Kalm, 2015). The latest available Provincial IDP Assessment Criteria was set up in 
2013. Section 2.2.3 of the IDP Evaluation Criteria Regarding Energy and Electricity 
Development strategies requires that municipalities report on energy planning and 
demand-side management, including the diversification of the energy mix and 
renewables. It also requires that municipalities report on their consumption (Western 
Cape Provincial Government, 2013). 
 Further, the Western Cape Climate Change Biennial Monitoring & Evaluation Report 
programme was initiated as a reporting platform in the province. It was aimed at 
aligning the provinces reporting with the National Monitoring & Evaluation strategy 
and reflects on the Paris Agreement. Its main goal is to monitor the Western Cape’s 
Climate Change Response Strategy through: 
1. Providing a clear picture of response mechanisms;
2. Providing an assessment for the effectiveness of these mechanisms;
3. Moving toward greater consistency in approaches and increasing the coordination
of response methods and monitoring and evaluation;
4. Demonstrating the impact of responses over time;
5. Increase transparency and awareness (Western Cape Governmen, 2016).
This report also categorises municipalities into non-performance, compliant 
performance and optimum performance categories, and tracks among other things 
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energy efficiency in both the public and private sector and renewable energy and 
carbon emissions focussing on areas improved and areas to be improved. 
6.4.3 Target Setting and Lobbying for National Regulatory Changes 
The province set a target of enabling independent generation through PV of 135MW 
by 2020. Between May and December 2016 the Metro saw a 120 per cent increase in 
improved installations. Fifteen municipalities had been assisted in meeting the legal 
requirements for embedded generation by 2017. The province aims to assist another 
20 municipalities in obtaining the rights to allow embedded generation in 2017/2018. 
The pioneering attitude of the province did not rest with rooftop PV and energy 
efficiency mechanisms. The Provincial government has lobbied for the rights to sign 
power purchase agreements with independent power producers, an issue that has been 
identified by many as the key to solving the problems of the municipal financial 
models within South Africa. However, as evident from Helen Zille’s State of the 
Province Address’s in 2016 and 2017 respectively, this has been an uphill battle: 
We need to diversify our energy mix so that we can create enough power for 
growth that is both sustainable and low carbon. To be successful, we will need 
to sign Power Purchase Agreements with Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs), focusing on solar and wind energy, and import Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) into the Province on a large scale. The City of Cape Town has applied 
for permission from the Department of Energy to procure power from IPPs. 
This approval is the key that unlocks the full potential of this game changer, 
and we trust that the Department of Energy will act in the public interest by 
making it easier to purchase independently-produced power. (Zille, 2016)  
We’ve also engaged National Treasury and the Energy Department numerous 
times on the business case for direct power procurement. We believe that 
allowing municipalities to enter into contracts with independent power 
producers is a four-fold win: cheaper electricity prices, lower carbon 
emissions, more investment and more industrialisation. This ultimately means 
more local jobs. The City of Cape Town is pushing hard for the right to do 
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this. Unfortunately, we have had no meaningful response to date from the 
DoE, and we are concerned that they may well be trying to defend Eskom’s 
monopoly. Mayor De Lille has been clear about her plans to pursue the City’s 
legal options in this regard, and we will support her. (Zille, 2017)  
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1 Power and Agency within the Niche 
As a point of departure it might be useful to begin with a discussion about the steering 
attributes of the main steering actor within this niche. Generally steering or 
empowering actors are thought of as those that create regulations and legislation that 
hold some sort of hegemonic agency over other actors. For the actors in this niche, 
that is not always the case. The primary steering actor within this niche is the Western 
Cape Provincial Government. The delineation of direction, meaning and values takes 
place through their green narrative, and is conveyed relatively clearly to the rowing 
niche participants including producers, municipalities, third sector participants and 
other market actors. The reason for saying that the delineation of direction is relative 
clear is because, at the time when this thesis is being written, a high level of clarity 
had not yet been reached about the specific calls to action that are to result from the 
green narrative; there is no step-by-step guide or rule system for the impending 
change. The data presented in this chapter provides an account of the formation and 
refinement of a clear direction for action. Throughout this process of refinement the 
Western Cape Provincial Government was able to establish monitoring mechanisms 
in-line with the broad goals of their ideology and later, in line with the results of 
cycles of action, research and observation. Claims about institutional reform were 
strongly put forward in two ways in their ideology: first, private sector investment 
was to fund development with public sector guidance. Secondly, new forms of 
collaboration between consumers and producers, the public and the private, and new 
coalitions were to be formed. The latter later translated into reform strategies for the 
financial models of municipalities. The push for regulatory reform on national 
provincial and municipal level is an on-going effort. 
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6.5.1.1 Agency in Discourse 
The politics of a niche is captured in the narrative that is created within it. Actors 
create narratives in order to reshape societal action and mentalities in such a way that 
allows for institutional reform. Smith and Raven (2012) have found that there are 
three over-arching themes within the competing actor narratives negotiating 
empowerment. Negotiating protective spaces involves the contention of narratives 
over: positive expectations about the niche that justifies it for society; explicit claims 
for institutional reforms or claims on competition in order to change the environment; 
and lastly, a reframing of the past that justifies the challenges that the niche poses to 
the dominant regime (Smith & Raven, 2012: 1033). The green narrative of the 
Western Cape Provincial Government effectively captures the niche. Beyond setting 
the justification of the niche, the claims for institutional reform, and the historical 
justification for the niche, the narrative has an important role in framing the 
‘problems’ dealt with in the niche. In this way the Provincial Government is actively 
re-framing the mentalities of actors that they are steering in such a way that informs 
future decisions away from the dominant regime but toward the story that their 
narrative tells. Provinces are ‘thinking’ participants in the electricity sector. Their 
ability to shape the electricity sector rests with their ability to modify the behaviour of 
both the national government and of the occupants of their own jurisdiction. The 
ideology of the Western Cape Government is the value component of their governing 
power. This type of ideology is captured in policy plans with ‘principles’ rather than 
‘rules’. These principles are as much to guide their own action, as it is to guide the 
action of other actors.  
6.5.1.2 Stretch-and-Transform Empowerment 
One might gain more insight about the entirety of the process of stretch-and-transform 
empowerment once stable sets of rules exist within the niche. However viewing the 
system at such an unstable point does provide interesting insights about the processes 
that steering actors go through toward the creation of stable sets of rules. One must 
realise that this niche, as any niche, had existing rules to contend with, albeit not 
many regulative rules advancing the development of the niche. The cognitive and 
normative rules of the system implemented by the Western Cape Provincial 
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Government served as a guide for action as discussed above. However, none of the 
actions that followed from this, at this stage in the niche, was an exercise of 
hegemonic power. Instead, the Western Cape Government used a combination of 
relational agency and networked agency to achieve the goals that they set out. Look 
for example at the processes of the CCMSP (Price, 2013). The active alignment of 
actors around municipal financial models including actors not formally part of the 
municipal structures was the main methodology for the coordination of resources. In 
this case the resources that were coordinated were mainly knowledge and skills 
participants that could facilitate the process. Network creation in this instance 
consisted of three interlinked phases: stocktaking; cycles of evaluation and cycles of 
solidification. The first phase is relatively stationary and done by the steering actor 
alone. The second and third phases are on-going cycles that arguably never stop in the 
life of the network and involve multiple actors. 
Stocktaking 
Stocktaking is a necessary prerequisite before networked action can be accomplished. 
The steering actor in this case is driven to action by both the risks relating to the 
deterioration of the dominant regime and the added complexity that new options 
outside of the dominant regime offer in the accomplishment of the traditional 
outcomes of the dominant regime. Should the actor choose to explore the new options 
outside of the dominant regime in obtaining the goods and services that the regime 
once yielded, she now has to realign the actions and perceptions of other actors in 
such a way that successfully accomplishes this. Enrolling other actor’s means creating 
new rules of conduct, new ways of thinking and new ways of connecting them with 
one another. Before this can be accomplished, the steering actor, wishing to create 
these pathways, needs to fully understand what already exists. This includes taking 
stock of the existing knowledge and skills needed to perform the new tasks required 
to generate the determined outcomes. Important to note here are that often the actual 
outcomes of the new network and of the niche are the same as the outcomes of the 
dominant regime (sufficient, affordable electricity). However the risks produced by 
the traditional method of generating this outcome is what the new methodology is 
attacking. Thus the outcomes here are the mitigated risks in the operation of the 
system. In mitigating the risks, as I will show below, the question of how and by 
whom is less important than the creation of a stable network along which this can take 
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place. The variables of the network are interchangeable; they are merely a means to 
an end.  
 The steering actor also takes stock of the existing tools at the disposal of other actors, 
and of themselves. This means understanding exactly what it is that they can and 
cannot do. In the case of state actors, such as the Western Cape Government, much of 
this required a full evaluation of what legal stumbling blocks exist that lock them and 
other actors, such as municipalities, into the paths of the dominant regime.  
Most importantly, the steering actor must take stock of the mentalities that exist in 
other actors and once again within themselves. This includes finding out whether 
other actors view the same issues as problems as they do, and how they think it could 
best be solved. It also includes testing the appetite of key actors to participate in 
network actions. 
Cycles of Evaluation 
The initial evaluation that takes place is a departure from the stocktaking phase. First, 
for the steering actor this means distilling their role in producing the preferred 
pathways of the new network. Secondly it includes the mapping of existing 
stakeholders based on the knowledge, skills, tools and most importantly mentalities 
that these actors possess. One important factor that identifies an actor as a possible 
network participant is their appetite for addressing the same issues that the steering 
actor wishes to address.  
Thirdly, informal connections need to be established between actors and some form of 
discussion needs to take place between them. Agreements and issues highlighted by 
this discussion will allow, predominantly the steering actor, but also the other actors, 
to begin to measure and quantify new variables in the processes that lead to outcomes 
for the new network. This means that the problems experienced by a group of actors, 
including but not limited to the steering actor, needs to be understood better by the 
entire group. Lastly, this preliminary level of understanding will allow the group to 
discuss different approaches or pathways for solving the problem. Often, more than 
one pathway will be tested and evaluated for its methods before a pathway is chosen. 
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Thus in the beginning a network has various weak paths of which the better choice 
will survive.  
Network creation in niches often happens through the creation of smaller networks 
that spill into one another at a later stage, however, the amalgamation of all of the 
sub-networks is not a prerequisite. The example presented here depicts the creation of 
various smaller test networks in various municipalities by the same steering actor, but 
with different network actors in each case. Geography and the availability of 
resources means that municipalities experience electricity issues differently, and that 
these differences are likely to persist even after the creation of a new network for 
action.  Cycles of evaluation are ultimately the processes of trial and error that keep 
on taking place within a network; it acts to refine the scope of the network and direct 
action better and better as the network develops. 
Cycles of Solidification 
The first step to solidifying the network is formalising the connection between at least 
some of the stakeholders to some extent. This can happen through agreements or 
through the cooperative participation in programmes of change. This said, the 
connections within a network will remain rather fluid, more so the further the actor is 
removed from directly impacting the outcomes generated by the network. In order for 
some solidification to take place, there has to be a relative amount of certainty about 
the new pathways for action, or about the new outcomes produce by the network. At 
this point one can see which actors are closer to the production of these outcomes and 
which are further away.  
Beyond the solidification of connection of actors at the centre of the network, the 
other important facet of solidification is the alignment of mentalities. This is by no 
means a once-off exercise but rather a continuous cycle in reaction to new selection 
pressures and new environmental stimuli.  
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6.5.2 Developmental Trajectories within the Niche 
The conducive environment created through provincial activity for the reformulation 
of municipal financial models and the electricity master plans do rely to some extent 
on hegemonic power, because of the hierarchical relationship between the Provincial 
Government and municipalities. This might seem to be a contradiction of the 
statements made above, however, one must take note of the fact that, if this process of 
change was implemented by a third sector actor or market actor, there may be a 
higher risk of falling out of touch with the determinations of national government. As 
I show in the next chapter, the third sector plays an important role in facilitating the 
growth of the embedded generation and energy efficiency market within the province, 
however very little of this is toward the creation of regulative rules held by formal 
public institutions like municipalities. When acting in that capacity they follow the 
guidelines for action set forth by Provincial Government. Thus one cannot disregard 
the hegemonic agency of actors that act in a top-down manner in the absence of 
immediate regulatory rules even if the rules and the consequent activity of the steering 
actor function through relational and networked agency.  
6.5.2.1 Steering Actors Contributing to the Properties of the Niche 
The contribution of this actor to growing the niche remains steering and allowing 
other actors to row. The steerer, in this case, does not offer much more than shielding 
by proxy, however the network shields the actors within and surrounding 
municipalities by creating a space in which trial and error exercises can take place 
with minimal long-term damage. Much of the shielding offered by the network lies in 
the reinforcement found in the perpetuation of new routines and thought patterns by a 
variety of actors. The Western Cape Government thus initially employed a passive 
form of empowerment, which allowed them to also then nurture the market. An 
important aspect of the nurturing role here was the identification, quantification and 
measurement of the aspects of new value chains. For the niche, this initial 
identification of new value chains was not necessarily the identification and 
development of path-breaking innovations, but the identification of terrains for these 
innovations to take place, because it altered the balance of selection pressures by 
making these newly identified issues important for the niche. Once again framing 
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emerges as an important tool for development within the niche. In the same way that 
an actor’s framing of a problem within the dominant regime can restrict the critical 
reflection of other actors, so too can the reframing of a problem at niche level become 
a podium for critical reflection. 
The steering actor in this case was more concerned with the mechanisms of change 
than with the outcome. Nurturing change in a Darwinist manner, they relied on 
natural selection, as their nurturing processes were often accompanied by the 
exploration of many pathways concurrently to avoid lock-in to a specific path. Crucial 
to this was the long-term thinking and the alignment of a variety of actors toward 
socially acceptable outcomes and required thinking in multiple domains with a 
philosophy of learning en route. This, taken with the results of Chapter 5, show that 
different principles can guide the creation of policy in one country. Similarly, here 
policy, much like the regime, relies on a set of stable norms through which the public 
enrols the private. Thus, part of what is being nurtured in niches is this philosophy. If 
the narrative falls away, the whole network will disassemble. This does not take away 
from the fact that the narrative is constantly evolving, however this evolution needs to 
happen in relative synchronicity within the various elements of the network or it will 
not survive. 
6.5.2.2 The Articulation of Selection Pressure 
Empowerment here involves the processes that help innovations to become 
competitive within unchanged selection environments or processes that change the 
selection environment to favour path-breaking innovations. Smith, Stirling and 
Berkout’s (2005) understanding of the role of selection pressure articulation does not 
only explain the grand narrative changes. It can also be used to explain how certain 
actors bring about change at a smaller scale. In addition to this, this conception often 
explains why some efforts at problem solving in regime transition are successful and 
why others are not. Selection pressure articulation takes place at various levels. 
Even though the provincial government is mainly a thinking participant in the 
decentralisation of electricity in the Western Cape, the results of their shifts in 
ideology causes tangible problems for the dominant regime. This is in line with the 
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second requirement that Smith, Stirling and Berkhout (2005) set forth for the effective 
exertion of agency through the articulation of selection pressure: the coherent 
orientation of selection pressure needs to be strong enough to illicit a reaction from 
the dominant regime. These problems come in two forms and the reaction from the 
dominant regime is specific to the shape that the problem takes: first, a problem can 
be created through incremental advancements or problem solving at the periphery of 
the system and secondly problems can be created at the centre of the system through 
outright opposition posed to one of the important functions or structures of the 
system. Problems at the periphery of the system, including the instillation of small- 
scale embedded generation and sustainability technologies might not have immediate 
opposition, but the snowball effect of these changes adds up to bigger issues in the 
future. Changes required within the internal functioning structures of the system (such 
as changing the rules for municipal procurement) are much harder to bring into 
operation, however they elicit an immediate response from the dominant regime. 
6.5.2.3 Regime Membership 
In contrast to the developments of the IPP project, the renewable energy 
developments in the Western Cape can all be regarded as decentralised. There are 
some important characteristic differences between actors that act toward renewable 
electricity development alongside the dominant regime and those that act toward 
renewable electricity developments that contrast the dominant regime. According to 
Geels, the power that an actor holds is to be found in their resources and in the way in 
which their interests are aligned with the interests of other actors (Geels, 2004b: 909). 
Aligning one’s interests with that of other key actors in the sector is of utmost 
importance to the actor that wishes to exist harmoniously alongside the dominant 
regime; this can however not be said for more decentralised development.  
In processes of decentralised development power lies in an actors ability to align other 
actor’s interests with theirs and in contesting the structural alignments in the 
structures that underpin the system, especially regulation. The alignment of the 
decentralised actors’ interests with other key actors, in the way that the IPP 
programme did it, means very little. What is more important in this context is the way 
in which selection pressure and institutional arrangements have been moulded to the 
narrative of the Western Cape Provincial Government. 
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According to Smith, Stirling and Berkhout (2005), regime membership can be 
measured and understood by looking at the degree to which an actor or a group of 
actors participate in the activities within a socio-technical system that reproduce lock-
ins and path dependencies. Viewed in this light, the Provincial Government presents 
as quite an interesting case. It certainly perpetuated the outcomes of the dominant 
regime through its regulatory structures historically, however, can one actually say 
that as an actor, the provincial government contributed to the creation of path 
dependency and lock-in in the electricity sector? Only by proxy - only through the 
strengthening of other related institutions in the processes of building the economy. 
6.5.2.4 The Importance of Field-level Rules 
One of the major critiques of the MLP that underlies the work done in this thesis is 
the lack of attention that the theory gives to the underlying politics and power at play 
in the processes of creating rules within a socio-technical system. The MLP 
emphasises the activity of core regime actors, such as policy-makers, large firms and 
incumbent beneficiaries of the outcomes of the dominant regime, focussing 
specifically on the role that recursive action and reflexivity plays in the processes of 
rule maintenance and the acceptance of new rule. As such it pays insufficient 
attention to the processes through which new rules are created and the role of 
collective action, especially as it relates to non-core and external regime members. 
Geels acknowledged that field-level rules and resources could be shaped through 
monitoring, defence or alteration tactics by collective actors (Geels, 2014). However 
in explanation of this he reverts back to the high-level categories of actors captured in 
political economy concepts, such as the minerals-energy complex, carbon capital and 
carbon lock-in (ibid.). This disregards the way in which field-level trajectories shape 
the rule-forming process at niche level. A trajectory within a socio-technical system is 
viewed as a sequence of four successive mechanisms: the structural conditioning of 
actors in the system by rules and institutions, social interaction between actors, 
structural elaborations where rules and institutions are shaped, and lastly the 
acceptance and retention of these rules and institutions (Geels et al., 2016: 897).   
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Because niche processes are shielded to some extent from the rules and selection 
pressures of the dominant regime, niche advocates are able to disregard the 
functioning of existing regime-dependent alliances, such as the minerals energy 
complex in the South African case. Of course there can never be a complete disregard 
of these rules as they still provide certain boundaries for niche advocates. An example 
of this is the small-scale embedded generation market, which the next chapter will 
show is the net consumer model for small-scale embedded generation in the Western 
Cape and that effectively allows for the preservation of municipal financial models in 
accordance with the dominant regime. However, beyond the boundaries created by 
these rule systems, the agency for niche advocates is derived from ground-level 
interactions with one another. This morphogenetic cycle involves the initial structural 
conditioning by rules and existing institutions setting boundaries for development as 
explained above, however the social interactions between actors is a pivotal podium 
for processes that resemble Geels’s strategic games (Geels et al., 2016) rather than 
outright conflicts and power struggles. Arguably these conflicts and power struggles 
that are depicted by Geels as a part of the sequential cycle of field-level trajectories 
only occurs once rules have stabilised within the system. The elaboration of rules and 
institutions takes place as a result of the network formation during strategic games 
and the acceptance and retention of rules and institutions is, just like the formulation 
of networks, the result of collaborative action.  
6.5.3 Steering Actors and the Three Core Processes of the Niche 
 Geels and Schot discussed four different evolutionary mechanisms that contribute to 
the generation of radical change (2007). One of these evolutionary mechanisms, 
namely natural selection, resonates to some extent with the process of niche formation 
discussed above. The ability to attain a level of independence from the dominant 
regime through technologies, such as small-scale embedded generation and energy 
efficiency technologies was a selection criteria generated and initially articulated in 
the broader socio-technical regime, outside of the niche. This level of independence 
was captured in the green ideology that set priorities for the development of the niche 
and established broad expectations for the niche, thereby contributing to the first 
process of the niche.  
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The action of steering actors within the niche then further articulated this selection 
pressure and allowed for the coordination of resources around municipalities. The 
coordination of resources and the formation of networks were to find a middle ground 
between the boundaries of the regime and the new selection pressure, thereby 
formulating social networks.  
The monitoring and evaluation that took place in cycles of evaluation towards cycles 
of solidification accounts for the final process of learning and articulation suggested 
in the MLP. Thus the MLP’s conceptualisation of the broad processes proves to be 
accurate. The work done in this chapter however elaborates on the finer nuances that 
lead to these broad processes within the niche, and in so doing, highlights one 
important missing link in the MLP argument. This relates to the regime bias that 
underpins the conception of niche-level developments in the MLP. Because of this 
bias, niche developments are contextualised in terms of their reaction to or their effect 
on the dominant regime. This is easily illustrated by reflecting on the MLP’s analysis 
of the evolutionary mechanisms that lead to radical change. 
Geels’s conception of natural selection is one that presupposes the existence of a 
variant in the internal market niche that then links up with the dominant regime (see 
chapter 2) and produces tensions regarding the rules of the dominant regime. 
However the inverse took place here. A selection criteria from the dominant regime 
was amplified within the niche environment, however the niche environment was able 
to exist because steering actors were able to decouple the niche-level trajectories from 
the risks of the dominant regime and work around the boundaries created by the 
dominant regime. This resulted in a niche that is not completely shielded from the 
dominant regime but rather acts around the niche-level problems produced by the 
dominant regime.  
The MLP does take account of the fact that niches can form at different levels of 
proximity to the dominant regime, however the crucial interplay between regime rules 
and the processes of niche-rule formulation is left out of the equation. The MLP 
analysis begins at a point where niches are ready to ‘break through’ into the dominant 
regime or where the dominant regime has deteriorated to such an extent that the decay 
of regime rules created windows for the development of new niche rules. The case 
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study presented in this chapter is one of a niche that is neither ready to break through 
nor developing solely due to the decay of the rules of the dominant regime. This does 
not mean that the end result of the niche process won’t resemble the breakthrough/ 
replacement narrative presented in the MLP, but it does mean that, first, the MLP 
misinterprets the role of niche regime interaction in the decay of the dominant regime 
because the perspective does not consider that the rules of the regime provide nothing 
more than the outer boundaries for action within the niche, and that many of the new 
rules are created in the spaces between these boundaries. Secondly the MLP 
disregards the crucial importance of the positioning of actors in relation to one 
another, the initial organisation of network and alliances that might be just as 
effective in playing out the normative and cognitive rules set forth by the steering 
actor in the niche, without reliance on regime-level relational agency. 
6.5.4 Conclusion 
Steering the initial formulation of rules does not necessarily require the immediate 
delineation of regulative rules. Cognitive and normative rules suffice for the initial 
steering practices within the niche. Often the process of creating regulative rules take 
place through the participation of an actor that wields hegemonic agency but enacts 
this agency without regulative rules. In these cases the role of hegemonic agency 
removes some of the risks of novelties that might not have been attempted by a group 
of actors without this form of agency.  
Framing and discourse are incredibly powerful tools in the creation of developmental 
trajectories within a niche that initially functions with relatively few niche-conducive 
regulative rules. Even though framing and discourse cannot  provide the same step-
by- step guide that regulative rules can, the value of normative and cognitive rules lies 
in the liberating effect that it has on the market. It allows for the broadening of the 
mentalities of niche advocates and in so doing stimulates critical reflection. It 
stimulates cooperation and the formulation of coalitions and networks that then 
further acts to articulate selection pressures and coordinate the resources of niche 
advocates. This does not mean that there are no power struggles at play. However, 
when there are fairly few niche rules to contest, the main avenues for these power 
struggles are not inward but rather outward toward the boundaries created by the rules 
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of the dominant regime. The internal organisation that takes place in groups of 
heterogeneous actors in the formation of rules takes place along evolutionary 
principles rather than outright power struggles. I say that this process has an 
evolutionary character because various options for development are considered and 
the contestation that takes place is rather between these options than between the 
actors that advocate for them. 
The strongest advocates for specific developmental trajectories, as I show in the next 
chapter, are rowing actors. Their contestation is with the regulative, normative and 
cognitive rules of the dominant regime and, at least in this case, not with the rules 
within the niche. This is because of the open-ended nature of niche rules, resulting in 
the absence of niche-conducive rules. The work of these open ended rules, even 
though they are bounded by the lock-ins of the dominant regime, is to put the issues 
of the niche advocate on the radar, albeit without direct solutions to the problems of 
niche advocates. 
This open-ended process of network formation by the steering actor takes place in 
three loops: stocktaking, cycles of evaluation and cycles of solidification. These 
processes are, as explained above, evolutionary in nature. Stocktaking includes the 
evaluation of existing regime rules, the negative externalities of the dominant regime 
and the needs of rowing niche advocates. Based on this the steering actor justifies the 
niche. Cycles of evolution can be summarised as the initial process of role 
determination by the steering actor, based on the justification for the niche. It includes 
the continuing evaluation of problems but also the delineation of actor groups that 
could attend to these problems. Cycles of solidification are essentially the final steps 
of field-level trajectory formation, the acceptance and retention of rules and 
institutions. Here developmental trajectories begin to take shape and niche-conducive 
rules begin to form. 
Stretch-and-transform empowerment is better suited to creating decentralised niches if 
the dominant regime functions on the principle of centralised production. The role of 
non-core regime members in offering stretch-and-transform empowerment is evident 
in this process. Even though the non-core regime member as steering actor must 
contend with the boundaries that regime rules create for the niche, being removed 
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from the processes that created and perpetuated these rules historically makes it easier 
for these actors to diverge from these rules.  
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Chapter 7 
Power Taking in the Niche 
We live in a world where many centres of power both steer and row. And each 
steers its own rowing being mindful of the steering and rowing being 
undertaken by other private and public institutions. (Braithwaite, 1999: 90) 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter it is structured around the work of the intermediary actor, GreenCape, 
but includes a variety of areas of development, mostly relating to the Western Cape. 
The goal of the data put forward in this ‘snapshot’ manner is to give special attention 
to the role of rowing actors in the niche. Up to now, steering has received more 
attention in the substantive chapters. The initial steering that took place was primarily 
toward guiding future action, rather than placing new requirements of immediate 
change on incumbent physical and institutional structures. What also became clear 
from Chapter 6 is that, even though there is an overarching ideology guiding long-
term goals, there were some issues dealt with more immediate effect. The type of 
rowing that took place thus depended on the immediacy of the risk factor dictating the 
change. Considering the role of the empowering actor, or the steerer in network 
creation, an obvious avenue of enquiry for this chapter is how rowing takes place and 
how it contributes to the creation of networks in the niche space. This chapter 
considers the categorisation of actors, the modalities of rowing governance in stretch-
and-transform niches and the contribution of this to the developmental trajectories of 
the niche. 
7.2 The Problem with the Privatisation of Electricity 
Cyril Ramaphosa, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, said that 
“governments should look at getting the private sector to partner with them and 
eventually reach a point where the private sector generates power independently” 
(ESI Africa, 2017). The Vice-President further said that the South African case has 
proven the effectiveness of private sector involvement in electricity supply projects. 
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Having IPP’s completely independent from the Eskom monopoly might be a difficult 
ideal to attain as there were, and still are, strong interests in keeping Eskom’s 
monopoly. These interests are partially ideological, considering Eskom’s role as a 
powerful utility in the ‘developmental state’. Increasingly, however, other interests 
have come to light, including black empowerment and, unfortunately, corruption. The 
debates surrounding drastic shifts from the centralised dominant regime at the 
national level are not likely to yield any changes in the near future. Various of my 
interviewees said that the future of the electricity sector in South Africa should 
logically have Eskom, or a centralised regulator, in charge of the distribution and 
transmission infrastructure, and move toward a more open market of production.  
This sentiment is complicated by the voices of political elite that are still lobbying for 
full-centralised control over electricity production and distribution as discussed in 
Chapter 5, and by other voices in civil society, such as the labour unions. Even though 
a national open market of electricity production might never exist in South Africa, 
one has to realise that there is a pattern of ideological shifts taking place in almost 
every group of actors that are involved in the electricity sector of South Africa. These 
shifts are not necessarily toward a decentralised market. There is a growing discontent 
with the failures of the dominant regime, which is evident when listening to the 
narratives of labour unions. 
One example of this is the narrative and ideological changes that NUMSA, South 
Africa’s National Union for Metal Workers, has publically undergone in recent years 
on the issue of electricity production. NUMSA has always posed strong objection to 
private-sector ownership in the electricity sector. They propose rather driving the 
renewable electricity sector on the principle of social ownership. The trade union was 
not persuaded by the mammoth amounts of social development that happened through 
the IPP programme, rather, they had lost confidence in Eskom, as explained in a 
statement on the resignation of Eskom’s CEO. However, they blame state corruption 
in this case, on the state’s involvement of with the private sector: 
Numsa has consistently opposed privatisation of public entities, called for the 
renationalisation of Arcelor Mittal SA and Sasol and the nationalisation of 
other strategic industries. But it is now clear that SOEs all need to be run in a 
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far more democratic and socially responsible way. Public utilities should have 
an entirely different set of objectives from private companies – to produce 
commodities and deliver services which people need, as efficiently, safely and 
economically as possible and to protect the environment and the economic 
prospects for future generations… The underlying problem at the heart of all 
Madonsela’s allegations is that SOEs have become entangled with the corrupt 
private sector through outsourcing of ancillary activities and thus been 
infected with the disease of corruption, which is inherent in the capitalist 
system. (NUMSA, 2016) 
Beyond the socialist agendas of the labour force in South Africa and the stock energy 
mind set of some South African politicians, there is yet another issue with public 
private partnerships: there have been failures in the past. The Solar Home System 
Project, for example, was aimed at providing basic electrification to poor rural 
households that do not have access to the grid. This was achieved through subsidizing 
households and giving private contractors concession sites in rural areas (Prasad, 
2007:05). Other small-scale efforts at introducing renewable energy also failed, 
including the Solar Water Heater Project. Failed efforts at procuring large-scale 
privately produced electricity include REFIT. Failed efforts by Eskom include the 
Pilot National Cogeneration Programme, the Medium Term Power Purchase 
Programme, and the Multisite Base-load Independent Power Producer Programme. 
An energy activist interviewed in 2015 expressed the sentiment that these failures 
carried on a national level in civil society: 
Well, that’s why as a pragmatic thing some would say we will accept this 
thing. Civil society was not united in rejecting liberalization per se, some folks 
say, “well, given that Eskom hasn’t delivered, this does have some potential”. 
But there was always with this sense of trepidation. Liberalization is not the 
panacea to solve all ills, but not all were against it. Particularly organized 
labour. But a lot of the left said we have a state and we have a state-owned 
entity and we have policy to say we are going to do this, Eskom must get out 
there and deliver energy services and where Eskom cannot  do it we will have 
solar home system, which we had that with the whole series of concessions, 
but what happened to the solar home system? It became public-private 
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partnerships, it started operating as IPPs and the whole thing failed. 
(Interviewee 5) 
At this point it must be clear that the institutional arrangement of the procurement 
programme carries as much weight as the ideals upon which the programme is based. 
When it comes to forging a relationship between the state and the private sector, it 
appears that the best structure is one that is removed from the immediate mandate of 
the state. This has been successfully done through government, in the form of the IPP 
office. As an interviewee representing the office said:  
Yes, and everybody believes they own us and in fact we do not belong to 
anybody… (Interviewee 1).  
The developments in the electricity sector at national level were the catalyst for 
developments at subnational level. However these developments, at provincial and 
municipal level, differ drastically from those at national level. They move away from 
centralised electricity generation and consumption and toward decentralised, semi-
independent systems. In the case of the Western Cape much of the ‘power taking’ was 
accomplished by a variety of actors and by an intermediary actor created by the state 
to facilitate the growth of the industry, GreenCape. 
7.3. Hybrid Intermediaries: the Case of GreenCape 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the initial role of GreenCape was to grow the renewable 
electricity sector around the IPP programme in the Western Cape. GreenCape is an 
important agency in the power taking governance of renewable electricity 
development in the Western Cape, and the rest of South Africa. They stand out from 
the rest, because they are neither private nor public, but rather a middleman between 
the two. Often, as I will show in this chapter, several of the ideologies of the Western 
Cape Government became evident in the work that they do, however they have 
managed to become more and more independent of their place of birth - the Western 
Cape Provincial Government.  
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7. 3.1 Institutional Structure
GreenCape was established in 2010 by the Western Cape Government, initially 
funded only by the Department of Trade and Tourism under the Western Cape 
Government. They have now diversified their funding pool, with the Western Cape 
Government funding them to around 50 per cent and the rest coming from sources 
like the World Bank, the Department of Trade and Industry, the City of Cape Town 
and international bodies. Their website describes their main activity as aiding the 
green economy in removing barriers to the establishment and growth of businesses, 
and in order to do this they work closely with the state, the private sector and 
academia. 
They report to the Western Cape Government, however, unlike the state, their sole 
purpose is the promotion of the green economy in the Western Cape. The Western 
Cape Provincial government has various special purpose vehicles that are designed 
with a specific agenda and developed to become self-sufficient.  
GreenCape is comparable to the IPP project office in this sense, and much like the 
IPP office, this hybrid structure is part of the reason for their success. The placement 
of GreenCape was no accident. As an interviewee from the Western Cape Provincial 
Government explained, the main advantages of their placement outside of government 
is easing interaction with the private sector, and that they can act as neutral middle 
man to the industry: 
There is that stigma around government, distrust of government, slowness of 
government. By having them outside of government structures they are seen as 
being independent of government, although they report to us. They are seen as 
a neutral body, as a body that can provide advice to business without vested 
interests. And I think that’s why it works.  (Interviewee 10) 
The risk of becoming obsolete does not seem to be a point of concern for them. They 
explained that while the ability to diversify their funding pool remains high, it means 
that they remain useful to their funders, which is currently the case. This institutional 
setting, answering to the Western Cape Provincial Government, however, could 
potentially place a fair amount of political risk to their survival. According to them, 
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the biggest political risk that they are facing is in accepting projects from outside of 
the region, as explained by an interviewee from GreenCape: 
We’re increasingly asked to do work in other areas, so Northern Cape, 
Eastern Cape – and I think from my perspective a much bigger risk is how do 
you separate out if we do work in some of those other areas, from our 
perspective it’s the right thing to do and it only adds to the argument that the 
Western Cape is this hub; but then from a political or from a more petty 
political perspective, it can have more issues. (Interviewee 13) 
7. 3.2 GreenCape as Problem Solvers
The special purpose vehicle does not only act within the bounds of the IPP project. 
The procurement programme can be considered as the catalyst of further renewable 
energy developments in the Western Cape, and the reason for the creation of 
GreenCape. This sequence of events has had crucial knock-on effects for the industry 
as a whole. GreenCape view their work in the green economy as a networking and 
informing agent within a very good network, geographically. They view their network 
as their customers and they view their main task as rendering a service to the network. 
Their ‘customer base’ consists of people that want to do business in the green 
economy of the Western Cape. They work across government, foreign investors, local 
businesses, local banks, and all three levels of government. It depends on what the 
opportunity is and what the barrier is and who needs to be involved to try to unlock it. 
When asked about what makes them succeed, they explained that the ability to make 
themselves useful is the main ‘tool in their toolbox’. This means understanding what 
every actor that they work with is trying to achieve and leveling with them rather than 
directing them. They have “no carrots and no sticks”. Further, their methodology 
relies on a snowball effect of their growing legitimacy in the market. Being invited to 
participate in discussions and standard-setting bodies, such as the wind and PV 
localization strategies is the best symptom of success for them. In order to do this they 
realize that they need to become useful to more than one body, they need to wear 
different hats at different times. They can be seen – strictly speaking, as an 
independent not-for-profit company, but they are seen as a government agency when 
it suits them, as a municipal agency when it suits them, and they are seen as 
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researchers when it suits them. Further, they are also the storytellers of the market. 
They publish annual reports on key developments in various market areas. The 
intention of this is that anyone from outside of South Africa who would like to 
understand the market could go to their website to read and understand that there are 
opportunities in the Western Cape economy.  
They view themselves as the problem solvers of the industry. They understand that 
their capacity to solve problems hinges on the relationships that they have formed 
with various key actors in the industry and with the way that their services are 
received. Thus the legitimacy of the information and network that they provide is key 
to their functioning. Even though government employs them, they do not see 
themselves as an extension of the state, in fact, they described their interaction with 
state bodies as being as much of a problem solver to the state as they are to the private 
sector: 
And 95% of what we do is to help the City and the province realise what is in 
their control and what is not in their control. And there is a huge amount that 
is not in their control. So once you’ve accepted that then you have to have a 
different set of tactics to achieve the things that are not within your control. I 
think we’ve been very good at helping them see that and then do a lot of work 
to influence things that are outside of the control of the provincial 
government; and that’s where we get to actually quite autonomously. 
(Interviewee 13)  
7.4 Small Scale Embedded Generation, Energy Services and Large Scale Renewable 
Energy in the Western Cape 
7.4.1 Small-Scale Embedded Generation 
Initially, metros such as the City of Cape Town did not place much emphasis on the 
uptake of small-scale renewables. This is understandable, as an increase in the uptake 
of renewable energy technologies by high-end consumers could result in financial 
losses for the metro, as explained earlier. There was however a clear realisation within 
the municipal authorities of the Western Cape that ‘add-on’ solution are doomed to 
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fail. They realise that the electricity system is so intertwined with municipal 
functioning that shifts in electricity dictates shifts the entire institutional structure that 
supports it. They also realised that the bigger issue is the underlying institutional 
structure and how that is leading to suboptimal outcomes, and that if one really 
wanted a better outcome you have to change that.  
This institutional misalignment has been the main barrier to the introduction of small-
scale technologies in the Western Cape. The lock-in created by policy was broken 
when municipalities partnered up with other key actors to solve their problems. They 
started investigating the possibilities for the electricity sector, and what they can do in 
their own right to ensure that they do not suffer as a result of changing tides. The City 
of Cape Town has set a target for sourcing 20 per cent of its energy needs from 
renewable energy sources by 2020 (Kilian, 2016).  
The groundwork for getting this shift underway was mammoth. From a policy 
perspective the City was in a difficult position. NERSA had been awaiting the 
approval of their proposed rules and regulations for small-scale embedded generation 
from the Department of Energy, without which, technically, there is no national 
protocol for operations. NERSA was now in a difficult position, where there was no 
policy, but with applications coming in from various municipalities wanting to 
implement small-scale embedded generation. At the same time there was massive 
pressure on municipalities to implement small-scale embedded generation because of 
the risk that their high-end consumers might defect from the grid. Cape Town was the 
first city in South Africa to implement feed-in tariffs for embedded generation at 
household level and by 2016, 18 contracts had been signed with small- to medium- 
scale embedded generation with businesses. These installations had a couple of 
limitations, including that the consumer needed to be a net-consumer and not a net 
producer when calculated annually. They also had to generate less than 1MW. No 
licenses were required for these installations. This is how the City avoided licensing 
issues with NERSA. Rather than creating a podium for financial benefit for 
consumers installing small-scale embedded generation, they modelled it as an energy 
efficiency podium through which consumers could offset their consumption. 
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This has to some extent solved the problem for municipalities. The provincial 
government, as discussed in Chapter 6, is monitoring the risk that these developments 
pose to their financial model. Between 2013 and 2016 GreenCape also worked with 
the majority of municipalities in the Western Cape to explore possible future models 
for their business in electricity in the changing landscape (Basson et al., 2016). One 
example here is Stellenbosch municipality that approached GreenCape in 2014 
because they were unsure of how the uptake of small-scale embedded generation 
would affect their financial model. GreenCape carried out a study testing various 
alternative financial models and from this, drafted a small-scale embedded generation 
policy for the municipality and assisted them with submitting this to NERSA for 
approval. They have since provided the same kind of support to other municipalities 
in the Western Cape based on the realisation that these solutions are specific to the 
municipalities for which they are designed, rather than pursue a ‘one size fits all’ 
solution.  
The Smart Electricity team at GreenCape has enabled municipalities to leapfrog 
directly to more sustainable technologies while preserving their financial models. 
According to them, the renewables industry provides opportunities for municipalities 
to keep providing the social goods that fall within their mandates while growing in a 
sustainable manner. One key realisation that GreenCape brings to the table is that the 
risk landscape is constantly changing for municipalities. While the issues of supply 
shortfall have been mitigated, the next big risk is the rising cost of Eskom electricity. 
The results and projections have proven that the solutions that GreenCape has 
suggested to Western Cape municipalities are effective. The estimated value of 
rooftop PV between 2016 and 2019 is R2 billion, with the potential of creating over 
3,000 jobs. Fifteen municipalities in the Western Cape currently allow for small-scale 
embedded generation (15 out of the 21 nationally) (GreenCape, 2017a). 
Municipalities and provincial government were not the only actors that had to 
overcome lock-ins in bringing about small-scale embedded generation. The 
transactional costs of installing a PV system cannot be absorbed in the case of smaller 
installations. If a consumer is going to pay more for the transactional costs than for 
the technology, that is a large barrier for small-scale embedded generation. 
GreenCape and other actors attacked the transactional costs in the market by 
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developing a form of accreditation that allows technicians to show that they have the 
necessary knowledge to sign off on the installation of a system. GreenCape, together 
with local and international partners developed training for renewable energy 
technicians. SARETEC (South African Renewable Energy Technology Centre) was 
established through partnerships between GreenCape, CPUT, the City of Cape Town, 
SAPVIA and the National Skills Fund. Prior thereto SARETEC already provided 
training to the wind and solar industries and the processes of accreditation of these 
qualifications are underway. The SARETEC programme developed a test that will 
eventually be converted into a professional qualification or a semi-professional 
qualification, which will allow installers to sign off on the structural components of 
installations and is once again limiting the transactional costs, especially where small-
scale installations are concerned. SAPVIA and the City of Cape Town have accepted 
the tests as industry standard. The process of getting the test and the qualification 
accepted is less about trial and error and more about lobbying with the right bodies.  
Sola Future Energy is a critical private sector actor that contributed to the growth of 
the embedded generation industry in the Western Cape. In contrast to GreenCape, this 
is a profit-seeking private company that had different ideals in growing the market, 
but as I will show below, can be regarding as one of the catalytic actors in the growth 
of the market. 
Sola Future Energy 
Sola Future Energy’s parent company, Aurora, started looking at energy efficiency in 
the 2010s. Aurora Power Solutions ended up focussing on the procurement 
programme, lobbying specifically for the inclusion of solar energy technologies, such 
as PV. They subsequently had two projects successfully run through the IPP 
programme. At that time the media coverage of the programme raised the amount of 
public awareness- people were starting to realise that the South African market was 
reaching a point of price parity for solar energy, and they wanted to benefit from this 
new technology as well. This is why they created the subsidiary Sola Future Energy, 
specifically geared toward the small-scale embedded generation market.  
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The first phase of their first project, Black River Park business complex, was 
completed in 2013. This was done with the help of subsidies from the Standard Offer 
Programme of Eskom, through which 20 per cent of the cost of capital was refunded 
through a verification mechanism. A team comes on site, measures the savings and 
pays that back to the client. The subsidy was awarded in advance, and the project was 
paid off over three years. The savings were higher than expected so the client went for 
phase 2 in 2014 without the subsidy.  The business model that drives their projects is 
based on a principle of offsetting demand with their production rather than making a 
profit for their clients from electricity sales. All of their clients do, however, end up 
selling excess back to the city, save for Woolworths, because they are such a large 
consumer.  
7.4.2 Finance 
One of the biggest challenges faced by the renewable electricity industry is that of 
finance. The challenges are often related to the difficulty of making a case for the 
availability of finance for a new sector, one for which there is ample scientific support 
and examples in other countries, however one for which there is a lack of local test 
cases. Finding finance is part of the challenge of getting out of the starting blocks.  
In the Western Cape the renewable energy finance issues often relate to non-utility 
scale renewable electricity projects simply because utility-scale renewable electricity 
procurement has been centralised through the REIPPPP.  The incentives created by 
the REIPPPP and perpetuated by private sector banks, companies and lending 
institutions for utility-scale renewable electricity finance is evidenced by the 
mammoth investments that have been made in the programme. However when one 
considers finance issues in the green economy from the point of view of provinces or 
cities, the picture is slightly different. Questions here often relate to the uptake of 
renewable energy technologies at a smaller scale, or of energy-saving technologies, 
which do not come with as many guarantees as utility scale investments. As explained 
by our interviewee from the City of Cape Town, the City pushes for the uptake of 
energy efficiency technologies such as solar water heaters, however it’s a futile 
attempt if the financial institutions do not come to the table. 
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 Yes Cape Town does look at this and we drive it forward on that front on new 
buildings. But on old buildings, and what I am going to try and do, and I do 
not know if I will get this right, but I want to go and speak to the banks, 
because to my mind this whole issue of solar water heaters is really finance 
issue, not an economic issue. The reason why people are not buying them in 
my opinion is they do not want to do the upfront cost of R12,000. They either 
do not have it or they would rather spend that on something else. Part of the 
way we may be able to solve the problem is to go to banks and say that (this 
should be included under) home loans… And if the banks can agree to 
something like that, then I think you will see a major uptake on solar water 
heaters. We have to make the financing easy for people. Banks like to push 
their green credentials as long as it doesn’t cost them anything.  Because it is 
mainly homeowners who will want to buy it and that’s who we want to reach. 
(Interviewee 4)  
Financing small-scale embedded generation and energy efficiency technologies 
present with similar issues because the key receivers of those technologies are 
individuals and not businesses. One solution that has been found for this problem is 
PV renting. This financial tool was set up by Maxx PV for schools, guest houses, 
public bodies and small- to medium-scale businesses. Two pilot projects are running 
in Cape Town producing 40 kWp and 14 kWp30 respectively to a school and a 
guesthouse. This project has a variety of partners including the German Energy 
Agency and a variety of local installers. The business model is simple: an entity, the 
system owner, rents the system to a system operator and the system operator has the 
option of buying the system after 15 years. These pilots have allowed the system 
operators to lower their monthly consumption without any upfront investment 
(SAPVIA, 2016).  
Another innovative financial model has brought off-grid renewable electricity to an 
informal settlement outside of Stellenbosch. The Ishack Project of the Sustainability 
Institute in Stellenbosch brought electricity to shack households that had never been 
afforded access to electricity. The original research was funded by the NRF through 
30 Kilowatt Peak power, meaning the output power of a solar module achieved under full solar radiation 
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Stellenbosch University’s TsamaHUB. After that the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation allowed the Institute to develop the technology to upgrade 100 shacks in 
2011. Later in 2013 the state Green Fund added to the pot with a target of supplying 
electricity to a further 1,500 households (Wild, 2015). The business model here 
differs from that of PV renting. It works on a pay-as-you-go basis, which is controlled 
by a ‘sim’ card in the distribution box. 
The Green Finance Desk was established to create a financiers database with an 
investment and opportunities map for the Western Cape. It is also aimed at 
conducting a municipal revenue analysis and to drive energy efficiency in provincial 
buildings. To date the Green Finance Desk has developed a model to determine the 
impact of energy efficiency and embedded generation on municipalities and mapped 
the size of the main investment opportunities in the Western Cape (Western Cape 
Government, 2015: 39).  Established in 2014, the Green Finance Desk was largely as 
a result of the Green Finance Investment Case Report that the Western Cape 
Provincial Government commissioned. The aims of the sector desk are in line with 
the provinces Green Economy Strategic Framework’s intention of being private sector 
driven but public sector enabled. The sector desk serves a facilitators role in that it 
cuts across all of the other focal areas within GreenCape, connecting potential 
investors to businesses seeking finance. The Green Finance Database tool provided by 
GreenCape’s Green Finance Desk is based on the recognition that there is a data gap 
between potential financiers and businesses. This tool was created in collaboration 
with GIZ and is being hosted on SANEDI’s website. It is a database of financiers and 
the services that they offer and it is being continuously updated and holds at least 80 
financiers, both public and private (Basson et al., 2016). 
The GreenCape Green Finance Desk is aimed at understanding what the financial 
landscape in the province looks like, at identifying levers of change and how to act on 
these. This means going into discussions with banks and financial institutions in an 
attempt to understand how decisions are made in the banking world. What they have 
found is that decisions are rather irrational because it involves the quantification of 
risks that have not been around for long enough locally. Their solution has been to 
include international bankers to these discussions, from areas where the risk of 
lending for developments such as small-scale embedded generation, is not new. In 
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this way they have managed to attract international and local investment, such as 
Tesla and the French Capital Fund.  
Training has often been a spin-off of green electricity projects. In both the PV renting 
and Ishack examples mentioned above, one of the ultimate goals or one of the 
stepping-stones was training at different levels. Daniel Conway, the director of the 
Sustainability Institute Innovation Lab, the implementing partner in the IShack 
project, explained that they want to train locals to do much of the installation, 
maintenance and client management work (Wild, 2015). According to him, 
distributed green technologies, such as off-grid installations, often do not rely on 
massive enabling infrastructure, so it’s ideal for local job creation. The Maxx PV 
team also trains companies to install their products and many of these are located in 
the Western Cape (SAPVIA, 2016). Since 2011, engineers, architects and craftsmen 
have been taking part in the Maxx-solar academy, and many of them have gone on to 
work in the industry as certified installers. Over 40 of these installers are based in the 
Western Cape. 
7.4.3 Manufacturing 
GreenCape’s involvement in large-scale renewable energy procurement relates mostly 
to their dealings with manufacturing, equipment suppliers, technical advisors and 
financiers (GreenCape, 2017b). In line with this they engage with the IPP unit, often 
times specifically focussing on expediting communications between state departments 
(such as the DTI) and key industry actors. They also engage with related industries 
such as agriculture and agri-processing on the demand side and clean technology 
industries on the supply side to enable the uptake of clean technologies. Lastly they 
engage with potential manufacturers in the renewable energy industry towards 
establishing themselves in the Atlantis Special Economic Zone that will be discussed 
below. 
Atlantis Special Economic Zone 
In 2011 GreenCape proposed the development of a Special Economic Zone in 
Atlantis for the advancement of green technology in the Western Cape. The SEZ is a 
collection of industries related to the green economy that are aimed at growing the 
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industrial component of renewable electricity in the Western Cape. They 
accomplished this through networking with the Department of Trade and Industry, 
Wesgro, the City of Cape Town and investors. The Department of Trade and Industry 
has proposed various incentives to attract investment to the SEZ, such as a reduction 
in corporate income tax of 15 per cent (instead of the current 28 per cent); 
employment tax incentives toward hiring younger, less experienced workers through a 
cost-sharing mechanism with government; a building allowance with accelerated 
depreciation allowance on capital structure of 10 per cent per annum over 20 years; 
and a VAT and customs relief system.  
From the manufacturing side it creates an opportunity for companies to understand 
what markets there are for industrial components, so they can position themselves to 
manufacturers. There’s an opportunity for new manufacturers, but it’s a fairly well 
established oligopoly style market with a few big meter manufacturers really 
dominating the global landscape. The issue with industrial and manufacturing 
development in the Western Cape is thus related to understanding the opportunities. 
Further there was a need for the establishment of a network for goods and services, 
and positioning actors along this network to strengthen it. This type of development 
often has positive spin offs, such as the Ankerling diesel power plant that GreenCape 
lobbied for turning into a gas-fired power plant. In Atlantis there’s a peaking diesel 
power station and the IPP office is busy with this gas rollout. And there are a couple 
of arguments in favour of the conversion: the Atlantis region is already well 
interconnected, so to have gas to compensate for the variability of renewables is 
basically seen as the future grid. Ankerlig generates 1000 MW and is running 
currently off diesel at R1 billion a month and needs to be converted to gas. It’s really 
expensive to build the pipelines from Saldanha to Ankerlig and 1000 MW of diesel 
power is just not enough to justify the infrastructure for the port and the pipeline. 
Basically it’s the cheapest possible way of getting both gas and diesel replacement 
with the smallest impact on the final price to the customer.  
From Eskom’s perspective it will solve a headache they’ve had for seven years: 
getting the gas there is too expensive, but diesel is also not viable. From the IPP’s 
perspective it solves a massive problem because there’s really good infrastructure 
already there, so it’s not that hard to evacuate the power and give it a place on the 
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grid, where it is really valuable to have additional generation capacity. Another 
argument for this upgrade is that it compensates for the variability in renewables, and 
it spurs on industrial development in Atlantis. So you’ve got a tiered argument for a 
number of different layers that all makes sense to do this conversion in Atlantis. 
7.4.4 Energy Services, New Business Models and Sustainable Thinking 
The landscape of energy service providers in South Africa has changed drastically. 
Service providers in the energy space are increasingly providing holistic options to 
customers that include forms of own production but also relate to energy efficiency or 
a combination of energy efficiency and own production. According to GreenCape, a 
network of service providers have started emerging that attend to the needs of 
customers across the value chain (GreenCape, 2017c). An integral part of their role in 
growing this network is providing key actors with market insights given via their 
annual market intelligence reports. They also facilitate the connections between key 
actors in order to streamline the industry and affect the mind-sets of public and 
private actors alike.  
Energy has been identified as a ‘game changer’ for the province and through it, the 
province strives to become the ‘green-economy hub of Africa’. Even though the 
Western Cape Government aims to streamline their approaches to climate change 
mitigation with that of national government, they have taken an aggressive stance 
with regards to becoming less reliant on Eskom electricity and on actively pursuing a 
more diverse local energy mix. At city level, various measures have been taken to 
improve energy efficiency:  all of the traffic lights in the city have LED light bulbs 
and over 25,000 streetlights have been retrofitted to be more energy efficient. This has 
saved the city over R100 million over the past six years. Beyond improving state- 
owned infrastructure, there is a serious drive toward decentralization coming from the 
Western Cape Government. This sentiment was evident in Helen Zille’s 2017 State of 
the Province Address: 	
If we want our economy to grow, we have to ensure energy security. We have 
learnt over the past decade that our country is overly reliant on the state 
monopoly called Eskom. This brings me to our energy game-changer, on 
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which we are working jointly with the City of Cape Town. South Africa’s 
energy crisis requires a sustainable, low carbon and diverse energy-mix. 
Technological advances are enabling the Western Cape to pioneer the trend 
towards small, distributed suppliers of renewable energy, with flexibility and 
low costs. (Zille, 2017) 
GreenCape and the City are not the only actors facilitating the growth of this market. 
As I will show below with the example of Villiera Wines, some of the uptake of these 
technologies resulted from factors such as international market pressure to lower the 
carbon footprint on produce. The case of Villiera also shows a change in the mind-set 
of consumers of electricity that become producer-consumers. This case serves as an 
example of the kind of sustainable thinking that has been articulated by various 
interviewees. 
Villiera Wines 
The wine industry is not one of the obvious cases for investments in renewable 
electricity or energy efficiency technologies, when considering that the cost of 
electricity in wine farming is minimal and seasonal. The main reasons in the case of 
Villiera for investing in rooftop solar was based on: the poor quality of electricity and 
the interrupted supply that they had been experiencing; an increase in tariffs above the 
inflation rate and the projected increases for the future; avoidance of carbon tax in the 
future; and lastly because of their environmentally sensitive international and local 
customers that require a lower carbon footprint. All of these factors contribute to the 
profitability of the business. Woolworths have been one of the major promoters of 
sustainable consumption in South Africa and require a periodical business audit from 
all of their producers. Marks and Spencer is another chain with stringent requirements 
to which the wine farm has to adhere. According to my interviewee from Villiera, 
being indispensible or unique in the eyes of large supermarket chains does not only 
pertain to the quality of the product and the price at which you can produce it. Today 
these chains have short-term contracts that are under constant review. In line with this 
the farm is involved in diverse sets of social and environmental sustainability 
focussed projects such as clinics, schools, nature conservation, including having an 
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onsite wildlife sanctuary, and maintaining a practice of planting extra trees. They also 
have a programme for sustainable water usage.  
In 2009 the farm decided to renovate their tasting room. As part of this they decided 
to make a statement by installing rooftop solar. Because of the price of the technology 
at the time, they decided it would only be worth their while if they installed it on their 
cellars as well. Within 5 years of the installation they had accomplished electricity 
savings of 46 per cent. Of these savings, offsetting their consumption by own 
production only accounted for 40 per cent of the total savings. The other 60 per cent 
was due to energy efficiency practices that they had started adopting on the farm. 
Energy efficiency in this case was more about behavioural changes than the 
installation of new technologies. They would, for instance, monitor the temperature 
inside and outside of the wine cellars based on the data gathered, manually open or 
close doors at different times to control the temperature, rather than using electronic 
air conditioning.  
This was a self-funded project done without any external debt or subsidies. A year 
before the commencement of the project, they had a discussion with regional Eskom 
employees that knew that there might be intermittent electricity supply. An Eskom 
advisor that had subsequently retired advised the farm to get a generator. A lot of the 
initial planning of the system was done with the help of the old Eskom advisors. 
According to them, in the past they had great regional advisors that were willing to 
help their clients. This is no longer the case - my interviewee from Villiera referred to 
Eskom’s  current relationship with small-scale producers as being ‘obstructionist’. 
Sustainability, as explained by my interviewee from Villiera, was a way of living and 
functioning. Once you have started with little adjustments here and there, other 
possibilities become apparent: 
And then one day it was just like the light going on; all the stuff we’ve been 
involved in on sustainability and everything, I could just see the whole picture 
– BANG! – where you can get rid of everything, the whole lot can go. There
are just little bits in the puzzle and they all fell into place and things changed
to the extent that we could. (Interviewee 15)
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Sustainable thinking solved a whole range of problems for the farm as described by 
interviewee 15, some of which they only realised they had when they really started 
thinking about their consumption.  
 The Eskom power lines ran across their wildlife reserve. According to Interviewee 15 
they were visually an eye sore and moreover their location away from the bustling 
movement at the farm headquarters made them an easy target for copper thieves. But 
they could not abandon the need for the Eskom lines because a house at the furthest 
part of the sanctuary and other functions, such as a neighbour’s borehole, all required 
electricity. And yet there was a determination to be off grid. So they decided to put 
the house on solar power with backup batteries. They decided to use an old irrigation 
line instead of pumping to move the water from the old borehole dam to the new one 
on the neighbour property rather than using pumps, it was slower but it didn’t use any 
electricity. Through this they managed to get rid of most of the transformers on the 
sanctuary, and by investing in one step up transformer they saved R160,000 per year - 
R100,000 saved in rentals for transformers that used to be paid to Eskom and the rest 
from electricity savings from their own production. In addition to this, the farm is 
now no longer affected by power interruptions; they can run independently from the 
Eskom grid off backup generators and solar power. They have also managed to bury 
the cables that used to hang overhead in the sanctuary because they simply do not 
need that much grid infrastructure anymore. This has saved Eskom a lot of money 
according to interviewee 15, and it has removed the eyesore created by the original 
cables. 
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Power and Agency in the Niche 
7.5.1.1The Coordination of Resources 
GreenCape’s agency can be described as a combination of relational agency and 
networked agency. Their main activities are coordinating the resources of various 
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actors in the sector toward building a network. There is an important distinction to be 
made between the way that resources are coordinate by hegemonic- networked- and 
relational agency. Pure hegemonic agency is descriptive about how resources should 
be coordinated because of the hierarchal differentiation between actors. A good 
example of this is way that the price of electricity, determined through hegemonic 
agency, makes it more expensive for some consumers than for others. The 
coordination of resources through relational agency is accomplished when various 
actors combine their resources toward a specific outcome or when an actor falls in 
line with another actor that has access to more resources and in so doing amplifies the 
outcome of action. Networked agency and relational agency in the coordination of 
resources often go hand in hand because the podium for the coordination of resources 
happens along the network between actors. In order for the niche to grow, the 
development of a network is of utmost importance. This network should develop 
organically as actors recognise shared interests and goals, however, as I show below, 
one of the main functions of intermediary actors in growing the niche relates to their 
work as network builders. It lies in pre-empting the possible connections between 
actors and facilitating these connections toward solving the problems of the niche. 
The coordination of resources for intermediary actors require that they are able to 
identify problems, or rather selection pressures within the sector and that they then 
act, through the creation of networks, on the selection pressure with the resources of 
others. In this way they allow for the network along which industrial protection, 
technological protection and market protection can be provided by connecting the 
actors that can provide these forms of protection to one another in different cases, and 
by amplifying the agency of actor sets through the connections that they make. The 
only selection pressure that they directly affect in relative isolation from other actors 
is socio-cognitive protection by acting as information agents for their customers. Thus 
through indirectly affecting selection pressures and allowing other actors to act in a 
shielding capacity, they act in a nurturing capacity by identifying and developing 
path-breaking innovations both actively and passively. In the case of GreenCape, this 
ability to mediate stems from their clear goal of growing the green economy, which 
resonates on some level with most of the actors active within the niche. They are by 
no means a neutral participant in the sector, however their overarching goal resonates 
with many actors. Thus for the intermediary actor, alignment is simplified if their goal 
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is the common denominator of the goals of a large amount of heterogeneous actors 
that occupy the system.  
7.5.1.2 The Transference of Rules 
GreenCape’s hybrid structure, designed through the hegemonic agency of the Western 
Cape Government is perhaps the most linear example of steering and rowing taking 
place aimed directly at growing the industry. One must realise though that the 
motivation for their creation was in part an avoidance of one of the key shortcomings 
of hegemonic agency held by state actors: the disconnect between the public and 
private sector. As discussed in Chapter 6, steering actors that are also state actors have 
to contend with the boundaries created for the niche by the dominant regime. The 
existence of selection pressures in the form of regime rules make it difficult for pure 
niche advocates to find a middle ground with core regime members or with non-core 
regime members that are powerless in the struggle against the lock-ins of the 
dominant regime. 
Hegemonic agency is best at producing regulative rules. Regulative rules are best 
transferred in a top-down manner. Of course one can consider the shifts in ideology 
that take place higher up in the hierarchy, however the transference of both normative 
and cognitive rules are harder to achieve through hegemonic agency. This is so 
because monitoring normative and cognitive rules is usually not something that can 
be done through most forms of hegemonic agency. This state of affairs left the niche 
devoid of regulative rules governing the outcomes of the niche in its formative years.  
This is not to say that the steering of normative and cognitive rules do not take place 
at all. Look for example at the power that the international market wields in the wine 
industry. Their ‘rules’ might appear regulative but it has had a normative function and 
it has resulted in new cognitive routines for wine producers. This is because the rules 
that have been affected by these institutions do not function in the same manner that 
state law functions. These buyers have changed their operating procedures; they have 
essentially redefined what they want from a product. Their internal regulative rule 
system changed and resulted in normative and cognitive changes in the industry. The 
only real method of accountability is the creation of a new factor of competition in the 
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market. These types of regulative rules that act like normative and cognitive rules 
exist in the formative phases of niche development. However, as I mentioned, they 
ultimately result in a purer form of regulative rule, such as legislation and policy. 
In these initial phases, intermediaries row by tapping into the power of steering actors 
such as the municipalities and national departments. In cases where steering actors 
and rowing actors are project participants, the hegemonic agency of steering actors 
translates into relational agency for other project participants. The outcome of this 
type of relational agency sometimes then re-assumes the form of hegemonic agency 
held by state participants. Consider for example the process through which standards 
were developed and accepted through SARETEC. The process of rule creation was 
driven by a wide array of actors and facilitated by the horizontal podium for 
networking through GreenCape. In processes of negotiation and testing the combined 
action of all parties led to the outcome of new rules in favour of the niche. Even 
though various actors participated in the creation of these rules, the act of accepting 
the standards set through the process is more powerful if done by a steering actor such 
as a municipality or the provincial government. In this case, acceptance of these 
standards by the City of Cape has more far-reaching implications than if the standards 
were accepted, for example, by a single business.  
7.5.1.3 Rowing and Monitoring 
The monitoring and evaluation activities of the Western Cape Government were 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. One would expect that steering actors, or 
those that govern through hegemonic agency would be the only actors that take part in 
monitoring measures. In the data provided in this chapter that has not been the case. 
This illuminates another way in which intermediaries govern within a niche: through 
monitoring. A good example of this is the role that the Green Finance Desk plays in 
monitoring the financial effects and benefits of energy efficiency and embedded 
generation activities within the province. One of the streams that are monitored is 
municipal revenue analysis, especially as it relates to energy efficiency. The aim of 
the Finance Desk’s activities remain facilitative, however, because finance is such a 
cross-cutting theme in the green energy landscape their activities often prove to be 
active facilitation rather than passively linking up key actors with similar goals. An 
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example of this type of action is the debates that they entered into with financial 
institutions regarding the risk-averse lending procedures that make it difficult for 
SSEG and energy efficiency technologies to be taken up by the market.  
As networking agent, GreenCape is not a completely neutral participant in the 
shielding activities that they coordinate. Much of what they do centres on the making 
judgement calls about the actual ability of other actors to act within their networks, 
particularly as it relates to the state. This finding sets them apart from other actor sets, 
as they occupy spaces between public and private domains and act in all of the 
aggregations identified for actor categories, such as academia. Part of their role in 
niche building is monitoring the traditional steering actors, the state. This special role 
of intermediary actors has been highlighted in the literature (Hodson & Marvin, 2010; 
Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016; Fischer & Newig, 2016). In addition to confirming the 
findings highlighted in the literature, the case of GreenCape also shows that some 
forms of agency does not govern through the creation of rules, but rather through the 
creation of podiums for rule creation. This they do by guiding the rule-making 
activities of other actors, including steering actors.  
7.5.2 Developmental Trajectories of the Niche 
7.5.2.1 Innovation Deviating from the Rules of the Niche 
Viewing governance as a linear process, with steering input and rowing output, 
disregards the non-linear power struggles that take place within the niche and beyond 
it. The relationship between steering and rowing is not a bipolar one. Different actors 
provide steering governance and different actors in turn row in response to these 
steering actions. The actions of rowing actors, like the actions of steering actors, do 
not take place in a vacuum. They are intricately linked with one another and therefor 
affect one another. In the previous chapter I showed how the Western Cape’s 
narrative put certain issues on the agenda and how they affected the representation of 
the problems experienced within the province by physically quantifying, defining and 
measuring them.  The Western Cape Government also identified certain avenues for 
development that are more acceptable to their frame of reference and actively made 
these avenues more accessible for rowing actors. One example of this type of avenue 
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is their preferred model for decentralised electricity production. That being a model 
by which small-scale embedded generation takes place in a grid-connected fashion 
where the producer remains a net consumer of the electricity that municipalities 
distribute. This goal was accomplished in most cases. However one of the cases that I 
reviewed deviated from this model: that of Ishack. Included in the Avelino and 
Wittmayer’s third sector, they considered the role of academia as being similar to that 
of intermediaries, as they often occupy different aggregations within socio-technical 
systems acting between the state and the private sector (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016). 
Within the SSEG market, the development of an off-grid system does not interfere 
with the rules set forth by other parties in solving the problems within the niche 
because it does not affect the financial model of municipalities and it has a relatively 
low effect on the carbon footprint of the country. However the action of establishing 
an off-grid system deviates from the rules created by municipal and provincial 
government. This finding shows that the relative proximity of third sector actors to 
steering actors determines the level at which they can deviate from the rules that 
already exist in the niche. In light of this, academia can then often be grouped with 
actor sets that aren’t affected to the same extent by the monitoring measures of 
steering actors. In addition to academia, this grouping consists of actors such as 
international market participants and funders that are not really held accountable by 
the steering actions of provincial government and municipal government in the same 
way that local business and intermediaries such as GreenCape are. However, because 
of their distance from steering actors, they cannot mediate between steering and 
rowing actors in the same way that intermediary actors can. Thus academia can 
function in two ways as non-knowledge producing niche participants: by actively 
connecting with steering actors toward the establishment of a determined good 
outcome or through isolated action that does not necessarily disrupt the system but 
rather creates add-on solutions for the system in dealing with the problems created by 
the niche or by the dominant regime.  
7.5.2.2 Rowing and Framing in the Niche 
Framing and discourse is one of the main methodologies that structure both the 
enablement of change and resisting change. SSEG in the Western Cape was enabled 
through the modification of various actors’ framings. The problem at hand related 
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primarily to electricity security. The diagnostic framing of the problem was to an 
extent shared across actor sets, being that intermittent supply of electricity was a 
problem experienced by municipalities as distributors, business and consumers as 
users and the Western Cape Government as facilitator for development in the 
province. From this diagnostic framing, various personalised offshoots resulted. For 
municipalities the problem became the effect that electricity security issues had on 
their revenue model, for consumers the problem became the limiting effect that it had 
on their day-to-day activities including conducting business, their life styles and their 
security. The prognostic framing of specific social groups that make up the bulk of 
high electricity consumers in the province including high-income households, small- 
to medium-size businesses and some electricity intensive consumers, was not to fix 
the broken system but rather to employ methods of self-generation spurred on by the 
price parity that had already been achieved through large scale solar developments. 
The choice of consumer groups to defect from the traditional model or the threat 
thereof forced municipalities and provincial government to refine their diagnostic 
framing as the problems experienced with centralised electricity was now not only 
challenging the income models of municipalities. The reaction of consumers posed an 
even greater risk to the longevity of this model. Consequently the prognostic framing 
of state agencies became to limit the damage that their financial model had to absorb 
from different angles. Their rational for action was to a certain extent validated by the 
goal of sustainable consumption, however, the core reason for allowing SSEG was to 
safeguard the municipal financial model. In this way one can observe cycles of 
framing adjustment between rowing and steering actors. The effect that rowing actors 
have in governing steering actors is not necessarily a case of direct competition over 
the rules created by steering actors, but rather in responsive action typically allowed 
in terms of the steering actor’s diagnostic framing, with an alteration in the rowing 
actors’ prognostic framing. In the case of SSEG, because of the lack of regulative 
rules, and because of the new set of cognitive rules about the value of SSEG and solar 
PV in the minds of consumers (that was now seen as a viable option for solving the 
diagnostic problem shared in the minds of all actors- the problem of electricity 
security), the steering actor was forced to add to their diagnostic framing (that their 
financial model runs the risk of key users defecting from the grid), readjust their 
motivational framing (their rational for action) and find a prognostic framing that was 
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an acceptable middle ground for all actors involved (the net consumer model). This is 
also a good example of the dynamic interaction between rule-regimes, actors and the 
system. 
Just as actors are bound in their actions by the rules of the socio-technical system, so 
too are their possibilities for framing adjustments. When an actor’s goals have 
become tied into the outcomes of a socio-technical regime it has a limiting effect on 
the degree to which their diagnostic framing of the problem, their prognostic framing 
of the solution or their motivational framing (rational for action) will deviate from 
that of the rest of the regime. This hardness of rules at regime level translates into one 
of the main differences between the capabilities of empowering actors in stretch-and-
transform and fit-and-conform niches. At regime level the direct action against non-
regime actors, as shown by the example of trade unions on the topic of private 
electricity production, remains intact even while the dominant regime is deteriorating. 
These actors are not oblivious to the faults of the dominant regime but refuse to 
accept the non-regime actors in its place. This means that actors such as NUMSA 
refuse to change the rules captured in their ideology about what the electricity sector 
should look like.  There were various case specific reasons for this which could 
arguably mean that this is not a replicable finding, however as mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 5, this same ideological stubbornness is evident  in many spheres of the 
national level, another example being that of the presidency.  
As much as discourse can drive change, it can also act to resist change. A good 
example is NUMSA’s ideology of social ownership extending to the electricity sector. 
Their diagnostic framing of the problem is the same as the solution that the two 
identified niche’s provide for the problem, at least in part. They view the involvement 
of the private sector in what they essentially consider public goods, to be the root 
cause of problems in the provision of these public goods. Their prognostic framing is 
simple - driving renewable energy on the principles of public ownership as their 
motivational framing is in line with their definition of the problem, being private- 
sector ownership within the electricity sector.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
relationship that was found between regime and non-regime members at provincial 
level. Even though the actions of regime members were guided by the rules of the 
regime, their relative distance from the process of rule creation meant that it was 
200	
easier for them to change different types of rules, not least of which is their cognitive 
and normative rule sets. This is due to the fact that provincial actors have historically 
occupied a non-core member status in the dominant regime. This brings to light an 
interesting conclusion: non-core members are more likely to be stretch-and-conform 
empowering actors than core members and the potential deviation from the dominant 
regime that comes through non-core members is likely to be larger in magnitude, as 
Smith and Raven (2012) have suggested. However, as Smith and Raven have also 
shown, even if the potential for deviation from the dominant regime is higher, the 
cumulative financial value of the change remains lower than that achieved through fit-
and-conform empowerment. This can be attributed to the boundaries set by stretch-
and-transform empowering actors on the niche and will be discussed in detail later on 
in this section. 
7.5.2.3 Positive Externalities of the Niche 
For the success of a niche, the political, social and institutional climate in which it 
operates is often more important to the success of the niche than the technology or 
range of technologies employed by the niche. These surrounding circumstances are 
also not always internal to the niche, or geared toward the outcomes of the niche. 
Consider the diagram further below, which is a schematic representation of the 
complexity involved in the creation of the two types of training mechanisms 
discussed in this chapter: professional training and lower level training relating to 
SSEG in the Western Cape. This diagram focuses on the chains of problems and 
solutions and starts with the problem of electricity security, ending with the creation 
of training. It disregards the tertiary training of professionals, such as engineers, 
producers, researchers and electricians, and focuses specifically on the training 
mechanisms that have been created purely towards growing the SSEG and energy 
efficiency sectors within the Western Cape.  
At national level the problem of electricity security was attended to by the IPP 
programme that was one of a suite of shifts that had been implemented and can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the failures of the dominant regime. At regional level, the 
initial response of municipalities was to mediate the problem through short-term 
solutions as discussed in the previous chapter. The cost effectiveness of solar 
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technologies and the public awareness of this possible method of mitigating the risk 
of electricity security stemmed from the readiness of the technology, meaning that it 
had reached an acceptable price and level of affectivity in the utility-scale market. 
Beyond the technological-, socio-cognitive- and industrial protection that grew the 
market for SSEG, a spinoff of the IPP programme was cultural protection. According 
to Sola, the public awareness that was raised due to the success of solar projects in the 
IPP programme opened up a space in the market for them. The goals of the Western 
Cape Government as steering actor translated into a business model for Sola that 
allowed their clients to offset their demand through own production rather than 
making a profit. Thus the positive externalities created by another niche effectively 
acted to stimulate a similar developmental trajectory within the Western Cape niche.  
The consequent framing shifts led to a cascade of reactive readjustments for all of the 
actors involved in the creation of the SSEG developmental trajectory as discussed 
above. This diagram shows further that the types of business models and the types of 
training that acted to shield the niche resulted from the same kind of messy reactive 
responses to problems. The problem of electricity security is a combination of 
landscape pressure and the deterioration of the dominant regime. The solutions 
developed at niche level were initially intended to solve the problems of the dominant 
regime based on economic considerations toward solving ‘small problems’. This 
transition pathway resonates strongly with Geels and Schot’s Reconfiguration 
Pathway (2007: 411). They describe a Reconfiguration Pathway as a transition where 
symbiotic innovations developed at niche level solve problems for the dominant 
regime and based on this, subsequent readjustments are triggered within the dominant 
regime because of a snowball affect created by the accumulation of intended and 
unintended externalities resulting from the breakthrough of various component 
innovations. 
Viewed from the niche perspective, the problems solved through the introduction of 
component innovations had a delayed effect on the dominant regime and primarily 
affected the sub-system around which the niche formed. It had no immediate 
implications in terms of rule adjustments for all of the actors in the socio-technical 
system as the regulative rule changes only affected the Western Cape area. It also had 
no effect on the municipal financial model as this was, for the time being, mitigated 
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through the net consumer model. This also means that the symbiotic nature of the 
innovations were only so because of the way in which they were allowed to occur in 
the system by the steering actors. This type of innovation could potentially snowball 
into a bigger problem for the Western Cape Government and its municipalities, if a 
large amount of users were to employ the technology or if the acceptability of the net 
consumer model became outweighed by the possibilities offered by other forms of 
technology, for example viable storage, which could make complete off-grid systems 
a viable option. Important conclusions to be drawn from this are: the formation of 
rules in a niche when there is a relative vacuum in regulative rules is often the result 
of reactive adjustments rather than active debate. 
Secondly, in cases where component innovations are symbiotic with the regime, this 
cannot be regarded as intended in all cases or a stable reality. Sometimes these 
innovations are symbiotic because of the minor regulatory adjustments that allow 
them to be so.  
Thirdly, the boundaries created through stretch-and-transform empowerment 
sometimes creates (at least initially) a radius of effects for new developmental 
trajectories. Another example where the action of changing the selection environment 
through stretch-and-transform empowerment creates both the opportunities for the 
growth of the niche and limits growth is found in the geographical limitations faced 
by GreenCape. As I mentioned, this intermediary was created mainly through 
hegemonic agency. Hegemonic agency usually functions through the creation of 
regulative rules. However in this case, the hegemonic agency of the state created a set 
of cognitive and normative rules represented in the mandate of GreenCape. Rather 
than a set of operating principles, they were mandated with growing the green 
economy.  
GreenCape does not have to adhere to the regulative structures that guide the 
interaction between the state and the private sector, which eased their interaction with 
the private sector and with the state. However the hegemonic agency that created 
GreenCape did not cease to exist after its creation. Because of their success, 
GreenCape had to start thinking about the geographical radius of their usefulness. 
Perhaps they started in the identifiers role, meaning that they were the ones 
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identifying problems and aligning problem solvers. As their success and reputation 
grew, they began to be sought out by other problem solvers, sometimes not within the 
Western Cape. One of the possible avenues for avoiding the political implications that 
this problem carried was the diversification of their funding pool, however, 
disconnecting financially from the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape 
Government might mean that they lose a critical part of the network through which 
they became established. This situation highlights the limiting factor of hegemonic 
agency in stretch-and-transform niches. Even in cases where hegemonic agency does 
not function through the creation of regulative rules, the normative and cognitive rules 
held by the hegemonic agent limits the potential for a niche to grow in specific ways. 
In this case a geographic limit was placed on the developmental potential of 






































Figure	1 Creation of the two types of training mechanisms in the SSEG Market 
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Relational Agency lies in an actor’s ability to alter the balance of selection pressure or 
their ability to affect the adaptive capacity of another actor. As Smith and Raven 
(2012) have shown, this results in the shielding attribute of the niche. Relational 
agency observed for rowing actors differs from that observed for steering actors. 
Rowing actors contribute in a very real manner to the shielding and nurturing 
properties of the niche. The private sector or the ‘market’ tends to be made up of 
shielding actors, at least in so far as a niche that resulted from stretch-and-transform 
empowerment is concerned. They do this through innovative thinking and competitive 
practices. Often taking a gap in the market means providing the right shielding 
conditions for a technology to flourish. By way of example, Maxx PV altered the 
balance of selection pressure through active shielding of market selection pressures 
that made the adoption of rooftop PV inaccessible for groups such as schools. The 
logic of the action for Maxx PV is clearly profit, however it resulted in opening up the 
market and the creation of a new rule: that credit is not a prerequisite in the process of 
funding SSEG.  
7.5.2.4 Rowing and the Three Core Processes of the Niche 
There are two examples here of rowing accomplishing new developmental trajectories 
that steering actors have failed to do. The two financial models for small-scale 
embedded generation discussed here opened up a crucial barrier for the market caused 
by the risk-averse operating procedures of banks and finance institutions toward low- 
cost developments. As mentioned, the City of Cape Town aimed to solve the same 
problem with little success. This points to the role of external, private, for-profit 
actors in establishing developmental trajectories within the niche. Typically, as this 
case shows, these occurrences are easier to come by in niches where the traditional 
power-giving actors (the state) empower in a stretch-and-transform manner. What is 
more, it often becomes a podium for developments that go beyond the dominant 
regime, as with the example of Ishack, or snowballs solutions in other areas, for 
example the training provided under the funding mechanisms and the issue that 
Eskom has had with getting gas to Ankerling, which was solved by the addition of the 
SEZ in Atlantis. 
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In the Western Cape niche studied, two types of networks were apparent: networks 
that yielded financial benefits and network that yielded systems benefits. The 
networks that yielded systems benefits often had networks yielding financial benefits 
as spin offs. In this way, the actors that created networks that yielded systems benefits 
steered the actors that created the networks that yielded financial benefits. Because 
this study takes place in the formative years of decentralised electricity development 
in the Western Cape, many of the actors appeared to act as an island initially, without 
a network. However, these actors have an incredibly important role in stimulating the 
creation of these spin-off networks, as I will show below. 
System Building Networks 
System building networks are those networks that create the initial pathways for 
development to happen in a specific way. The steering actor provides the narrative 
while the rowing actor does the groundwork. GreenCape is an example of a rowing 
actor in this network. Technically, one of their main aims was to create the network. 
They actively sought to connect diverse actor sets and facilitate the development of 
the system - facilitate, not guide. They searched for problems and connected problems 
with solutions that already existed or created solutions where there were none. All of 
these actions are network forming.  Their power does not lie in their ability to create 
rules, or make money, but their agency in the sector is undeniable. Their agency lies 
solely in their ability to modify the adaptive capacity of other actors. This proves to 
be an interesting case when considering how agency has been perceived in the 
literature up to now. They do not compete with other actors for agency, rather they 
enable other actors to become powerful. 
Profit-driven Networks  
The initial pioneers within an industry always assume a certain level of risk, both 
financially and productively, that they remove from the shoulders of the businesses 
that follow their example. Both Sola and Villiere Wines can be regarded as industry 
pioneers. In cases of sustainable development, the successful industry pioneers often 
create routes from problems to solutions rather than directly connecting actors with 
one another. In doing so they force other actors to act in the same manner, they create 
new standards for living, thinking, operating and consuming. In the case of Villiera 
they created a competitive edge for their product that sets it above the rest of the 
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industry. Villiera installed PV at a time when the market was relatively unregulated 
by the South African government. The steering actor in this case is the international 
market, demanding a lower carbon footprint for products. The actions of Villiera had 
a dual effect: the initial risk within the market, which, once a successful business 
model, made it easier for other actors to follow. But by adopting the stipulations of 
the steering actors, they inadvertently started a process where new standards became a 
factor in the wine industry. The power of steering actors can be measured by the 
reactiveness of rowing actors to their steering. And the initial process where new rules 
are adopted by a market by a few rowing actors establishes the starting point of a new 
developmental trajectory within the niche.  In the case of Sola they created a podium 
for tweaking the way in which small- to medium-size companies or properties 
consume electricity. It once again offers clients the ability to compete on various 
fronts with other actors. These types of networks are thus stimulated by competition 
and are made up mostly of rowing actors.  
The role of rowing actors in the three core processes of the niche relate mostly to the 
second process, the building of networks and the expansion of the resource base 
within the niche. However this chapter has shown, before the existence of niche- 
conducive regulative rules, that rowing actors are participants in the processes 
through which these rules become articulated in both active and passive manners. 
Passively, through first-order reflexivity the reactions of rowing actors impact the 
framing adjustments of steering actors. In this way rowing actors contribute, albeit 
unwittingly, to the holistic shaping of niche-conducive regulative rules. Actively, 
rowing actors do at times home in on a lock-in created by the absence of a regulative 
rule and rely then on processes of development through which the buy-in of steering 
actors solidifies the regulative rule.  
7.5.3 Conclusion 
The Western Cape Government’s ‘green ideology’ has had an undeniable steering 
effect on the rest of the province. However the actors steered are all in relatively close 
proximity to the Provincial Government and include GreenCape and municipalities. 
Both provincial government and international market actors set up the monitoring and 
accountability measures required to measure the performance goals set forth, and both 
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of these actors steer the actors that they foresee rowing. In Chapter 6, I discussed the 
role of the Western Cape Government as steering actor within the niche. Both the 
Western Cape Government and GreenCape exert power through relational and 
networked agency. The core factor differentiating these two types of actors in stretch-
and-transform niches lies in the automatic hegemonic agency that the Western Cape 
Government has over the network that they are affecting. The implication of 
adjustments in the search function for innovation in the steering actor’s ideology has 
regulative rules as the envisioned end result. A new development trajectory identifier, 
such as GreenCape, merely facilitates network building. The transference of rules that 
takes place and is facilitated by the search function of the intermediary happens 
through actors other than the intermediary. As such one of the major roles of 
intermediary actors is the fertilisation of the processes of niche network creation that 
could arguably have taken place organically. In so doing, intermediary actors 
contribute primarily to the nurturing attribute of niche spaces and allow other actors to 
act in a shielding capacity. That said, intermediaries are not neutral participants in the 
processes of rule formation in the niche. There is a level of discretion involved in the 
identification of actors to be connected within the networks that intermediaries 
facilitate. They also at times assume some of the discretionary monitoring and 
evaluative roles usually performed by steering actors not only in exercising the search 
function in network creation but also in getting personally involved in the breaking of 
lock-ins through active advocacy on specific issues. Lastly, in the case of GreenCape 
as intermediary actor they actively participate in shaping the market through the 
provision of knowledge resources. 
As rowing actor, the third sector provides the networked agency, which allows for the 
formation of alliances that a steering actor would not have been able to accomplish on 
its own. However the outcome of this agency toward the creation of a new rule is void 
if steering actors do not accept the rule created. This means that while steering actors 
do hold the bar for new rules at niche level, the creation of these rules are often not 
purely the outcome of steering action. Rules that have been created through this type 
of interplay between steering and rowing actors are then considered more stable, 
simply because a larger group of actors have agreed on the terms for these rules.   
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The relative proximity of third sector actors to the steering actor in a niche determines 
the level of deviation that they can attain from the rules that have already been created 
in the niche. In this way academia occupies a very different role in the niche than that 
of intermediaries. As seen in Chapter 5, academia can engage directly and 
sporadically with steering actors toward the adjustment of regulative rules or as seen 
in this chapter, they can act completely disconnected from the spirit of cognitive, 
normative and regulative rules in providing add-on solutions to the negative 
externalities of the dominant regime with the available technologies in the niche. This 
is a troubling realisation for academics, both as knowledge participants and niche 
advocates. The triple helix relationship described by Etzkowits does not seem to exist 
within the South African context when academia produces non-knowledge outcomes 
(Etzkowitz, 2002). In the production of knowledge outcomes, the academic 
community has managed to support the plea of niche advocates in cases where it is 
necessary to improve performance and prices for specific technologies (see Chapter 5) 
or in cases that provide the knowledge basis for the facilitation of networks, such as in 
the final phases of the CCMSP, discussed in Chapter 6. 
The cycles of framing adjustment discussed in this chapter describes the evolutionary 
strategic games that take place in the spaces between the boundaries that are created 
by the rules and lock-ins of the dominant regime. The distinction between outright 
power struggles and strategic games here lie in understanding that the actions and 
reactions of actors in the formative stages of the niche are examples of first-order 
reflexive rather than second-order reflexive (Grin, 2012). First order reflexivity 
relates to unintended consequences that occur during the processes of rule formation, 
retention or abandonment in socio-technical systems. Second order reflexivity is that 
critical process that actively evokes agency, direction and action. The result of first 
order reflexivity is very clear in the reactions of rowing actors in the representation of 
the creation of training mechanisms, mentioned in this chapter. The shielding 
activities for the niche often come from the first-order reflexive reactions of rowing 
actors to the rules that exist within and beyond the niche. This means that passive 
shielding provided by rowing actors results from their ability to find immediate 
solutions to system lock-ins and not from their contestation of the rules of the niche or 
the regime. Often this includes the incorporation of the positive externalities created 
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by another niche and altering them to suite context-specific problems or context- 
specific solutions generated through smart business models. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions on Niche Governance 
8.1 Review and Background 
We humans are dependent on the earth systems, which we used to think of as 
conquered and enslaved. The risks posed to ecological systems by our engagements 
with earth systems, for example, through the burning of fossil fuels, have manifested 
themselves in a variety of ways, including climate change.  Our emerging realization 
on the impact of these engagements, and their implications for ecological securities 
that have long sustained humans and many other species, is beginning to be translated 
into new political and social responses as much new scholarly work focused on 
transitioning to less damaging engagements. This means that ecological harms have 
become embedded in our social worlds. The scientific problems that used to be solved 
by innovation and technology, have begun to manifest as social issues and are now, 
rightfully so, dealt with by the addition of social scientific thought. This thesis built 
on an increasingly well- developed socio-technical transitions literature, and 
specifically the Multi-Level Perspective on Socio-technical Transition, by considering 
the question: How is agency constituted in the niche environment of a 
transitioning socio-technical system, which enables the establishment and 
strengthening of alternate developmental pathways, and what are the 
implications for socio-technical transitions? 
To better address this core question, a series of sub-questions were proposed around 
the theoretical framework that underpins this research: 
1) At niche level, which are the categories of actors that can be differentiated?
2) What methods do actors use in niche environments to exert power?
3) Under what conditions do actors contribute to the formulation and strengthening of
developmental trajectories within niche environments?
4) What are the conditions for ‘rowing’ and ‘steering’ within the niche environment?
These questions resulted from circular engagements with the theory on socio-
technical transitions and were shaped by an evolving compendium of scholarship that 
was presented mainly in Chapter 2. The theoretical basis that underpins this study 
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makes suggestions about various modalities of agency within the niche and the larger 
socio-technical system; about the types of actors that occur within socio-technical 
systems; about the interactions between actors and other actors, and between actors 
and their environment in socio-technical systems; about the developmental 
trajectories of socio-technical systems; and lastly about the properties of niches or 
protective spaces.  
In order to achieve theoretical coherence, and to address the question of actor 
governance at niche level, I borrowed from the governance literature that: focuses on 
the collaborative and networked elements of governance; with a distinct move away 
from command-control conceptions of rule-making captured in the observed 
dichotomy between the state and its citizens; toward a pluralised conception of rule- 
making as a communal effort among and between an array of actors (Castells, 2000; 
Shearing & Wood, 2003; Latour, 2005; Rhodes, 2007; Stenning, 2009; Zhong & 
Grabosky, 2009; Braithwaite, Charlesworth & Soares, 2012; Galaz et al., 2012; van 
Steden et al., 2013). In line with this conception of governance, one of the most 
important outcomes of this thesis was to consider the modalities of power in the 
exertion of agency as steering or rowing, power-taking and power-giving, toward the 
formation of regulative rules (legal or policy), normative rules (values and norms), 
and cognitive rules (symbols and ideologies) that underpin the developmental 
trajectories within niches. 
Guided by theory in this way, this thesis went beyond most existing research that 
generally approach the research from a macro perspective, but which neglects the 
institutional and interpersonal aspects of governance in the socio-technical niche.31 
The research followed a methodological approach that hinges on continuous loops of 
interaction between theory and the literature, as delineated in Chapter 3.  
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the findings of this thesis and offer 
some reflections on the implications of these findings for theory and practice. Section 
31 For example Schot and Geels (2007) focused on the mechanisms for radical change and characterized change in 
terms of four over-arching patterns dependent on the ways that the niche interacts with the regime. Others focused 
on active niche-building practices (Nill & Kemp, 2009), qualities of the niche (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005b; 
Raven, Schot & Berkhout, 2012) and conceptions of transition in its entirety, making the niche dependent on the 
regime and not considering the internal aspects of governance within the niche (Geels, 2005, 2014) 
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8.2 reflects on the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis and 
highlights some of the emerging themes that came from the research. Section 8.3 
considers what this means for socio-technical transitions theory and reflects on some 
of the bigger questions and debates that was touched on in Chapter 1. Section 8.4 
reflects on areas for future inquiry, based on the findings of this research, and lastly, 
section 8.5 offers some concluding remarks on this study and the state of socio-
technical transitions research. 
8.2 Emerging Themes from the Research 
8.2.1The Deterioration of the Dominant Regime 
In Chapter 5 I showed that the deterioration of the dominant regime was a crucial 
preceding factor to the development of the niche. This deterioration was observed in 
the actions of actors that no longer contributed to the positive feedback loops that fed 
the developmental trajectories of the regime. It was also observed in the accumulation 
of experienced negative externalities and problems within the regime by core regime 
members. These misalignments were neither aimed at supporting the niche 
environment nor were they prompted by the existence of the niche environment. The 
niche in this case, could be considered as the manifestation of a level of coordination 
that took place toward the articulation of selection pressures and the coordination of 
resources in a specific direction.  
The key attributes of this initial misalignment lies in unequal perceptions of selection 
pressures and negative externalities on the part of regime actors that lead to 
inconsistencies in the actions and mentalities of regime members. The outcomes of 
the regime, which were usually perceived in relative unity by regime actors, now 
became contested terrain. One of the manifestations of these contestations is 
regulatory rules that contradict the developmental trajectories of the dominant regime. 
Again these rules usually do not topple a regime, but rather play an important role in 
producing further misalignment of actors and results in divergent action on the part of 
regime members. Chapter 5 also showed that the availability of alternatives can only 
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aid in the production of misalignment once a fair amount of alignment already exists 
within the dominant regime.  
8.2.2 The Interaction between the Niche and the Regime 
In the fit-and-conform niche discussed in Chapter 5, boundaries for the development 
of the niche were set both through the regulatory mandate of the procurement 
programme and through the existing rules of the dominant regime. One of the most 
important factors in fit-and-conform niches is this tightrope of development in parallel 
with the developmental trajectories of the dominant regime. Smith and Raven (2012) 
found that fit-and-conform empowerment often results in improved alignment in the 
niche, especially as it relates to the existing industrial norms of the dominant regime. 
However, this they warn could be detrimental to the goals of sustainability focussed 
socio-technical transition due to the trade-offs that are made to ‘fit in’(Smith & 
Raven, 2012: 1030). This was echoed in the findings of Chapter 5 where the dominant 
regime served to create boundaries and facilitate the alignment of actors along the 
norms and goals of the dominant regime. In addition to this, and building on the 
conceptions of regime deterioration discussed above, a niche can obviously not serve 
every aspect of the regime. Those aspects or issues where the deterioration of positive 
feedback loops has resulted in enough stagnation to produce minimal resistance from 
regime actors, should they be challenged, are the aspects that fit-and-conform niches 
build on.  
In stretch-and-transform niches this type of alignment with the deteriorated aspects of 
the dominant regime becomes less important. The boundary work of the dominant 
regime still encapsulates niche development, however the development within these 
niches is based on the deficiencies of the regime and on finding ways to develop in 
the spaces between these boundaries, with complete disregard for the effect or the 
reaction of the dominant regime. Those actors that have been dependent on the 
outcomes created by the dominant regime, including core and non-core regime 
members, mostly observe the boundaries set by the dominant regime in stretch-and-
transform niches. In contrast to fit-and-conform niches, stretch-and-transform niches 
exist only when steering actors in the niche are able to decouple niche-level 
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developmental trajectories from the risks, rewards and developmental trajectories of 
the dominant regime by working around them rather than in alignment with them. 
8.2.3 Actor Proximity to the Regime 
As shown in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, non-core regime members occupy a special role in 
the empowerment of stretch-and-transform niches. Within these niches, the type of 
development that results deviates more from the dominant regime than the type of 
development that takes place within fit-and-conform niches because these actors can 
distance themselves from the regime processes, by which they were always guided 
but to which they never really contributed. The regime membership status and niche 
actions of the Western Cape Provincial Government and municipalities are testament 
to this. From Chapter 5 one can conclude that a non-core regime member can be 
created (the IPP office) by the regime in the presence of enough regime deterioration. 
Both the steering champions discussed in this thesis (the IPP office and the Western 
Cape Provincial Government) were non-regime actors and both of these actors’ 
steering ability rested to an extent on their regime membership. It would be nearly 
impossible for a core regime actor to accomplish the deviation from the regime within 
a niche achieved by these actors, and in the same light it would be nearly impossible 
for an external actor to steer with the same level of legitimacy and reach that these 
actors had as a result of their existing presence within the socio-technical system. An 
external actor would first have to accomplish this level of acceptance and reputation 
before they could steer niche developments.  
8.2.4 Steering Governance Practices 
In the fit-and-conform niche, the steering actor was an artificial non-core regime 
member that resulted from the inertia within the regime and the deterioration of the 
regime. As such, this steering actor only steered within the niche. In contrast, the 
steering actor in the stretch-and-transform niche steered more broadly and the steering 
that happened within the niche is a result of broader ideologies and a broader adoption 
of sustainability goals. This confusing difference lies in the absence of hegemonic 
agency held by the IPP office. They articulated and adjusted expectations, set forth 
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the monitoring methodologies for the ideals of the niche, and delineated this to other 
niche participants, however they did so, not through hegemonic agency, but rather 
through relational agency. When one considers the way in which the programme was 
established and the rules that came out of this process (see Chapter 4) it becomes 
evident that the shaping of the programme was more of an abandonment of 
hegemonic agency of top-down implementation of rules in favour of cooperative 
input. 
Even though the steering actor in the stretch-and-transform niche occupied a more 
hegemonic role within the system historically, the main methodology for steering in 
this case was also not through hegemonic agency. In contrast to the IPP office, the 
Western Cape Provincial Government had no strict set of rules for rowing actors, but 
rather adopted a narrative for change. As mentioned in Chapter 6, this narrative will 
possibly result in some form of regulation or regulatory rules, however, the initial 
work in this narrative has been incredibly important for this steering actor.  
The work done by this framing, opened up both their own mentalities and the 
mentalities of other actors. The observations made in Chapter 6 were made at a point 
where the steering actor was busy delineating the direction of the niche, creating 
meaning, goals and values, before they could convey this to rowing actors. In short, 
they were figuring out what they wanted. The cycles of stocktaking, evaluation and 
solidification are testament to this process. In the absence of regulative niche rules, 
the steering actor implemented a set of cognitive and normative rules to guide the 
realisation of regulative rules. This was done through relational agency, by 
identifying, connecting and tapping into the networks within the niche. Often the 
second action - connecting actors onto a network- is a major part of this process and 
thus the steering actor also exhibits a level of networked agency. The main purpose of 
this type of action lies in finding the most acceptable blueprint for action, for the most 
possible actors. Because of the inability of the niche to absorb internal contestations, 
niche steering actors tend to avoid this. In this way state actors behave very similar to 
market steering actors. Look for example at the steering of the international wine 
market that was discussed in Chapter 7, here the ‘rules’ might appear regulative but 
they have a normative-cognitive function, making new things important in the market 
and changing the ingredients of ‘the competitive edge’.  
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8.2.5 Rowing Governance Practices 
Because of the relational and networked agency exerted by steering actors within the 
niche, rowing actors are, from the very beginning, participants in the governing 
processes of the niche. However these actors do not have to be concerned with 
regulation as a necessary outcome of their action. Often, these actors produce 
cognitive and normative rules through the choices that they make. For these actors the 
development of networks and the coordination of resources are of utmost importance.  
The processes of network-building accomplished by rowing actors coincide with the 
processes of network-building by steering actors. Therefore, many of these networks 
will overlap and feed off one another. Because of the absence of regulation as an 
ultimate goal for rowing actors, steering actors need to tap into the needs of rowing 
actors in order to benefit from their networks. Because of these interdependencies, the 
relationship between steering and rowing actors is not a bi-polar, command-control 
relationship. Rowing actors also guide steering actors by responding to the normative 
and cognitive rules that they put forth, and by responding to the larger selection 
pressures within the socio-technical regime. These responses then prime reactions 
from the steering actors within the niche, minding the boundaries set by the dominant 
regime. 
The relational agency exerted by rowing actors differ from that exerted by steering 
actors. Rowing actors contribute in a very real way to the shielding and nurturing 
properties of the niche. Often the ability of a rowing actor, especially an external 
market actor, to realise a gap in the market and successfully act on it requires that they 
actively shield and nurture the segment of the market that they want to develop. This 
has no immediate implication for the creation of regulation and might never have 
regulatory consequences, however it allows for further offshoots and progress to be 
made.32  What is more, through this type of activity they also develop corners of the 
market that were previously left untouched.33  
32 See the example of Maxx PV in Chapter 7. 
33 See the example of Ishack in Chapter 7. 
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8.2.6 The Importance of Framing 
At the formative stages of the niches observed in this thesis, one of the most critical 
findings was that framing is incredibly important. A lot of agency is rooted in the way 
in which a problem, or a solution, is framed. Framing is also one of the main methods 
for structuring a niche and translates into normative and cognitive rules in the absence 
of regulative rules for the niche.34 The entire methodology for the development of the 
Western Cape electricity sector niche relied on the narrative that was created for the 
niche. This narrative framed problems and solutions, justifying the place of the niche 
and priming actors to explore a variety of different possible developmental 
trajectories. The evolutionary development of the niche was grounded in the framing 
that was set for by the steering actor. 
The reactive nature of framing shifts between rowing and steering actors, depicted in 
Chapter 7. This chapter shows how actors enable and resist change, starting with a 
shared diagnostic framing - often in the form of a shared problem with the dominant 
regime - and differences in prognostic framing, resulting in steering actors having to 
shift either their prognostic framing or their motivational framing of the problem or 
the solution to make it acceptable to rowing actors. The boundaries created by the 
dominant regime also translate into the framing possibilities available for actors in the 
face of regime deterioration. As proven by the example of NUMSA and various other 
change resistant core-regime actors, the adjustment of the framing of these core-
regime actors is incredibly difficult to accomplish. Even in cases where they have 
already observed the negative externalities of the regime, their prognostic framing is 
unlikely to include the abandonment of the outcome that they enjoy from the regime.  
At regime level, the observation of selection pressures and problems in the regime 
differs between actors because they no longer frame problems in the same way. If the 
majority does not accept the diagnostic framing that predates the creation of policy, 
then the prognostic framing of policy becomes contested terrain. 
34 Here and above it is important to understand that by considering the absence of regulative rules for the niche, I 
do not assume that there are no regulatory rules governing the niche, as the regulatory rules from the regime that 
impact the niche have a profound effect on the development of the niche. This is discussed earlier in this chapter 
and in all of the substantive chapters as the boundaries for action. By observing a relative lack of regulatory rules I 
mean that there are no (or relatively few) regulatory rules specifically for the niche that governs the spaces 
between the boundaries set by regime rules. 
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8.2.7 The Formulation Developmental Trajectories 
In order to understand the contribution of actors to the formation of developmental 
trajectories within the niche, I look specifically at the ways in which different rules 
are developed and transferred at niche level. For fit-and-conform niches, the 
transference of rules from the dominant regime provides the boundaries for action 
within the niche. There is also a critical alignment that takes place between some of 
the normative goals of the dominant regime and the objectives of the niche. In the 
niche fit-and-conform studied here, alignment happened with the normative goals of 
job creation and industrialisation, which also structured the regime. Transferring rules 
in this way, the niche actors were able to create motivations for its existence within 
the logic of the dominant regime. This logic is not likely to change any time soon so it 
is the most stable anchor that the niche could have cast. This anchoring in the 
dominant regime does not take place within stretch-and-transform niches beyond the 
normative goals of sustainability, which is much less stable. However these goals 
allow for more drastic deviation from the dominant regime.  
Stretch-and-transform niches have an open-ended process of network formation, or at 
least the one viewed in Chapters 6 and 7. Because only one stretch-and-transform 
niche was observed, it would be difficult for me to conclude that all these niches will 
form their developmental trajectories in the same way, however, I can conclude that 
this is one of the ways that work. The open-ended cycles of stocktaking, evaluation 
and later solidification of steering actors allows for rowing actors to be very powerful 
in the creation developmental trajectories. This is so because rowing actors, especially 
external market actors, do not enter into as many contestations as steering actors do. 
The initial processes of rule formation rely on this non-aggressive, solution-finding 
mentality because of the heightened search function of steering actors. 
The potential role of intermediaries in socio-technical transitions must not be 
underestimated, because they contribute in the purest way to this open-ended process 
of rule formation. They indirectly affect selection pressure by allowing other actors to 
act in a shielding capacity, while they themselves nurture the network by identifying 
and developing path-breaking innovations. The action of alignment is simplified by 
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their single-minded goal. They are thus specially adapted to the creation of rules that 
are in line with the needs of rowing actors, and of which steering actors would 
approve. As I have shown in Chapter 5, rules that are created in a top-down 
hegemonic manner that contradict the dominant regime, cause more problems than 
they solve for the regime. Rules that are created in this way will be just as problematic 
for niche environments. Rules created through the interplay between steering and 
rowing actors as described in Chapter 6 and 7, can be considered to be more stable.  
8.3 Theoretical Insights 
8.3.1 Deterioration of the dominant regime 
The MLP takes account of the role of the deterioration of the dominant regime, 
observed as both overt changes in the system and abstract new rules within the system 
and takes note of this in the expositions that are offered for developmental trajectories 
within the niche. The major difference between my research and the MLP lies in the 
point of observation: the MLP mainly and most attentively observes transition at the 
point when the niche breaks through into the dominant regime. I observed niches 
before they were ready to break through into the dominant regime.  
The MLP conceptualises the niche as something that emerges at the fringes of the 
regime (Geels, 2005), and breaks through either because of the strength of the niche 
or because of the deterioration of the regime, or a combination of the two. There is 
thus a gap here in understanding how the deterioration of the regime leads to the 
initial formation of the niche before it is allowed to break through into the dominant 
regime. Again, MLP theorists probably won’t argue about the influence of this factor 
as it is hinted at in various places in the literature (Geels & Schot, 2007; Geels et al., 
2016; Geels, 2004b), however it is never adequately explored.  
As explained above, the deterioration and misalignment of the dominant regime was 
observed as three inter-related loops of cause and effect: the unequal perceptions of 
regime actors of shifting selection pressures and negative externalities of the regime; 
the manifestation of the resulting contested terrains in the form of regulatory rules; 
and the availability of technological alternatives. These insights contribute not only to 
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the way in which the formation of the niche is understood by transition theorists but 
also to the way in which regime change is understood. The MLP provides key insights 
into the way that regimes usually respond to selection pressures and negative 
externalities - through incremental advancement (Schot & Geels, 2007). My findings 
describe the decay of the regime, should these incremental advancements not succeed. 
This realisation effectively adjusts the timeline of observation in transitions theory to 
include the initial misalignments of the dominant regime more carefully. It also 
decouples some of this misalignment from the work of the niche and provides a more 
precise point at which alternative technologies begin to be viewed as acceptable 
options to the members of the regime.  
8.3.2 Niche Regime Interactions: the Creation of Boundaries 
Path-breaking innovations, as argued by evolutionary transition theorists, tend to 
develop within niches that can shield these innovations from the selection pressures of 
the dominant regime. Niche scholars have studied the position of niches in relation to 
the regime, being either external or internal (Schot and Geels, 2007); the level of 
stability within niches in terms of rules and networks; and the processes of niche 
building (Nill & Kemp, 2009). In this conception of the niche, transition scholars take 
account of the fact that the regime does not always have the same level of impact on 
one niche as it does on another.35 One the most important factors of niche regime 
interactions, shown in the substantive chapters of this thesis, was the creation of 
boundaries for the niche by the regime. 
For fit-and-conform niches, I have shown that the dominant regime provides 
boundaries, but also allows for alignment with the regime on specific issues. Those 
issues form the foundations of these niches and are considered as the positive 
feedback loops within the dominant regime, which has deteriorated to such an extent 
that niche development contradicting their pathways of development would not be 
contested by the dominant regime. This points again to the importance of 
35 Schot and Geels postulated that there are four types of niches that develop from four types of evolutionary 
patterns (Schot & Geels, 2007: 618). In this work the different types of niches that resulted from different 
evolutionary processes were aggregated according to their ‘position’ within the market, relative to the involvement 
of the dominant regime or rather relative to the amount of ‘shielding’ that the niche achieves from the dominant 
regime (see Chapter 2). 
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understanding the initial misalignment of the dominant regime, especially in cases 
where fit-and-conform niches start appearing.  
8.3.3 Actor Proximity to the Regime and the categorisation of actors 
Just as actors can be defined by their proximity to the dominant regime, so too can 
they be defined by their proximity to the niche. This thesis has shown that the way in 
which actors cooperate to produce positive outcomes for the niche is key to the 
success of the niche. Actors have existing roles in society, that precedes the existence 
of the niche. These roles do not fall away because of the niche, and so inhibit and 
empower actors in specific ways to act toward the outcomes of the niche. It is 
therefore important to take into account the categorisation of actors in relation to the 
niche, in order to understand the levers of change toward developing a specific niche. 
In order for non-core regime members to successfully bring about change, coalitions 
have to form that actively seek to change strategies, initiatives and power 
relationships in the existing regime (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005: 1505). The 
type of inertia provided by non-core regime members represents a whole new power 
relationship that transcends the boundaries of the niche and the regime. The agency of 
these actors are not found within the legitimate structures within the dominant regime 
or within the possession of resources, rather, the regime structures provide the 
boundaries for the activities of these actors as discussed above. These actors in turn 
usually steer the development of the niche bound by the regime boundaries to which 
they are still linked.  In fit-and-conform niches this level of steering is all that they 
can do. However, in stretch-and-transform niches, their non-core regime status makes 
it easy for these actors to also tap into external forms of authority and external 
resources and doing so begin bringing new issues to the table, that condition the 
structures of demand and supply in new ways. They can do this because they have 
historically not been core contributors to the outcomes of the regime; historically the 
regime has provided guidelines for action, just as it does in transition. This is in line 
with, and an elaboration on propositions made by Smith, Stirling and Berkhout, who 
suggested that an actors position within the regime, i.e. an actor’s regime membership 
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status, affects the actors ability to alter the flow of events (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 
2005: 1505) 
For socio-technical transitions scholarship, this builds on the work that Avelino and 
Wittmayer started toward more nuanced categorisation of actors. They argued that 
most socio-technical transition theories are plagued by issues of ambiguity because of 
their large categorical boxes, which lack consistency in differentiations between 
aggregations of actors (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016: 630). According to them, this 
lack of clarity translates into the way in which theories, such as the MLP, 
conceptualises power and empowerment. The differences in the ways that non-core 
regime members empower other actors within the niche based on their proximity to 
the dominant regime are concrete proof of this statement. 
8.3.4 Steering and Rowing in the Niche: the exertion of power 
When studying niche environments, one must realise that the embedded pathways for 
producing outcomes in the dominant regime hold embedded power that is exerted by 
the actors that play out the roles of the dominant regime. Because of this, one of the 
first places to look for the exertion of niche building or niche supporting power, is in 
the deterioration of these networks. As Chapter 5 has shown, much of the agency to 
act toward the niche environment became available once the deterioration of the 
dominant regime had begun. These initial exertions of authority that make the niche 
possible might in no way be directed at the formation of a market space that is 
unfavourable to the dominant regime. Sometimes this deterioration can be the result 
of divergent action, all seemingly toward the dominant regime. Thus, the first method 
of power allowing for the niche, is disagreement over the core path dependencies 
within the regime, by powerful actors.  
Steering governance at niche level is likened in this thesis to the empowerment of 
actors. As discussed above, stretch-and-transform empowerment leads to innovations 
that undermine the dominant regime and transmit niche-driven institutional changes 
into re-structured regimes. Here niches influence their selection environments and 
favourably affect the subsequent changes to the socio-technical system. Fit-and-
conform empowerment takes place when an innovation, that was originally viewed as 
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path-breaking, becomes incremental because of broader socio-political implications. 
In these cases, the cumulative economic impact might be broader than that of ‘path-
breaking’ innovations, even though the innovations happen parallel to the dominant 
regime. Rowing is conceived of in relation to steering practices as reactions and 
interactions and as the groundwork governance done by actors that do not necessarily 
provide the structures for the functions of the niche but produce important outcomes 
within the niche, and in so doing affect the work of steering actors.  
The data presented in this thesis shows a specific point in the lives of steering actors. 
For the fit-and-conform niche, the artificially created steering actor had to rely on 
relational methods of agency because they were devoid of any real hegemonic power. 
In the stretch-and-transform niche, the steering actor also had to rely on relational and 
networked modalities of agency. The reason underpinning this similarity lies in 
understanding the importance of negotiation in the niche space, and it also explains 
why non-core regime members are better suited to be steering actors in socio-
technical niches. The establishment of regulatory rules within the niche is a risk 
because the niche has a low capacity to absorb any internal tensions. Thus, this 
process of negotiation is crucial to the formation of not only the rules that become 
solidified in regulation but also contributes to the formation of networks within the 
niche environment. This holds major implications for socio-technical transitions 
scholars as it indicates the place where positive feedback loops start forming within 
the niche. It also shows what the role of steering actors is in kick-starting these 
developmental trajectories.  
The role of rowing actors in contributing to these positive feedback loops must be 
considered. As discussed above, the relational and networked agency of steering 
actors demands the participation of rowing actors. In order for this participation to be 
accomplished, steering actors must, to a certain extent, align themselves with rowing 
actors. During the formative phases of niche development, rowing actors are not as 
restricted by steering actors as they arguably become once regulative rules have been 
created specifically for the development of the niche. This gap allows rowing actors 
to act in unregulated spaces, form routines and translate this into normative and 
cognitive rules for the niche. 
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8.3.5 The Importance of Framing 
Framing and discourse has different effects in different socio-technical contexts. From 
core regime actor’s framings one can deduce what stock they place in the dominant 
regime, by looking at the facet of the regime that remains protected. In the case of 
NUMSA, this was the socio-economic ideal of job creation and socialist methods of 
financial accumulation. Focusing on the framing of actors in socio-technical 
transitions studies serves to provide at least some context to some of the messy 
reactions and interactions within socio-technical transitions. The unpredictable 
reactions of rowing actors at niche level can be better understood if one considers the 
ways in which they framed problems and solutions to these problems. Geels suggests 
that one of the major ways in which regime actors resist change is through the 
adoption of different types of framing (Geels, 2014). In line with this finding, the 
work done by this thesis extends the role of framing into the niche level, showing that 
one of the major ways in which niche actors implement change is through the 
adoption of different types of framing. I have also found different framing loops when 
looking at the role of rowing actors, which means that the decision to change ones 
framing can either be a first-order reflexive reaction or a second-order reflexive 
reaction. 
8.3.6 Developmental Trajectories 
A trajectory within a socio-technical system is viewed as a sequence of four 
successive mechanisms: the structural conditioning of actors in the system by rules 
and institutions, social interaction between actors, structural elaborations where rules 
and institutions are shaped, and lastly the acceptance and retention of these rules and 
institutions (Geels et al., 2016: 897).  For niches, the structural conditioning by rules 
and institutions forms the boundaries of the niche. This is the extent of the structural 
conditioning of rules in stretch-and-transform niches; however in fit-and-conform 
niches this becomes a two-way process, with the niche establishing roots in the 
external factors that structurally condition regimes. The second third and mechanisms 
of trajectory formation are crucially important in niches: social interaction and 
structural elaboration.  
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These mechanisms for niches indicate the processes through which the niche 
developments diverge from regime developments, and take place in loops, with the 
last mechanism being the acceptance of rules and institutions. These loops mostly 
consist of interplays between actors that shape the normative and cognitive rules of 
the niche so that regulatory rules can be aligned with the outcome of these 
interactions. Crucial to these interactions is the network along which ideas, norms, 
things, and skills become communicated. This indicates that Geels’s dynamic 
interactions between rule regimes and actors, observed in two feedback loops - actor 
structuring and social learning (Geels, 2004) - remain important at niche level, 
however the processes of actor structuring are at the core of the way in which niche 
rules are formed. Social learning, or the transferences of rules is only important in 
setting boundaries and in the later structuring of the niche and possibly at the 
breakthrough of the niche.  
8.4 Areas for Future Enquiry 
The work done in this thesis builds on the work done by scholars of socio-technical 
transition, rather than breaking down the analytical frameworks that exists. In doing 
so it opens some specific areas for deeper analysis into the functioning of socio-
technical systems and the ways in which they transition. The work is rooted in 
understanding the role of actor governance in the processes of socio-technical 
transition as observed in niche spaces, and consequently most of the theoretical 
additions provided in this thesis centres on issues of governance. There have, 
however, been chance encounters with the broader functioning of the socio-technical 
system as this precedes my understandings of the niche environment or as it informs 
the governance debates attended to in this thesis. In this section I elaborate on the 
avenues that have been opened up for analysis in socio-technical transitions 
scholarship by suggesting how this work could be built on in future scholarship. 
One of the interesting findings of this thesis, which does not directly relate to niche 
level governance, is the importance of and mechanisms for the deterioration of the 
dominant regime that precedes the formation of niches.In this thesis I have merely 
laid the groundwork in this regard. The initial deterioration of the dominant regime 
probably includes more factors than the three discussed by me, and thus should be an 
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important avenue for research. The implications of a nuanced understanding of this 
process could be vitally important to policy-makers and regime actors that find 
themselves in the midst of a decaying regime.  
The role of artisan training in stimulating niche driven outcomes has been explored to 
some extent in this thesis, however, this remains a very important area for future 
inquiry. This thesis has shown that much of the “groundwork” of niche formation 
happens through semi-formal training schemes that allow for the population of 
practicing professionals to grow substantially. Future research might focus on the 
effect that these schemes have on the stabilisation of developmental trajectories 
within the niche, and on the way in which practices and procedures are developed 
through these channels, that later become requirements in a market.  
Another area for further elaboration relates to the categorisation of actors within 
transitions studies. As I have shown, the categorisation of actors in this thesis aided in 
providing analytical depth in understanding the way in which different actors in 
different niches interact with the regime and empower other actors within the niche. 
The categorisation of actors also had the important function of allowing me to 
differentiate between modalities of power observed as different types of agency. This 
was a good start, however, there is a lot of space for further investigation here. Future 
studies might conceive of different categorisations that, for example, completely 
discard the state-non-state dichotomy. The findings of such a study would be 
incredibly valuable, however very difficult to accomplish as this type of study would 
require an analytical distancing from the literature. That said, the catagorisation of 
actors in the research and development space, especially with regards to the impact of 
the triadic relationship between the state, the private sector and the academic 
community could produce significantly important results.  
Even though this research centred on the activities of rowing and steering actors, this 
can be elaborated upon, especially with regards to the role of rowing actors within the 
niche. These elaborations might include a stretch-and-transform niche for which 
regulative rules already exist. The limitations of a doctoral thesis meant that I was 
mainly able to consider rowing in stretch-and-transform niches. This type of work for 
a fit-and-conform niche would also be a relevant avenue for future scholarship.   
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8.5 Final Remarks 
It is not possible to give a static definition for where a niche starts and where it stops, 
due to the specialisation and differentiation that takes place within the niche. More 
importantly, it should not be possible. The complexity of a complex phenomenon is 
artificially reduced the very moment it is artificially bound by a defined/closed 
analytical model. The boundary issue is more empirical than theoretical because the 
functionalities of social systems in different socio-technical sectors look differently: 
 The advantage of looking explicitly at socio-technical systems is that the co-
evolution of technology and society, of form and function becomes the focus of 
attention (Geels, 2004: 902). 
This thesis has created artificial boundaries for two niches, and observed the form and 
function that results within these observed structures through the creation of meaning 
and rules. It found that agency is constituted differently in different niche 
environments through the contestation of rules, initially relying more on normative 
and cognitive rule contestations than regulative rule contestations. This is so because, 
within a new terrain, the actors that steer the governance of niches have to undergo an 
initial process of goal delineation. This goal delineation requires broad ideological 
shifts, but also the definition and quantification of elements of avenues for change 
that can be monitored later. The major contestation for both types of niches here relate 
to achieving a level of synergy with the dominant regime. For stretch-and-transform 
niches this synergy dictates the boundaries of the niche. The synergy captured in the 
net-consumer model for SSEG was a matter of great contestation, but necessary for 
the survival of the niche. Fit-and-conform niches are much more dependent on these 
synergies that form; more so than just the boundaries for development. For this reason 
these niches anchor themselves outward in the spaces inside and beyond the dominant 
regime. The internal processes of rule formation rely on networked and relation 
agency rather than on overt expressions of hegemonic agency. 
The implication for socio-technical transitions studies is a deeper understanding of the 
importance and mechanisms of agency at regime level in socio-technical transitions. 
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The differentiation between rules that form because of the existing regime rules and 
rules that are able to form despite the existence of these rules highlights the pluralised 
modalities of agency within the niche. From a relational perspective on niche 
formation, one must then add that networks within protected spaces do not create their 
own boundaries, but that the dynamic interaction with regime rules create these 
boundaries for them. The usefulness of these boundaries differs as explained above. A 
major implication for transitions studies lies in realising the absence of automated 
responses in the initial processes of niche formation. The amount of work that has to 
be done toward the agreements reached through networked and relational agency at 
niche level stands in stark contrast to the culmination of ‘small events’ and 
contingency in the processes that create lock-in. At the core of this lies the fact that 
niche rules have not yet gained ‘lives of their own’. These rules have not yet formed 
offshoots or become useful to enough actors that they become self-maintaining 
occurrences in socio-technical systems. Arguably, the point at which these rules 
exhibit the autopilot functions of regime rules is the point at which the niche could 
break through into the broader socio-technical environment and the point at which 
regime rules aren’t mere boundaries but become contested factors for the niche. 
Crucially the findings of this thesis indicate that humans are not powerless in 
governing the way in which we have become dependent on earth systems. The goal of 
creating sustainable pathways for transition in the niche environment of electrical 
socio-technical systems is not enslaved by the boundaries for life and development 
dictated by the existence of carbon dependence. Rather this goal plays out in the 
spaces between these boundaries and feeds off the larger social, economic and 
political forces that keep our carbon-dependent regimes intact. This realisation should 
re-orientate sustainable transitions scholarship to focus on these crucial spaces for 
human intervention, rather than ponder the limits and problems set forth by the way in 
which humans depend on natural systems. The evolutionary implication of this 
argument also means that we might have to abandon our immediate concern with the 
exact products of sustainable transition beyond the normative goal itself, because the 
level of plural governance that goes into producing these outcomes necessitates 
processes of trial and error that can never produce the immediately defined 
sustainable goals. One must thus also realise that sustainable development is more of 
a means to an end than an end in itself, as the end becomes defined through the 
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iterative process of negotiating social trade-offs with the survival of the natural world, 
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Appendix	1:	Actor	Categories	
Actor Categories relating to Chapter 5 











State x x x Non-core 




State x x x Non-core 









x x x x x x External 
IPP’s Market x x x External 
Ishack Market x x x External 
Marks and 
Spencer 




Market x x x External 




x x x Core 




















Sola Market x x x External 
Viliera Market x x x External 
Wesgro State x x x Non-core 
Woolworth
s 
Market x x x Non-core/ external 
Actor Categories Relating to Chapter 6 








State x x x Non-core 
City of 
Cape Town 
State x x x Non-core/ external 
CSIR 3rd Sector x x x x x Non-core/ External 
DOE State x x x Core 
Helen Zille State x x x Non-core/ External 
SALGA 3rd sector/ 
market 
x x x External 
SANEDI State x x x External 
Treasury State x x x Core/ Non-core 
UCT 
(CSAG) 




State x x x Non-core 
Actor Categories Relating to Chapter 7 
Actor Group Regime  
Membership 























ANC State x x x Core 




State x x x Core 
DME State x x x Core 
DTI State x x x Core 
Eskom State/ 
Market 
x x x x Core 
Google Market x x x External 
Guptas Communit
y 
x x x Core 
IPP Unit State/ 
Market 
x x x External and non-core 
IPP’s Market x x x External 
NERSA State x x x Core 
NPC State x x x Core 
President 
Zuma 




State x x x Core 
SAPVIA Market/ 
3rd sector 
x x x External 
SAREC Market/ 
3rd sector 
x x x External 
SAWEA Market/ 
3rd sector 
x x x External 
Treasury State x x x Core 
Weber 
Wentzel 





State x x x Non-core 
